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Abstract 
 
 Recent emphasis and attention by thinkers, media pundits, and politicians 
on terrorism requires new, critical evaluation of the processes by which terrorism 
is understood.  By investigating the concept of biopolitics, as developed 
specifically through Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, new insights into 
the interactions between terrorism, politics, and religion can emerge.  Most 
notably, the attempts to explain terror as simply an economic problem, an 
excessive form of violence, and/or as religious fervency gone awry rely on 
embedded biopolitical concepts.  The continual attempts to solve terrorism 
through increased biopolitical strategies, thereby making terrorism a problem for 
biopolitics, only further substantiate the crisis that biopolitics brings about in the 
first place.  Carefully investigating the relationship between biopolitical theory 
and religious concepts uncovers those very motivations of defining terrorism in 
certain forms (economically problematic, excessively violent, religiously 
passionate), and the continued insistence that terrorism is another problem to be 
solved, like any other political issue.  Instead, I propose that by taking the 
religious concepts of biopolitics seriously, we can reimagine terror as heresy, 
	 iii 
requiring a different political calculus articulating terrorism not as a problem for 
biopolitics to fix but instead as a problem of biopolitics. 
 iv 
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Introduction:  The Power of Terror 
	
In March of 2014, a group1 dressed in all black and using knives and 
swords rushed into the Kunming Railway Station killing twenty-nine civilians 
and injuring approximately 140 more.  Police subsequently killed four of the 
assailants, and arrested one, while the other attackers were captured days later 
by authorities.  In the immediate aftermath, no known terrorist organizations 
took responsibility for the attack, but many in the media quickly reported that 
those who perpetrated the attack belonged to the community of Uyghur 
Muslims.  While a minor terrorist incident by strictly numerical standards, the 
repercussions of this attack provide insights into central issues within terrorist 
studies and contemporary geopolitics.  Amidst the tragedy and loss of life, a 
provocative dialogue of the event rose to the surface regarding the classification 
of the Kunming attack as either terrorism or something else.   
The New York Times in March of 2014 detailed the transition by the US 
State Department as they officially adopted the language of terrorism.2  In the 
words of Jen Psaki, a spokesperson for the State Department,  
																																																						
1 Some put the number of attackers at 8 while other sources say 10.  
  
2 Didi Kristen Tatlow, “After Prodding, U.S. State Department Labels Kunming 
Attack ‘Terrorism’,” New York Times, March 4, 2014, accessed March 25, 2014, 
	 2 
Well, we acknowledge that China has characterized the incident as a 
terror act. We extend our condolences for the loss of life. We of course 
oppose terrorism in all of its forms, and based on the information reported 
by the Chinese media, this appears to be an act of terrorism targeting 
random members of the public. We don’t have any other independent 
information, but again, we of course deplore violence intentionally 
directed at innocent civilians in any case, regardless of whether — 
regardless of the cause. So that is where we are.3 
	
 The article continues with a Beijing reporter questioning Psaki on the 
hesitancy of the US  to officially label the Kunming attack as “terrorism.”4  
Additionally, an article from the China’s state press agency Xinhua speaks of 
world leaders joining in condemnation of the attacks, and while this news 
agency pressed the point of terrorism fairly heavily, none of the world leaders 
cited specifically called the act terrorism.5  In fact, in a convoluted statement, 
Russian president Vladimir Putin called the Kunming attack a “criminal act,” 
while simultaneously promising further partnerships in counterterrorism efforts.6 
The eventual concession by the State Department in calling the act 
terrorism only generates further turmoil regarding the nature and scope of 
terrorism in modern international discourse.  First, it highlights the reality that 
																																																						
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/after-prodding-u-s-state-
department-labels-kunming-attack-terrorism.  
 
3 Ibid.  
 
4 For a full transcript of the conversation between Jen Psaki and Bingru Wang, see 
“State Department Daily Briefing,” March 3, 2014, 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/03/20140304295315
.html. 
 
5 “International Community Condemns Terrorist Attack in China,” March 2, 
2014, accessed March 25th, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/02/c_133154326.htm.   
 
6 Ibid.   
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we possess no representative definition of terrorism, in either domestic or 
international form. This is even more unnerving when put into the context of an 
ongoing global “War on Terror” that lacks a fundamental and comprehensive 
means of defining the very object of this war.  Second, the international 
community lacks any comprehensive and objective way by which to differentiate 
“acts of terror” from terrorism.7  Are the two related in some meaningful way, or 
separated by political, theoretical, or rhetorical lines? Third, what conditions, 
ideas, and strategic consequences motivate the hesitancy or confidence for 
naming an act “terrorism?”  On the one hand, one can ignore these questions as 
unnecessary parsing of the terminology and claim that Chinese and American 
relations are strained for a variety of complicated reasons, resulting in a general 
attitude of suspicion.  On the other, the US and other human rights groups have 
continually cited China’s treatment of the Uyghur people as notably atrocious, 
intimating that this attack serves as a horrific reminder of the capability of those 
who have been repressed in such extreme ways to resort to violence.8  
Ignoring these questions and concerns as unproductive nitpicking has its 
attraction.  However, we are still left with some mystery surrounding this attack 
and its consequences; most notably why China remains so adamant this was, in 
fact, terrorism.  This unwavering insistence on the act being terror suggests 
																																																						
7 One might be reminded of the Clinton administration’s failure to call Rwanda a 
genocide, and instead opting for the less declarative claim that they were “acts of 
genocide.”   
 
8 Hannah Beech, “Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on 
Separatist Muslim Uighurs,” Time, March 1, 2014, accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://time.com/11687/deadly-terror-attack-in-southwestern-china-blamed-on-
separatist-muslim-uighurs/.   
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political capital accompanying the label of terrorism in a way unlike criminality 
or simply an “act of terror.” The naming of an act as “terrorism” imparts 
discursive coding about human rights, political action, military justification, and 
so on.   
The Kunming attack underscores a central issue in the world of terrorism 
studies:  The failure of defining terrorism produces unintended political 
consequences.  The definition of terrorism, and acts that constitute it, carries 
profound political power.  The ability to enact new political partnerships or 
justify violence occurs when the governing officials and political elites label an 
act terrorism.  As a side effect, such naming power also carries the ability to 
constitute other activities and then codify appropriate actions in response.  
Should something be merely criminal, as the case may be regarding Kunming, a 
certain set of actions are permissible.  While claiming something as terror not 
only constitutes and codifies what one may do in the face of terror, but 
simultaneously co-constitutes other violent acts as criminal, hate crimes, 
narcotics related, domestic violence, etc.   Each act of naming closes off and 
opens new discursive territories for a litany of other related terms and claims.   
 The term “terrorism” constitutes something special vis-à-vis other things 
such as criminality or even hate crime.  Terrorism represents a central and 
substantial organizing tool for politics.  It is like a strainer through which 
disparate political discourse and ideas pass.   
 It is not surprising that in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election, 
democratic hopeful Bernie Sanders made several comments during debates that 
	 5 
connected terrorism with climate change.9  Likewise, in a speech following the 
attack on a nightclub in Florida Donald Trump made the following remarks:  
A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub not only because he 
wanted to kill Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens 
because of their sexual orientation.  It is a strike at the heart and soul of 
who we are as a nation.  It is an assault on the ability of free people to live 
their lives, love who they want to and express their identity.  It is an attack 
on the right of every single American to live in peace and safety in their 
own country.  We need to respond to this attack on American as one 
united people – with force, purpose and determination.  But the currently 
politically correct response cripples our ability to talk and think and act 
clearly.  
 
He continues even more emphatically, “The bottom line is that the only 
reason the killer was in America in the first place was because we allowed his 
family to come here.”10 Trump connects the ideas of terrorism to sexual identity, 
to the right of security, to the debates around political correctness, and to 
questions surrounding immigration. 
 Terrorism is not merely a “hot button” issue, rather, terrorism has become 
a central point by which we organize and distribute meaning across the entirety 
of the political spectrum. Every potential political issue can attach to the purview 
of terrorism in some way: financial markets, drug trade, free movement of goods, 
migration, security, war, climate change, food distribution, and biological studies 
all intersect with terrorism.   
																																																						
9 Nick Gas, “Sanders Doubles Down: ‘Climate Change is Directly Related to the 
Rise of Global Terrorism,” Politico November 14th, 2014, accessed April 11th, 2015, 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/live-from-des-moines/2015/11/bernie-
sanders-climate-change-terrorism-215874 
 
10 “Donald Trump Addresses Terrorism, Immigration and National Security,” 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-addresses-
terrorism-immigration-and-national-security This press release has since been 
taken down from the official website.  
	 6 
 Rather than attempt (and fail) at providing yet another definition of 
terrorism, changing the way in which we examine the topic provides insight into 
this most nebulous and prolific field.  Instead of asking how people become 
radicalized, or the ways in which religion leads to violence, we should be asking a 
set of questions of why and how terrorism has come to dominate the field of politics in 
such a far-reaching fashion.  I contend that the nature of neoliberal politics in recent 
years contributes to this phenomenon, particularly the rise to dominance of 
organizing political power around the management of life in the most abstract 
form.  By managing life, biopower centralizes terrorism as a primary and 
fundamental problem for ongoing political institutions of all varieties.  Yet, 
biopolitics ultimately cannot solve the problem of terror, because terror exposes 
and undermines the foundational aspects of biopower.  Biopower makes 
terrorism a problem that can be overcome, yet I argue that terrorism only arises 
because of a series of paradoxical issues embedded in biopolitical motivations, 
actions, and philosophical organization.  Biopolitics regards terrorism as a 
problem for which solutions are available, yet I hope to show how terrorism is, in 
fact, a problem of biopolitics.   
 Carl Schmitt’s declaration that the political ultimately comes down to the 
friend and enemy divide provides some basic parameters in attempting to 
uncover why terrorism has arisen to such political prominence in contemporary 
biopolitical formations.  Obviously, in this moment of history the figure of the 
terrorist serves as the defining enemy for the West.  Likewise, the emboldened 
citizens who seek war against this nefarious force come to constitute the “friend” 
within Schmitt’s model.  However, the enemy does not arrive independent from 
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the confines of history.  No concept of enemy exists detached and abstracted 
from real human experience.  Rather, there are series of historical enemies, which 
over time take on an essential category.  At different times this concept of enemy 
has taken on demonstrably different meanings: The Communist, the Fascist, and 
so forth.  One could trace a series of historical moments all defined by different 
enemies, with different agendas and political properties.  Every people, nation, 
city, and community goes through a series of enemies, never abstracted and 
always continuously subject to historical context.   
 This contemporary enemy (terrorism) has much in common with previous 
incarnations of the enemy while at the same time producing new and contrasting 
elements.  For one, the general and globalized element of this enemy is not new. 
This was a common theme throughout the Cold War.  Yet this form of 
globalization takes on a new element because of the contemporary enemy 
lacking a specified or even symbolic geographic region.  For Communism, the 
U.S.S.R. served as the symbolic spatial center of the far more abstract Communist 
ideology.  It was tethered to geographic conditions.  Terrorism, on the other 
hand, completely lacks a spatial center, symbolic or otherwise. 
In response to this new historical iteration we must ask the historical 
situation whereby this thing “terror” arises as the primary form of the enemy 
and as a related question, what other enemies consequently have been ignored.  
To respond we need a thorough exploration of the general discursive climate and 
the circulation of ideas that attempt to explain the importance of terrorism.    
Terrorism highlights unique elements of biopolitics and the subsequent 
neoliberal state.  Through first examining the narratives that have come to 
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dominate terrorism, as a field of inquiry, I show that many of those narratives 
rely on a central disavowing of the religious tendencies of biopolitics.  This 
disavowal produces a series of narratives that mischaracterize and 
misunderstand the complicated relationship between terrorism and neoliberal 
states.  Instead of allowing such mischaracterizations of this relationship to 
continue, I insist on highlighting the religious dimensions of biopolitics in a way 
that allows for new insights into the ongoing war on terror.  By viewing 
terrorism, and the ongoing struggle against terror, through the lens of heresy I 
open new possibilities of understanding terror, and more importantly, new 
possibilities for understanding biopolitics and the neoliberal state. 
 
Explanations of Terror 
  
The first characterization and explanation of how terror has come to 
define the “enemy” in contemporary politics sees terrorism as a purely negative 
force in an otherwise positive (economic) globalized world.  In this response, the 
excessiveness of violence takes on less importance than the negative and 
catastrophic consequences of terrorism over and against an otherwise peaceful 
and positive globalizing economy.  For those who perpetuate this 
characterization, terrorism often becomes equated with a struggle against 
globalization.  In such a view globalization equates with increased democracy 
and financial stability for developing and developed world alike, creating a 
sphere of security.  External to this sphere of security resides a world plagued by 
insecurity and chaos.  The U.S. state department’s list of travel alerts and 
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warnings represents one way of envisioning the borders of these opposing 
spheres.  Such countries as Mali, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia come with a fair 
number of warnings.   The state department defines a travel warning occurring:  
when we want you to consider very carefully whether you should go to a 
country at all.  Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Warning might 
include unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence, 
or frequent terrorist attacks.  We want you to know the risks of traveling 
to these places and to strongly consider not going to them at all.  Travel 
Warnings remain in place until the situation changes; some have been in 
effect for years.11  
 
 For the proponents of this characterization, the basic formula works 
around ideas of destabilization.  The securitized world of global capital 
represents stability, while those areas, often associated with terrorism, represent 
a fundamental instability.  The value of stability over instability would appear as 
natural, and the two are mutually exclusive.   
The second characterization asserts that terrorism has become so 
important, and the dominant form of the enemy at this point in history, due to 
the extreme and perverse level of violence terrorists employ as their primary 
method.  Of course, no one sees terrorists as merely violent, but the level of 
violence represents something special in the world today.  For example, in 2015 
during the rise of the “Knife Infitada,” John Kirby, a representative of the Obama 
administration, made statements indicating that Israel, in response to the 
Palestinian violence, was possibly engaging in terrorist activities.  The primary 
determining factor in referring to these activities as terrorism revolved around 
																																																						
11 “State Department Travel Warnings,” 
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings.html 
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the excessive violence Israel employed.12  The excessiveness of violence brings 
about a visceral reality for individual citizens, not only fearful for their security 
but fearful of a peculiar type of security that terrorism threatens.  Of course, 
criminality is violent, but the distinguishing characteristics of a criminal act 
hinges on a legal definition of those acts.  Terrorism, on the other hand, while 
certainly illegal in nature, does not take meaning from its illegality but by the 
visceral and raw reality of something excessively violent in nature. The 
importance, the threat, and the visibility of terrorism arises out of its excessively 
violent nature.   
 Finally, a third provocative but haphazard approach characterizes the 
prominence of terrorism as a mismanaged type of religious fervor.  This view 
relies on a dichotomous vision of society whereby the public and private are two 
separate and distinct spheres of social life.  Terrorism, for those who espouse this 
type of response, represents a failure of the demarcation of these spheres; citing a 
violation of the public sphere by something that should, if functioning correctly, 
remain within the private sphere.  This view largely relies on traditional ideas of 
secularism and as such the religious has a certain place in society that terrorism 
fundamentally usurps, the attention given to terrorism is not the consequence of 
violence exactly, but rather as a consequence of religion that functions in 
irreligious ways.      
																																																						
12 Kelan Howell, “Obama Administration Accuses Israel of Terrorism, ‘Excessive 
Force,’” in The Washington Time, October 15, 2015, accessed April 16th, 2015. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/15/obama-admin-accuses-
israel-terrorism-excessive-for/ 
	 11 
 These characterizations and ways of thinking provide examples of the 
social, legal, and political regulations surrounding terrorism.  Only by taking 
these answers seriously, even if they are haphazard, and investigating their 
regulative function in the ongoing study of terrorism, can one begin to unpack 
the formative biopolitical concepts that undergird and support such answers. 
They do not arise on their own, as formed ahistorical ideas of enemy making.  
These answers serve to describe and make real the contemporary enemy, and 
since they serve to the make the enemy real, they rely on various rules and 
philosophical claims founded on an insistence of life as the primary object and 
mode of contemporary politics.   
Such haphazard characterizations of the contemporary enemy do two 
things.  First, it maintains simplicity where nuance and complication are 
necessary.  Second, such answers obscure the root biopolitical ideas supporting 
and maintaining their claim to truth.  The functional and strategic value of such 
answers lies in their apparent common sense.  Of course terrorism relies on 
violence.  Of course terrorism is destabilizing.  Of course terrorists often invoke 
religious ideas and tropes.  However, reducing the activity down to one of these 
three haphazard answers covers over a series of interconnected ideas in 
circulation that make such common sense so common.  They provide the 
appearance of being natural, while obscuring the very biopolitical discursive 
foundations of truth making that makes something appear instinctive. 
To uncover “the how” of terrorism rising to such political prominence one 
must engage in a “genealogical” study of terrorism itself.  Michel Foucault, in an 
	 12 
interview in 1978, described this genealogical approach to punishment in the 
following way,  
In order to get a better understanding of what is punished and why, I 
wanted to ask the question how does one punish.  This was the same 
procedure as I had used when dealing with madness: rather than asking 
what, in a given period, is regarded as sanity or insanity, as mental illness 
or normal behavior, I wanted to ask how these division are effected.  It’s a 
method that seems to me to yield – I wouldn’t say the maximum of 
possible illumination – at least a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility.13  
 
In accordance with this description I am attempting to answer a question 
of what makes something “terrorizing.”  The larger implication of this strategy 
insists terrorism, as a particular set of events, remain as events.  By this insistence 
on the “eventization” of particular occurrences, Foucault keeps these things as 
discontinuous moments, not subject to larger metahistorical movements that 
reduce the particulars into overarching patterns of the movements of history.14   
Each of the three ways of understanding terror - as repulsively violent, as 
purely negative, and as excessively religious, insist on understanding terrorism 
within the scope and framework of larger historical continuities.  The first 
envisions a history whereby people are becoming less violent over time.  Society, 
within this framework of historical continuity, sees violence as a harbinger of 
earlier points in historical progress, where violence was a medium by which 
disputes could be resolved, and has since gone away in favor of political options 
for resolving such disputes.  History moves us to a less violent situation.  The 
																																																						
13 Michel Foucault, “Question on Method,” in The Essential Foucault, (New York: 
The New Press, 2003) 247. 
 
14 Ibid., 250.   
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problem, as I will point out, is not so much that violence has been reduced but 
rather the nature and “look” of violence has transitioned under biopolitical 
demands.   
The second historical continuity insists that history naturally progresses 
along a line of efficiency.  Society demands usefulness, often measured within 
economic means.  Terrorism represents a force that seeks to destabilize and 
undermine usefulness, and again points to an earlier time in history where 
usefulness was not realized in the way it is today.  Like the less violent process of 
history, the usefulness concept of history envisions terrorism as a source of 
frustration over against this process, and something to be dealt with so that 
usefulness can again be realized.   
The third continuity relies on an understanding of secularization through 
the historical process of differentiation.  The religious sphere and the political 
sphere are slowly moving apart over the course of history.  In this moving apart, 
political activities become the dominant form of the public sphere, while 
religious activities have come to reside in the private sphere.  Terrorism then is 
seen to rupture this slow differentiation, bringing back into the realm of the 
public the private concerns of religion.   
By evaluating these three common tropes in response to terrorism I am 
attempting in many ways to restore the genealogical method to the question of 
terrorism, and what prompts the experience of terror.   
A series of intersections that are impossible to ignore between terrorism 
and biopolitics lies at the heart of this approach.  In the most forceful terms 
	 14 
possible, terrorism is that anomaly that calls into question the entire biopolitical 
paradigm, in its fundamental inability to solve the problem.   
The first chapter focuses on the religious and theological processes 
embedded in biopolitics and biopower.  Utilizing two thinkers, Michel Foucault 
and Giorgio Agamben I map the historical and genealogical process by which 
biopolitics and biopower dominate political discourse, rely on religious concepts, 
and the ruptures that terrorism poses to these developments.  This is not to 
revert to the re-instantiation of terrorism into a metahistorical process whereby 
biopolitics and terrorism somehow represent a culmination of larger historical 
movements.  Rather, my thesis insists that terrorism in its most contemporary 
form cannot be understood apart from a primordial theological and political 
insistence (and distinction) on life.   
Foucault and Agamben are at the heart of this project.  While much 
scholarship has been spent to parse out the respective differences between the 
two thinkers, this project focuses on the points in which they converge and speak 
to each other.  Some have accused Agamben of doing something completely 
anathema to Foucault’s approach by highlighting his attempts to uncover 
“origins” in the contemporary political situation through a turn to theological 
discourse.  It is not that I am overtly opposed to such criticisms as much as these 
criticisms simply do not matter for what I am doing here.  I also believe they fail 
to consider Agamben’s own comments on methodology, and I show the points of 
similarity to Foucault’s concepts of genealogy throughout this first chapter, 
focusing on convergence rather than divergence, namely Foucault’s shared 
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reliance on religious concepts to articulate his version of biopolitics and 
biopower.   
In the second and third chapters I explore the three haphazard answers 
given to explain the rise in ideological prominence of terrorism, with a critical 
investigation to each of these answers: repulsive violence, hyper-
instrumentalization, and excessive religiosity. I critically exam each of the three 
answers commonly provided to explain the rise of terrorism as a political 
category.  Finally, I will engage in a new line of inquiry that questions terrorism 
outside the boundaries of mere political categories, paying attention to the 
religious elements of biopolitics, and thereby envision terrorism within the 
framework of the religious category of heresy.    
My general methodology relies on two related philosophical concepts:  
genealogy, and biopower/biopolitics. However, I first want to make clear what I 
am not doing.  This is not only a necessity from a theoretical perspective, but also 
politically necessary.  The weight with which people use the word “terrorism” 
demands an apology for introducing it again under a very particular set of 
circumstances.  I do not intend to offer a definition of terrorism.  I do not intend 
to offer yet another political, military, or religious solution to the problems of 
terrorism.  Likewise, I do not defend the use of terrorism or violence for political 
or religious ends, yet I simultaneously recognize that violence appears in a 
myriad of forms with different uses in different contexts.  Most importantly I am 
not trying to locate a political, psychological, social, economic, or religious 
justification for terrorism.  Any attempts to answer the previous questions would 
run counter to a genealogical project in their attempt to locate an origin or 
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essence of terrorism, something I am intentionally avoiding.  Such an attempt at 
locating the origins of terrorism would ultimately be, in Foucault’s words, “an 
attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their 
carefully protected identities; because this search assumed the existence of 
immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession.”15 
I am merely looking at one instance, one moment in a longer genealogical 
study of the enemy itself.  The enemy does not arrive from some original 
primordial confrontation of the other.  Rather the enemy, and enemy making, 
takes place through a series of accidental encounters between different peoples at 
different times.  The current form of the enemy for biopolitical states appears as 
terrorism, but this enemy could have easily been some other figure.  Terrorism, 
while having a certain level of connection to prior enemies ranging from the 
Cold War to the more abstract War on Drugs, also possesses unique elements 
that require special and articulation.  Terrorism does not merely repeat history 
with a new shape.  A proper genealogy recognizes these similarities but likewise 
insists on following the differences and tracing the differences that have arisen.16  
The haphazard characteristics given to terrorism as excessively violent, 
economically negative, and inappropriately religious rely on the repetition of a 
past and stable history, an insistence on “original” thinking regarding the enemy.  
By exploring each of these haphazard characterizations in depth I attempt not 
only to dislodge such “original” thinking, I also show the differences and errors 
																																																						
15 Michel Foucault, “Nietszche, Genealogy, History” in The Essential Foucault, 353.   
 
16 Ibid., 355.  
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that each produce in the search for the truth of terrorism.  Or, again, in Foucault’s 
words: 
The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, 
it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what 
was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined 
consistent with itself.17 
 
This defines my precise goal in approaching terrorism, to take those 
characteristics often provided as the truth of terror – the violent element, the 
economically negative element, and the religious element – and disturb the 
immobility of these common-sense explanations.  Finally, I show how the reality 
of these common sense approaches to terrorism lies not in merely covering over 
the fundamental architecture of the truth of biopolitics, but how each truth 
betrays a series of anomalies embedded in the fabric of biopolitics itself.   In 
summation, this project argues that articulating terrorism as a problem for 
biopolitics rather than a problem of biopolitics produces a serious paradoxical 
effect in contemporary politics.   
 
																																																						
17 Ibid., 356.   
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Chapter One:  Biopolitics A Religious Concept 
 
Biopolitics, generally the politicization of abstract life, as with any 
theoretical concept has its own historical development and exists in different 
forms for different thinkers.  One could potentially trace this historical 
development in several different ways, arriving at varied constructions of the 
term that focus on phenomena within the social and political world.  Deciding 
then to focus upon Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben above others may 
seem arbitrary.  However, Foucault and Agamben provide convincing accounts 
of the political realm in relation to the contemporary issue of terrorism.  
Biopolitics for Foucault is not synonymous with biopolitics for Agamben, but 
some important similarities exist between the two, namely the theological and 
religious dimension present in each.  Consequently, the decision to focus upon 
these two thinkers reduces and diminishes other voices systematically utilizing 
biopolitics to describe and assess politics.  However, as I will show, some of these 
voices miss the religious dimension present in both Foucault and Agamben. The 
Theological Dimensions of Agamben’s Biopolitics: 
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The Theological Dimensions of Agamben’s Biopolitics 
 
I begin with Agamben, due to his contributions appearing the most 
overtly religious and thereby setting the stage for the comparison between the 
two thinkers at the center of this project.  His most deliberate work on the topic 
of biopolitics comes from the first two volumes of his Homo Sacer series, which 
spans over 9 volumes written over 21 years and concluding in 2016.  Within both 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life and The State of Exception, Agamben 
develops an illuminating account of biopolitics derived from multiple sources 
throughout the history of western thought and philosophy.  An account of three 
of these figures provides a helpful explanation of the religious elements bound 
up in Agamben’s biopolitics:  Aristotle, Carl Schmitt, and Georges Bataille. 
One cannot discount the influence Aristotle has over political philosophy.  
In many ways, outside of the Republic, Aristotle serves as the very root of the 
entire branch of philosophy focusing upon politics and the organization of 
people.  This ability to organize and form political unions resides definitively in 
human linguistic capabilities.  Humans alone use language, and because of this 
ability, can engage in self-examination.1  By examining ourselves we uncover our 
fundamental weakness and fragility, particularly in isolation.  As a result, we 
form partnerships, and in turn further develop these into increasingly complex 
arrangements.  In 1.2 of the Politics, Aristotle traces these partnerships from the 
																																																						
1 Aristotle, Politics  I.2, 1253a8-19, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine. 
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foundational male and female to the formation of the family, the combining of 
families into a village, and finally several villages into a city.   
 The larger and more complex the social associations, the more they 
demand the use of language, and as a result the biological reality of our fragility 
in isolation becomes increasingly opaque.  In the formative stage of our 
partnerships, survival is more precarious and more biologically immediate.  The 
biological threat to our survival coupled with the realities of procreation demand 
relationships and partnerships with others.   Second, more socially complex 
associations and partnerships require language to name things as evil and good, 
just and unjust.2  The ability to make partnerships and agree together on the 
nature of those partnerships requires the establishing of rules through language.   
 Aristotle goes so far as to compare the city to a body, arguing for its 
prominence among associations, showing that without the body, intact and 
entire, there would be no need for the individual arm.  Similarly, the family (the 
“arm”) must take secondary status to the larger more necessary collection of the 
whole (the body) in the city.  This city likewise offers a diverse skillset among the 
members.  Each person serves a different role, some farming and others making 
pots.  But bringing together such diverse talents, drives, desires, and fears 
requires some mediating force that can decide on how these arrangements will 
be made fair.  Language enters as the means to make these decisions known and 
shared by all who take part in the partnerships.  Ideas like fairness, justice, crime, 
citizenry, and so forth emerge from these primordial linguistic notions and 
																																																						
2 Aristotle, Politics. I.2 1252a25-1252b20, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine 
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demands.  The political realm exists as a possibility due to the biological 
precariousness of the human and the unique capability to put into words 
demands and restrictions.  Language uniquely belongs to the human, and the use 
of language defines the human in comparison to other creatures.  The more we 
use language, the more unlike other animals we become.  The polis as a refuge 
from the threats of nature exists because of language, and language as a 
definitive marker for humankind pushes us further into the polis and away from 
nature.  The human only comes about in the city because the city only comes 
about from language, and engaging in language most makes us human.   
 Giorgio Agamben highlights a paradox arising out of this unique 
relationship of language to the city.  In overcoming our biological reality and 
pushing away the dangers of nature we rely upon language.  Language takes us 
further and further away from the threats of the natural world and the internal 
biological reality of our own animality.  As we speak we become less and less 
like the wolf.  We are in the process of excluding the animal, the biological 
element, through using language and the subsequent development of the 
political.  We of course know we are still animals and biological, subject to the 
same existential fate of all the other animals.  As much as we are unique through 
our use of language, we are still the same living things that will one day die.  We 
take this linguistic capability and make partnerships to protect ourselves against 
this existential threat.  The paradox can be summarized in this way the more 
political we become the more we push out the biological, yet the biological is 
what pushed us to become political in the first place.   
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 The animal part of us, the part subject to the grip of death, motivates 
humans to develop language, the most un-animal part of us.  The paradox lies 
here, in the way we construct and imagine the remaining animal portion.  The 
fear and terror bound up in that animal part pushes us to further distance 
ourselves from that biological reality in attempts to postpone death for as long as 
possible.  Politics serves this purpose from its very outset, and continues into the 
contemporary situation.  The biological and visceral reality of death forces 
politics to focus upon life and its preservation. The uniqueness in our ability to 
use language always ends up linking our politics back to the fundamental 
negativity of death. 3 
 But this part of us, the included/excluded animal and biological part, 
retreats from the power of language.4  Because the passage into language 
represents such a fundamental distinction between ourselves and animals we 
articulate the primordial biological reality Agamben calls “Bare Life.”  Or put 
more simply, experiencing the world through language makes it impossible to 
cognitively apprehend a situation prior to language.  Bare life resists language 
because bare life exists completely and entirely outside of the political sphere, or 
prior to all political arrangements, generating a crisis within a political system 
which makes its foundation in the very unspeakable reality of biology and bare 
life.  Agamben distinguishes between a certain type of political life and bare life 
																																																						
3 Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death:  The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen 
Pinkus and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 
xi-xii.    
 
4 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller 
Roazan (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1995), 18.   
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through the Greek terms bios and zoê.   Bios entails a certain kind of life, 
particularized and manifested in certain forms, while zoê indicates life devoid of 
specificity, abstract and bare.   
 One representation of this crisis is sovereignty and its expression through 
the regulation of the law.  Agamben relies heavily on Carl Schmitt’s assertion 
that the sovereign only appears as sovereign when it decides upon the exception.  
In certain moments and during certain events the law itself, and the entirety of 
the legal order, can come under threat through some internal or external force.  
During normal circumstances the law maintains strict regulation of the polis, but 
during these exceptional moments where the threat increases to such severity, 
normal procedures cannot be maintained.  That which can declare the exception 
to the normal progression of rule and order is the sovereign.  Because of this 
ability to suspend the law the sovereign always exists in relation to the law as 
simultaneously inside and outside.  In the right situation, the sovereign steps 
beyond the legal order, and it is through this stepping beyond the legal order the 
sovereign appears as sovereignty.5  
 In the normal situation citizens are defined as citizens through a legal 
proscription.  The status of citizens designates a series of legal claims and orders 
(a form of life, bios).  Citizenship though, unlike other legal proclamations, 
bounds the very availability and possibility of the law to that individual.  There 
can be no legal recognition without the primacy of citizenship bestowed upon 
the individual.  Though this bestowal of identity can be suspended, by sovereign 
																																																						
5 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1.   
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decision, returning the individual back to a situation of bare life (zoê) prior to 
those political partnerships defined and outlined by Aristotle.  The citizen can 
only have recourse to the protection of the law if they are citizens, recognized by 
the law as such, and if they are denied citizenship all legal processes cease to be 
meaningful for them.  Like the sovereign, those reduced to this status of bare life 
are simultaneously included and excluded from the legal order.   
 The figure of the homo sacer represents, as a paradigmatic form, this 
inclusion and exclusion in relation to the law, and reduction to bare life.  This 
figure can be killed without being murdered, and, in addition, they cannot die in 
a sacrificial manner. The second part retains as much importance as the first, 
especially in an analysis of Agamben that focuses upon the religious dimensions 
of biopolitics.6  To be killed without being murdered makes the death of the homo 
sacer possible, but if one were to kill him or her such an act would not be 
considered legally as murder.  Murder entails a crime with serious legal 
ramifications and consequences; a murderer violates the state’s basic and 
primary monopoly on violence.  However, as the legal order excludes the homo 
sacer as a non-political figure without any legal protections, prior to all politics, 
the killing of that individual does not violate the state’s prerogative to protect its 
citizens from the violence of others because the homo sacer thoroughly and 
fundamentally lacks citizenship and inclusion in the state, having been reduced 
to bare life.   
																																																						
6 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, 83.  
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 The second part of the definition of the Homo Sacer claims an inability to 
be subject to a ritual sacrifice, and it requires a bit more explanation and some 
analysis of Agamben’s reading of George Bataille.  Agamben initially seems to 
discount Bataille’s contribution to the subject, accusing him of relying too heavily 
on fear and respect of the sacred in his work. 7 However, Bataille’s concept of the 
intimacy of animality8 has remarkable similarities to Agamben’s distinction 
between zoê and bios.  Bataille poetically envisions the experience of the animal 
eating another animal and the shocking intimacy between the two, one animal 
not recognizing the distinction between itself and the thing it eats.9  The most 
profound human action for Bataille is recognition and division, namely between 
the human self and other things external to the human.  The ability to speak and 
name the things around us as different from us and different from other things 
completely contradicts the animal’s vision of the world as radically 
undifferentiated.  Language enters here as an important element in the endeavor 
to divide the world of things up, naming each to set it apart from others.  We of 
course can only vaguely and inexactly imagine this animal way of envisioning 
the world because such a return to pre-linguistic and pre-political ways of 
thinking remains inaccessible to the political and linguistic human.  However, 
																																																						
7 Ibid., 112.   
 
8 Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 17.   
 
9 Ibid., 19.   
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Bataille views the law not as progress of the good, bringing about a harmonious 
society, but instead the law merely establishes and maintains the order of things.10 
 Bataille offers a theory that places this animal intimacy in close contact 
with the sacred realm.  This animal existence, completely foreign to the political 
human, and like the sacred realm with an ambivalent quality, vacillates between 
something demanding profound respect while also being a tremendous source of 
horror.11 The threat and respect element of the sacred realm, and similarly the 
animal realm, makes us more and more comfortable with the order the profane 
realm offers, a realm we can order ourselves and therefore control.  That 
animal/sacred realm reminds us, as does bare life, that we are still natural living 
things and as a result are subject to death.  The distinction between the profane 
and sacred realms is a distinction between the realm of ordered life and the 
realm of death.   
 We can offer sacrifices to this other realm of the sacred, but we can only 
sacrifice out of the realm we control and have given meaning over.  The things 
we control, name, and distinguish are those things which are available to 
sacrifice and hand over to the realm of undifferentiated.  We only name and 
identify as unique those things which are useful to us and as a result useful 
things are made available for sacrificing.  Ritual sacrifice serves as the process by 
which some object or thing is brought forth out of the realm of mere things and 
transported into the sacred realm.  The sacrifice extends beyond the object and 
																																																						
10 Ibid., 67.   
 
11 Ibid., 36.   
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offers the removal, if only for a moment, of those who offered up the sacrifice out 
of the profane realm as well.   As Bataille explains, “The first fruits of the harvest 
or the head of livestock are sacrificed in order to remove the plant and animal, 
together with the farmer and the stock raisers, from the world of things.”12  
Sacrifice removes all usefulness of the thing or object.  For example, an animal 
sacrificed in a ritualized manner does not in turn serve as food.  Killing an 
animal for food involves a different process with differing ritualistic overtones 
than killing an animal for sacrifice.  The death of the animal and refusal then to 
eat the animal results in a rearrangement of the instrumental value of the thing 
sacrificed.  Bataille writes of the one who offers up the sacrifice in the following 
way:  
Intimately, I belong to the sovereign world of gods and myths, to the 
world of violent and uncalculated generosity, just as my wife belongs to 
my desires.  I withdraw you, victim, from the world in which you were 
and could only be reduced to the condition of a thing, having a meaning 
that was foreign to your intimate nature.  I call you back to the intimacy of 
the divine world, of the profound immanence of all that is.13 
 
This consequence of the sacrifice brings about a community of people through 
the festival surrounding that sacrifice.  People remain faithful to the sacrifice by 
returning to the world of things, using and sharing those things and ordering the 
profane realm.  The sacrifice serves as the political center of the community, 
bringing people together and binding them in communion through the sacrificial 
act.   
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13 Ibid., 44.   
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This sacrifice and setting something apart from the regular mundane 
order of things, allows for the perpetual continuation of that very order.  This 
concept shares remarkable similarity to the paradox at the center of Agamben’s 
reading of Aristotle and the metaphysical ordering of the political Agamben 
unpacks.  The homo sacer in its inability to be sacrificed carries the connotation of 
the sacrifice being part of the foundations of the communal and political 
possibility of the legal order itself.    
 The sacrifice does not merely bring the community together through the 
festival, but a series of prohibitions around the sacrifice and its ordering forms 
the fabric of the legal order through historical development.  Bataille argues that 
a process emerges within the logic of sacrifice moving from the sacrifice of 
human slaves to an eventual moral prohibition against human sacrifice.  
Eventually, religious and theological solutions were proposed whereby God, in 
his ultimate goodness and nobility, would maintain the order of things on behalf 
of humanity.  Of course, this God maintaining the order makes itself useful and 
instrumental, and consequently subject to the possibility of sacrifice.  The 
Christian culmination and fulfillment of this process has God sacrificed and 
through the sacrifice establishes a stable divine realm where intimacy can be 
recovered in a purified form (bodies that will not age).   
 The homo sacer cannot be sacrificed because the homo sacer has no place in 
the general order of things, and their death then cannot be made meaningful 
because of the profound non-meaning embedded in its identity.  It is a figure 
beyond meaning and outside of the order of meaning, serving as a limit point 
and return to the intimate animality, in the words of Bataille, or the pre-linguistic 
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and pre-political zoê in Agamben.  They come to form a politics of the pre-
political situation, or more directly it comes to form biopolitics.   
 Unlike Bataille, who renders this pre-political intimate animal inaccessible 
to the human, Agamben retains accessibility of this reduction to bare life through 
biopolitics.  In the sacrifice, the complete reduction of all instrumental value 
brings the thing out of the world of things into the divine and intimate realm, but 
Agamben maintains some connection between the internal political sphere and 
the external pre-political/biopolitical sphere.  The reduction of bare life does not 
occur in an instant, but the political order maintains the expulsion from the legal 
order.  This tension between the internal and external, central to Agamben, only 
plays out in Bataille through the tension inside the divine realm, the threshold 
between horror and respect demanded by the sacred.  But for Agamben the 
threshold and tension gets bound up in the figure of the homo sacer.14   
 The inability to murder the homo sacer shows the tension in the legal and 
juridical exception of the homo sacer, related to the exclusion of the sovereign 
through the decisive act of the exception to the legal order.15  Both the sovereign 
and the homo sacer stand inside and outside the law simultaneously.  Even 
constitutional law, which at a cursory glance appears rather distinct from classic 
models of sovereignty expressed in one monarchic individual, retains this ability 
to suspend the law itself.  Agamben shows how constitutional orders still contain 
some element of potential suspension of the constitutionally defined legal order 
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for the sake of protecting said constitution.16  The suspension of the law still 
includes the law as a decisively excluded juridical order, likewise the homo sacer 
maintains some connection to the interior political system through its exclusion 
from that juridical order.  The sovereign and the homo sacer both reside in a zone 
of indistinction relative to the interior and exterior of the juridical order.  They 
are both included through their exclusion.   
However, the homo sacer does not remain merely political, as it takes on a 
religious dimension when connected to the idea of sacrifice through Bataille.  It 
simultaneously cannot be sacrificed and therefore enter a divine economy and 
spiritual redemption through being put to death, and the death of the homo sacer 
cannot act as a foundational act of community making.  Sacrifice, for Bataille, 
always has instrumentality as its goal and condition.  The usefulness of the 
sacrificed thing allows for the availability of sacrifice for the thing.  Sacrificial 
logic transcends the world of thingness.  Biopolitics, in its examination of the 
sacrificial element, thoroughly invests the concept not only with juridical and 
legal meaning, but religious as well.  Biopolitics for Agamben, through his 
reading of Bataille, is a thoroughly religious concept made political, particularly 
in the presence of the “camp.”   
The camp most viscerally exposes this internal and external tension.  For 
Agamben the camp denotes both the classic tangible representation through the 
horrors of places like Auschwitz, but it also denotes more abstract, divergent, 
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and unexpected forms.17  In the camp, which lacks the strict boundary of the 
nation state, bare life finds the height of its negative expression.  Life reduced to 
zoê, indistinguishable and lacking coherent identity, becomes the pure modern 
and contemporary form of biopolitics.  Life reduced in such a way enacts the 
sovereign exclusion of life from the political sphere, simultaneous to the 
construction of homo sacer, or that which can be killed without being murdered or 
sacrificed.  
The camp, like the homo sacer, serves as a paradigm for his biopolitical 
project.  Agamben articulates both his genealogical project of the biopolitical, the 
homo sacer, and the camp, in addition to Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and 
biopower, by using the paradigm.  He writes:  
At this point, I think it is clear what it means to work by way of 
paradigms for both me and Foucault.  Homo sacer and the concentration 
camp, the Muselmann and the state of exception, and, more recently, the 
Trinitarian oikonomia and acclamations are not hypotheses through which 
I intended to explain modernity by tracing it back to something like a 
cause or historical origin.  On the contrary, as their very multiplicity might 
have signaled, each time it was a matter of paradigms whose aim was to 
make intelligible series of phenomena whose kinship had eluded or could 
elude the historian’s gaze.  To be sure, my investigations, like those of 
Foucault, have an archeological character, and the phenomena with which 
they deal unfold across time and therefore require an attention to 
documents and diachrony that cannot but follow the laws of historical 
philology…Archaeology, then, is always a paradigmatology, and the 
capacity to recognize and articulate paradigms defines the rank of the 
inquirer no less than does his or her ability to examine the documents of 
an archive.18   
 
There are six elements to the paradigm within the work of Agamben: 
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31-32.  
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1.  A paradigm is a form of knowledge that is neither inductive nor 
deductive but analogical.  It moves from singularity to singularity.  
2. By neutralizing the dichotomy between the general and the particular, 
it replaces dichotomous logic with a bipolar analogical model.   
3. The paradigmatic case becomes such by suspending and, at the same 
time, exposing its belonging to the group, so that it is never possible to 
separate its exemplarity from its singularity.  
4. The paradigmatic group is never presupposed by the paradigms; 
rather, it is immanent in them.  
5. In the paradigm, there is no origin or arche; every phenomenon is the 
origin, every image archaic.  
6. The historicity of the paradigm lies neither in diachrony nor in 
synchrony but in a crossing of the two. 
Paradigms and paradigm shifts are most often associated with the work of 
Thomas Kuhn, someone Agamben cites regularly in his own description of 
paradigmatic thinking.   Though unlike Kuhn, Agamben does not articulate a 
robust explanation of the way paradigm shifts occur in thought.  Instead, he 
focuses on the presence of singularities in paradigmatic thinking, and how these 
singularities remain attached to other singularities, as the paradigm is not a 
meta-concept outside of singular expression.   
 This conversation of the paradigm provides important context for 
understanding the way the camp, the sovereign, and the homo sacer are 
simultaneously theological and political concepts.  Returning for a moment to 
Carl Schmitt, the statement that all contemporary political concepts are 
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secularized theological concepts begins to make sense in Agamben’s work when 
thought through the paradigm.  Taking seriously the use of paradigm provides 
some explanation for the way Agamben sees this shift from the theological to the 
political evident in Schmitt’s writing.  The switch from a religious epoch (with its 
own paradigm) to a secular epoch (with its own paradigm) does not provide a 
fundamental break between the two, but a shift in the singularities within each.  
Through time and different divergent modes of thinking the religious categories 
transition away from overt religious actions, such as sacrifice, into political and 
juridical activities.  The epochs are not thoroughly, finally, or radically separate 
from each other but rather different singular instances of the same fundamental 
structures of order, law, and the maintenance of the polis.  Foucault does 
something similar, though does not use the language of paradigm, and rather 
than focusing upon categories of sacrifice he focuses on the pastoral element 
within biopolitics, yet like Agamben still retaining a thoroughly religious 
condition.   
 
The Theological and Religious Dimensions of Foucault’s Biopolitics 
 
Scholarship on Foucualt’s concept of biopolitics tends to focus almost 
exclusively on the political processes moving power structures between what he 
describes as a discipline society and a security society.  While an important 
transition within Foucault’s biopolitics, such scholarship often foregoes the 
religious dimension in Foucault’s work.  Some remedy to this diminishing of the 
religious material is in order, though still beginning with the discipline society.  
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 In Discipline and Punish Foucault articulates the way in which 
society attempts to procure peaceful relationships between individuals, but does 
so through covert military-like organizational systems.  The institutions in 
society aim to produce peaceful citizenry through processes of segmenting 
individuals into groups, enclosing spaces, partitioning of people, ranking and 
creating hierarchies within the social order, and the serializing of individuals.  
These processes are rooted in militarized practices and forms of organization that 
seek to make effective soldiers.19 
Other institutions beyond the military reproduce these practices in their 
own structures and activities.20 The school utilizes a series of hierarchies in the 
form of grades, and encloses students within individual classrooms and desks, 
measuring them through a complex system of grading.21  Another example would 
be the regimenting of daily activities of patients by hospitals, along with charting 
and serializing a complex nexus of patient information, and enclosing the sick in 
segmented areas of the hospital.   
Foucault describes the ways in which the human body comes under 
disciplines so that, in the end, the human will discipline themselves in 
accordance with the larger structural goals of the society.  The schools, clinics, 
and most notably prisons serve the function of providing a model to the 
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21 Ibid., 157.   
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individual that they can then take into their life and carry out similar 
regimentations.   
This theme of disciplining the body gets taken up in Foucault’s later work 
The History of Sexuality and the recently translated series of lectures Society Must 
be Defended.  However, in these writings, the militarization strategy, endemic to 
the discipline society, changes its intended focus from the individual body to the 
body politic. Foucault develops an acute awareness of the way in which the 
population can come to look and appear strikingly like an individual body.  As 
such, the same militarized technologies that work so efficiently at regimenting 
the individual, also regiment and mobilize a larger population.  Like an 
individualized body, a larger population produces spontaneous needs and 
desires, and technologies could develop to calculate, control, and manage this 
larger body composed of individual bodies.   
Central to the process of discipline, management and segmentation 
strategies functionally correct, control, and mobilize the larger populous.22  This 
shift of focus from the individual body to the larger population does not erase 
the internal militarized machinations within disciplining the individual.  The 
goal of the military strategies Foucault originally introduced sought to make a 
good soldier.  If the institutions provide proper disciplining structures then 
individuals could reproduce the desired behaviors without the oversight of the 
institution, effectively becoming a better soldier.  Similar strategies applied to a 
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larger population produce docility at the macro level, making it possible to raise 
an entire population to wage war against any threat.23   
The war a population makes appears as notably different from other wars, 
in that a population does not fight over traditional issues such as territorial 
disputes.  Motivating an entire population, civilians included, requires a 
different set of criteria. Julian Reed astutely observes: 
In the earlier text Foucault understands war exerting an influence 
indirectly via the influence of tactical models of military organization as a 
kind of projected social schema for the creation of a logistical order among 
an otherwise disordered multitude.  In the History of Sexuality, 
alternatively, Foucault starts to develop an argument as the ways in which 
war invests the order of political power as a kind of immanent force.  The 
influence of war upon society does not refer simply to the discrete 
influence of an institutionalized military and its bodies of tactical 
knowledge, but to the ‘multiplicity of force relations immanent in the 
sphere in which they operate and in which constitute their organizations.’  
Here Foucault is developing a conception of war as the source of specific 
forms of force relations that are constitutive of power relations.  War is the 
source that accounts for the forms of life that generate power relations 
rather than being the source influenced by proxy through military 
institutions and discourses with wield power over the life of individual 
bodies.24 
 
This development of war, highlighted by Reed, serves as the formal distinction 
between the concepts of “strategy” and “tactic.” Disciplinary power focuses 
exclusively on tactics that divide and individualize bodies towards docility and 
efficiency.  Strategies, on the other hand, taken up in biopolitical regimes seek to 
combine and bring together, defining forms of life in the process and creating a 
sense of belonging and identity.  This sense of belonging does not merely 
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provide a place for the individual at the level of community, but instead gives 
the individual a sense that they belong to the whole of humanity.25 
 Enacting power over the population has certain consequences.  Most 
pressing of these consequences is the possibility that some forms of life simply 
will not fit or comply with the goals and dynamics of a given population.  In the 
later lectures of Society Must be Defended Foucault introduces this issue within the 
context of a new form of racism founded on the distinction between worthy and 
unworthy forms of life.26  This form of racism, notably different from previous 
iterations that focused upon ethnic boundaries between groups, determines that 
certain forms of life threaten the extinction of the abstract body of living 
individuals.  Divergent lifeforms potentially cause such profound 
destabilizations for the population, and in turn the entirety of the human-race, 
that they simply cannot be tolerated.   Biopolitics determines which lives can be 
understood and defined, while simultaneously translating ethnic differentiation 
into biological racism.  As a result, populations wage war on behalf of the 
species.27 
 Racism, and the resulting novel forms of war, changes the scope and 
nature of violence.  Rather than utilizing violence for tactical goals, whereby 
contested territories may be won and controlled, this new form of violence seeks 
to eradicate entire groups of humans that present a possible threat to the larger 
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continuation and preservation of life.  The goals of violence shift in accordance 
with these changing perspectives of life and its protection.    
[E]nemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the 
political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to 
the population and for the population.  In the biopower system, in other 
words, killing of the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in 
a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological 
threat to and the improvement of the species or race.28 
 
In the same way that Agamben describes the homo sacer as both a political and 
juridical figure as well as a religious one (that which cannot be sacrificed), 
Foucault likewise develops the concept of biopolitics and violence through both 
a juridical and religious perspective.  Protecting the species does come about on 
its own, but follows a religious and theological pattern of thought bound to the 
pastorate.  This pastorate has roots in both the Hebraic pre-Christian east, and 
then further developments in Christianity.29 Foucault articulates the pastorate 
through the analogy of the shepherd overseeing a flock of sheep.  He writes:  
The shepherd’s power is not exercised over territory but, by definition, 
over a flock, and more exactly, over the flock in its movement from one 
place to another.  The shepherd’s power is essentially exercised over a 
multiplicity in movement.  The Greek god is a territorial god, a god intra 
muros, with his privileged place, his town or temple.  The Hebrew God, on 
the other hand, is the God moving from place to place, the God who 
wanders. 30 
 
Foucault contrasts the power of the Greek gods to the Hebrew 
monotheistic God.  The Greek idea of a god prioritizes sovereignty above all else, 
particularly sovereignty over stationary and clearly defined territory.  Territory 
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defines the scope and reach of the divinity’s power, additionally, this power 
cares little for what resides within the territory only for the territory itself.   
Additionally, the Greek conception works as a negative force within that 
territory, by removing threats and opposition, rather than acting as a positive 
force guiding or instructing the individual inhabitants.31  
The Hebraic idea of God exercise power in a different way, reducing the 
emphasis on the territory.  Power in this form does not enact force over terrain, 
but guides and instructs a group within the terrain.  Unlike the Greek power of 
the god, this Hebraic idea does not negatively remove threats, but practices a 
benevolent and positive management of the group within.  The form of power in 
this model is, “entirely defined by its beneficence; its only raise d’etre is doing 
good.  In fact, the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation of the 
flock.”32 
 Elsewhere, Foucault provides a series of qualities that further define the 
form of power bound up in the shepherd and flock relationship.  Continuing the 
theme of a power that oversees a group as opposed to a territory, this power 
brings together and leads the flock to salvation.  Through bringing together a 
divergent group into harmonious union, this notion of power does something 
more than merely protect against threats and hostilities.  In addition, the 
shepherd provides a means of salvation for the flock.  Everyone within the flock 
falls under the care of the shepherd, who meets their individual needs.  Finally, 
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Foucault describes the shepherd’s connection to duty, who as leader of the group 
has a duty and role of service to the individuals that make up that group.  
Because of duty, the leader continuously keeps watch over the flock, ensuring 
everyone’s perpetual safety and prosperity, not to the benefit of the shepherd but 
for the individuals within the flock.33 
 The Hebraic notions of power are not isolated, and exist in other cultures, 
religions, and regions.  By looking specifically at Christianity, and how 
Christians theologically develop and augment the shepherding model of power, 
Foucault provides an analysis of how biopower and biopolitics have some 
important religious and theological elements.  He provides an analysis of the 
Christian development of power in four forms.34 
 First, Christianity expands the salvific responsibility of the shepherd.  The 
level, depth, and complexity of responsibility greatly increases, moving from a 
generalized well-being to an overt account of the actions of everyone.  Foucault 
describes this deepened responsibility: “In the Christian conception, the 
shepherd must render an account – not only of each sheep, but of all their 
actions, all the good or evil they are liable to do, all that happens to them.”35  The 
ability to manage and account for each individual sin and good deed committed 
by the members of the group expresses the success or failure of the shepherd of 
that group.   
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Second, the Christianization of the shepherd model of power entails a 
stronger allegiance between the flock and the shepherd.  The flock does not 
merely benefit from the power of the shepherd, their entire well-being 
thoroughly depends on the shepherd.  The relationship involves deep 
dependence and reliance on the shepherd and, as Foucault describes:  
In Christianity, the tie with the shepherd is an individual one.  It is 
personal submission to him.  His will is done, not because it is consistent 
with the law, and not just as far as it is consistent with it, but, principally, 
because it is his will.36    
 
Third, a certain form of knowledge arises out of the Christian concept of 
pastoral power connecting the increased responsibility of the shepherd over the 
flock with an increased accumulation of knowledge through accounting for the 
actions of everyone.  These actions, deeds, thoughts, sins, and inclinations must 
be tracked, tabulated, and recorded.  To meet this goal the pastoral power 
develops the confessional, whereby members of the flock render an account of 
their activities to the shepherd as part of their devotion.37   
 Fourth, while the responsibility of the shepherd extends to the entirety of 
the flock, individuals can only attain salvation on their own behalf.  The 
shepherd, while ultimately responsible for the flock, cannot in isolation bring 
anyone to salvation, as individuals pursue this on their own behalf.  Foucault 
describes this process as a “mortification in this world.  Mortification is not 
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death, of course, but it is a renunciation of this world and of oneself, a kind of 
everyday death – a death that is supposed to provide life in another world.”38   
 The development of this analysis of pastoral power has strong and 
formative connections to the specifics of biopolitics in Foucault’s larger body of 
theoretical work.  This model of power, in conjunction with the Greek emphasis 
on the city and sacrifice on behalf of the city, comes to model conceptions of 
legitimate use of political power.  Foucault connects this to modern politics:  
We can say that the Christian pastorship has introduced a game that 
neither the Greeks nor the Hebrews imagined.  It is a strange game whose 
elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-identity – a 
game that seems to have nothing to do with the game of the city surviving 
through the sacrifice of citizens.  Our societies proved to be really demonic 
since they happened to combine those two games – the city-citizen games 
and the shepherd-flock game – in what we call the modern states.39   
 
Both Agamben and Foucault share a conviction that underneath or in connection 
to our modern secularized political systems, theological elements exist.  Modern 
forms of government and the instrumental utilization of political power does not 
come about in isolation, but instead follows a lengthy path of theological and 
religious development and influence.  Obviously, overt forms of political power 
relying on theological and religious language wanes; however, what remains 
crucial for understanding the religious dimensions of biopolitics is the shared 
insistence of underlying theological material that helps carry forward and give 
structure to modern political projects.   
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 Nevertheless, there are distinguishing characteristics between Agamben 
and Foucault.  On the one hand, Agamben theoretically preserves the idea of the 
sovereign as a critical entrance into understanding politics, while Foucault 
overtly avoids sovereignty in articulating the contours of biopolitics.  Foucault 
makes this hesitancy and suspicion of sovereignty clear on several occasions: 
Rather than looking at the three prerequisites of law, unity, and subject - 
which make sovereignty both the source of power and the basis of 
institutions - I think that we have to adopt the threefold point of view of 
the techniques, the heterogeneity of techniques, and the subjugation-
effects that make technologies of domination the real fabric of both power 
relations and the great apparatuses of power.  The manufacture of subjects 
rather than the genesis of the sovereign:  that is our general theme.40 
 
These distinctions are necessary for understanding the work of both Foucault 
and Agamben in isolation; however, when it comes to the religious and 
theological element, both share the idea that modern politics has some debt to 
pay.    
 In summation, Agamben relies on the exclusion of bare life, while 
Foucault centers on the way in which political discourse arises and comes to be 
recognized as such.  Both approaches provide a biopolitical analysis with special 
attention to the religious dimensions involved.  Both work together making 
possible a unique analysis of modern politics, by first questioning the negative 
assertion of bare life and creation of a politics through this exclusion, and then 
through a series of ideas about what we become after such an exclusion occurs.   
 Further, while a hesitancy to approach sovereignty exists in Foucault, this 
hesitancy is the consequence of sovereignty evolving, not disappearing.  
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Sovereignty evolved beyond an essential connection with territory, delinked 
from needing some established zone that it can exercise sovereignty over.  
Agamben shares this evolution with Foucault, as he focuses less on the 
relationship between territory and sovereignty, and instead on the nomos of the 
“camp.”  The camp in this form of exclusion plays a similar role in Agamben as 
the concept of racism for Foucault.  Both the camp and racism involve producing 
a “we” over and against an unrecognizable (politically and biologically) other.   
 Finally, one further crucial connection between Foucault and Agamben 
bears mentioning.  By focusing on sacrifice in Agamben, we see the role 
instrumentalization plays and the crisis signified through the sacrifice of abstract 
life.  I disagree with Foucault on one point, as he writes:  
The theory of right basically knew only the individual and society:  the 
contracting individual and the social body constituted by the voluntary or 
implicit contract among individuals.  Disciplines, for their part, dealt with 
individuals and their bodies in practical terms.  What we are dealing with 
in this new technology of power is not exactly society (or at least not the 
social body, as defined by the jurists), nor is it the individual-as-body.  It is 
a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they 
might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted. Biopolitics 
deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a 
problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and 
as power's problem.  And I think that biopolitics emerges at this time.41 
 
The focus on population is a result of biopolitics, not its beginning.  Foucault 
captures the reality of the contemporary situation quite well in his notions of 
racism and war waged on behalf of life paradoxically relying on a more 
fundamental capability of a military technologies that could potentially eradicate 
all life.  Due to the possibility of species annihilation a new politics that seeks to 
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articulate and define what constitutes life and its subsequent management arises.  
Understanding biopolitics from this perspective seems much more in conjunction 
with Foucault’s often quoted remark, “For millennia, man remained what he was 
for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence: 
modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being 
into question.”42 
 The capacity to eradicate life and sacrifice life opens the central 
biopolitical moment and most immediate crisis.  That which constitutes life 
remains contested while the ability to eradicate life has actualized.  A biopolitical 
analysis must attend to this fundamental crisis – a crisis recognized and focused 
upon by both Foucault and Agamben.  In this crisis we can begin to detect the 
unique problem which terrorism presents.   The threat of terrorism forces the 
related issues of exclusion and racism to the forefront precisely because terrorism 
threatens life at such a profoundly deep level.  
 
Other Uses of Biopolitics 
 
 The work of Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri, most notably in their 
Empire trilogy, highlight concepts of biopolitics that dramatically diverge with 
both Foucault and Agamben.  Their work focuses prominently on means of 
resisting current political formations, and situating biopower as a remedial force 
against political stagnancy and rigidity within modernity. The movement from 
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modernity to postmodernity signals profound and serious shifts in the language 
of politics.  With very few exceptions, modern politics articulates power as 
formally bound to sovereignty that stands over and rules the social sphere.  
Postmodernity breaks apart this notion of power as a transcendental force from 
outside the social realm of lived experience.   
 One of these breaks between the modern and postmodern comes in the 
form of labor.  For the modern period, labor was instinctively conjoined with the 
material production of things, objects, food, shelter, and other tangible artifacts.  
The laborer would go to a factory or shop and manufacture a material product.  
As a result, one could easily measure labor through the matrix of output and 
profit.  If a certain number of objects were made, profit would directly align with 
the surplus value of each object produced beyond the costs of covering raw 
materials.  However, in new forms of economic production, work and labor have 
evolved beyond the measurable production, distribution, and consumption of 
particular objects, as work transitions into a socially encompassing process 
whereby the products made are intricately attached to the “life” of the laborer.  
Works shifts to encompass more than the factories and workshops and considers 
more abstract ideas such as mental labor, personal labor, and relationships.  As 
new forms of labor arise, new forms of monetization simultaneously arise.  As 
Negri writes: 
Today, ‘work’ refers to the entirety of social activity.  In order to 
understand this mutation we must keep in mind the struggles and 
transformations of organization of labor since 1917, an insurrectional 
challenge on the part of the workers that, for the long term (what some, 
precisely, have labeled the ‘short century’), plunged the whole of 
organized labor into crisis.  The first response to the aggression of living 
work towards the capitalist system took the form of the New Deal, and 
then developed as the general spread of the welfare state in the central 
 47 
regions of the planet, through the imposition of biopolitical forms of 
organization and exploitation of both society and the state.43 
 
Because of this radically new form of labor and production, resistance to such 
deeply entrenched modes of production becomes infinitely more challenging.  
Foucault, in his work, certainly attends to pressing matters of economic change, 
however, for Hardt and Negri the economic aspects are central, and in many 
ways exclusively the content of biopolitics.   
 Biopolitics arises in response to these new economic challenges.  Whereas 
biopolitics for Foucault primarily finds its impetus for action in the management 
of populations, and thereby subsumes economics under this larger managerial 
goal, for Hardt and Negri, biopolitics directly confronts the economic system, 
providing a necessary resistance to the shifting and often debilitating realities of 
a pervasive economic reality.  In fact, Hard and Negri criticize Foucault for his 
lack of available strategies for resisting this new form of politics.  They remedy 
this lack through introducing the concept of the “multitude.”   
 They derive this idea of the multitude from the work of Spinoza, Negri 
writes:  
Spinoza’s Political Treatise is the work that founds, in theoretical terms, 
modern European democratic political thought.  The assertion is a 
rigorous one, one that in the first place rules out the generic reduction of 
the modern idea of democracy, based on the concept of the multitude, to 
the idea of democracy proper to ancient, specifically Greco-Latin, thought.  
In Spinoza, the specific and immediate basis of the idea of democracy, and 
even more so the concept of the multitude, is human universality.  In the 
democratic thought of the Ancients this is not given, the freedom is the 
attribute of the citizens of the polis only.  On this score Spinoza 
distinguishes himself from the other democratic thinkers of his historical 
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era: in other currents of modern democratic thought, the idea of 
democracy is not in fact conceived in terms of the immediacy of political 
expression, but rather it is defined in the form of the abstract transfer of 
sovereignty and the alienation of natural right.  On the contrary, the 
revolutionary character of Spinoza’s political proposal consists in the 
conjuncture of the concept of democracy and a radical constructive theory 
of natural right…he elaborates not mere elements but rather democratic 
thought in its entirety – and at the level, as yet still larval, of mass 
capitalist society.44   
 
This form of democracy, living through the multitude, significantly differs from 
the concepts of biopower and biopolitics introduced by Foucault.  For Hardt and 
Negri the core of biopolitics does not reside in the management of some 
population, but in its allowing for new possibilities of political resistance in 
conjunction with Spinoza’s idea of the “multitude.”   
 One such difference from Foucault lies in the way they distinguish 
between biopolitics and biopower.  For Foucault, biopower signifies the essential 
condition whereby sovereignty shifts and focuses less on maintaining the power 
over a territory but maintaining and applying power to the very fabric of life.  
Biopolitics then is simply the different mechanisms, institutions, and formations 
of this more fundamental form of biopower.  For Hardt and Negri, conversely, 
biopolitics does not convey the means to achieving biopower’s goal, but as a 
point of potential alternative subjectivities with revolutionary tendencies set to 
resist biopower’s seemingly totalitarian grip on life.45  Biopolitics is a struggle of 
freedom internal to the system of biopower.   
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 The multitude, according to Negri’s reading of Spinoza, is life.  It is not 
life caught up in the tensions of the biopolitical practice of exclusion/inclusion as 
outlined in Agamben, but life in a much more immediate sense, life prior to the 
polis.  As much as the regimes of biopower may try, they can never legitimately 
capture and control the life of the multitude, because such life, such pure 
democratic immediacy, will always exceed the strict boundaries of biopower.  
Put differently, bare life exceeds and resists the docile codifications of life made 
political.  This excessive capability is precisely the essential structure of the 
biopolitical.  Borrowing from Deleuze and Guittari, they insist on the nomadic 
function and character of life, always resistant to and uncontainable by the form 
and workings of biopower.46   
 Terrorism may seem to conform to this system and even participate as 
part of the revolutionary work of the multitude.  In many instances, Hardt and 
Negri speak about the multitude as a warring force, but they make a distinction 
between this warring democratic multitude and outright terrorism, arguing that 
terrorism works against biopower as a symmetrical or asymmetrical force.  By 
directly attacking the system of power in a way that borrows from that power’s 
understanding of war and violence, it ends up replicating and reproducing the 
same violence.47  The proposed concept of a warring multitude always wages a 
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war against war itself, demonstrating the very ineffectuality of violence.48  This 
type of warring against war attempts to counteract biopower not by direct 
opposition or by using the forms of war that are part of Biopower.  It attempts 
and hopes to be radically different.  Terrorism, something they vehemently resist 
and criticize as ultimately impotent, does not function in the framework of this 
democratic war because it simply borrows the failed techniques of biopower, 
rather than formulating something new and affirmative.   
 Further, democratic violence for Hardt and Negri can only be legitimate 
when serving a defensive end, and never an offensive one.  Violence can protect 
what the multitude creates, but it can never be the foundation of that creative 
impulse.  Democratic violence “does not initiate the revolutionary process but 
rather comes only at the end, when the political and social transformation has 
already taken place, to defend its accomplishments.”49 
 Terrorism then would fail the litmus test provided for articulating 
democratically legitimate violence because it seeks to found something creative 
and revolutionary through the violent act.  But this notion of defensive violence 
does not appear to be essentially or even substantially different from the type of 
violence Foucault introduces through the concept of racism.  This violence finds 
justification through the defense of life itself against forces that seek to 
undermine or destroy life.  This racist form of violence introduced in Foucault 
would appear as thoroughly appropriate within the framework of defensive 
																																																						
48 Ibid., 342.   
 
49 Ibid, 344.   
 51 
violence established by Hardt and Negri.  As such they simply fail to fully 
consider the problem terrorism presents to modern political and biopolitical 
institutions.  By disregarding terror as creative and thereby a misuse of violence, 
they end up supporting the violence Foucault finds alarming.   
 Hardt and Negri are of course not alone in defining terrorism as 
ultimately impotent.   Many scholars from a variety of political perspectives 
share in this general view.  Contrary to this position, there are those that offer 
something that appears in many ways to be praise for terror as the only method 
of resistance still available within a pervasive biopolitical system.  Jean 
Baudrillard falls into this category.   
 Baudrillard invokes the term terror in connection to a global power that 
terrorism hopes to unravel.  Globalization involves not just economics but a 
robust symbolic exchange facilitated by technology, cohesive markets, and rapid 
informational distribution.  Universal human rights, freedom, culture, and 
democracy all get subsumed within this globalizing force, a force which 
continuously grows in power.  This process transforms universal values such as 
these into commodities, which can be valued, exchanged, regulated, and 
consumed like other any other commodity.50  As a result of this vigorous 
transformation, democratic processes and protections mutate into mechanized 
and instrumentalized monstrosities of their previous forms.   
 As globalization grows in power and scope, Baudrillard cautions against 
entering a moment in which no alternative to this ubiquitous influence remains.  
																																																						
50 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism (New York: Verso, 2002), 89.   
 52 
Biopolitics then is a type of historical limit point, and upon passing it we can find 
no lesser version than the completely pervasive power over life. In this situation, 
the significance of the singular vanishes, even singularity of experience becomes 
a symbol interchangeable with other experiences.  Terrorism offers a resistance to 
this perverse symbolic exchange, remaining something totally and completely 
negative in the terms of symbolic value.  Terrorism is anti-value and as such anti-
symbol.  It is not merely a religiously motivated act, or competing system of 
ideas but instead a foundational disruption of a system that transforms 
everything into commodity by being a singularity which it cannot transform, and 
which it cannot give value.51 
  Baudrillard envisions 9/11 as an “absolute event” because it is a “pure 
event uniting within itself all the events that have never taken place.”52  This 
terror attack, unlike anything before it, exposes the system of globalization to 
something genuinely novel.  He continues: 
When global power monopolizes the situation to this extent, when there is 
such a formidable condensation of all functions in the technocratic 
machinery, and when no alternative form of thinking is allowed, what 
other way is there but a terroristic situational transfer?  It was the system 
itself which created the objective conditions for this brutal retaliation.  By 
seizing all the cards for itself, it forced the Other to change the rules.  And 
the new rules are fierce ones, because the stakes are fierce.  To a system 
whose very excess of power poses an insoluble challenge, the terrorists 
respond with a definitive act which is also not susceptible of exchange.  
Terrorism is the act that restores an irreducible singularity to the heart of a 
system of generalized exchange.  All the singularities (species, individuals 
and cultures) that have paid with their deaths for the installation of a 
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global circulation governed by a single power are taking their revenge 
today through this terroristic situational transfer.53 
 
Terrorism does not produce or establish something other or beyond the global 
biopolitical order, and it offers nothing hopeful or redemptive.  It provides no 
ideological backing and does not try to change the world into a better place.  It 
can only ever hope to, “radicalize the world through sacrifice.”54  Baudrillard 
offers up the helpful claim that if, in fact, Islam did rise to take a global position 
of power terrorism would revolt against it.  Terrorism goes beyond Islamic or 
religious duty, and simply serves as a pure counter to the global order of 
symbolic exchange.  It lacks all instrumentalization or basic utility and instead 
serves as the complete and infinitely destructive opposite of all possible utility.  
We continue to search for meanings or a series of causes behind an act of terror 
when terrorism precisely and fully represents the very meaninglessness and 
absence of all causality. 
 Terrorism creates a vacuum at the center of global power because it does 
not directly confront global power but instead allows global power to unravel 
itself around this center point of absolute meaninglessness.  The tools global 
power uses in approaching terrorism are the tools of power, and as a result only 
work to undo power rather than undo the damage of terrorism.  Global power 
ends up undoing itself, attacking itself, and diminishing its own substantive 
ideas of freedom, law, and justice.   In the end our solutions, or more precisely 
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the very idea of a possible solution becomes the primary force of terror.  As 
Baudrillard asserts: 
There is no remedy for this extreme situation, and war is certainly not a 
solution, since it merely offers a rehash of the past, with the same deluge 
of military forces, bogus information, senseless bombardment, emotive 
and deceitful language, technological deployment and brainwashing.  
Like the Gulf War: a non-event, an event that does not really take place.  
And this indeed is its raison-d'être:  to substitute, for a real and 
formidable, unique and unforeseeable event, a repetitive, rehashed 
pseudo-event.  The terrorist attack corresponds to a precedence of the 
event over all interpretative models; whereas this mindlessly military, 
technological war corresponds, conversely, to the model's precedence over 
the event, and hence to a conflict over phony stakes, to a situation of 'no 
contest’; War as a continuation of the absence of politics by other means.55 
 
While Baudrillard continually insists both in language and ideas on 
“globalized power” and never uses the terms biopolitics or biopower, some clear 
connections exist between these concepts.  Global order is about a series of 
symbolic exchanges.  Everything is given symbolic meaning and easily 
substituted in the larger system of exchange operations.  Death however has not 
been given symbolic placement in this system of exchanges, but according to 
Baudrillard has been pushed out.56 Baudrillard then does provide a truly unique 
theoretical position on biopolitics as the commodification of life in the abstract.   
Finally, the work of Roberto Esposito attempts to remedy some of the 
overly optimistic tendencies in Hardt and Negri and the more pessimistic 
elements of Agamben, but in a way that fails to address some of the deepening 
global political crisis biopower and biopolitics tend to elucidate.  Esposito begins 
his three-part work by examining the foundation of the community, and 
																																																						
55 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism, 34.  
  
56 Foucault makes a similar observation in Society Must be Defended, 248.   
 55 
upending communitarian reliance on the dialectic between common and proper.  
Communitarian definitions think of the community in terms of what they hold in 
common versus what they hold properly as individuals.  This commonality 
could be anything from ethnicity to shared values, or anything that brings 
individuals, as individuals, together, and then belonging to a totality “produced 
by their union.”57 Instead Esposito investigates the etymological elements of 
communitas with intense focus upon munus, and the idea of obligation.58  Rather 
than envisioning and articulating community along the lines of what individuals 
hold in common, Esposito offers an account of the community through what 
individuals owe.  Individuals owe to the communitas their identity and 
subjectivity.  The community, “expropriates them of their initial property (in part 
or completely), of the most proper property, namely, their very subjectivity.”59  
This proper owing of the subject exposes the individual to the contagion of living 
alongside and in relation to others.  In so much as the community exposes the 
individual to contagions it likewise offers exemption and immunization for 
certain members.  Through this immunization, as the removal of certain 
obligations for certain individuals, a way of thinking through and organizing this 
removal of obligations arises, what Esposito labels the immunization paradigm.   
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 In reading Hobbes, Esposito focuses upon the biological reality of death 
serving as the engine for Hobbes’ theory of the contract.  What humans share, 
according to Hobbes, is the fear of no longer being alive, and this fear of death 
allows for the common practices which assure or assist in warding off this most 
“powerful passion.60”  The focus on self-preservation finds fulfillment in the 
contract as the threshold between the state of nature and civil society.  For 
Hobbes the contract, the binding and willful agreement between the individual 
and sovereign, allows for specific modes of protection of the self that grant self-
preservation.   Esposito views this as the essential modern political project, 
transforming natural inclinations of self-preservation into juridical and private 
endeavors, mediated by a sovereign.  The agreements and the demand of the gift 
between individuals vanishes as the contract obliges submission to a sovereign in 
total, rendering the interaction between individuals unnecessary.  Those 
interactions can be done through the immunization of further contracts, legal 
practices, economic engagements, and bureaucratic precision.61 
 Esposito reevaluates and interrogates this immunized self-preservation 
introduced by Hobbes for the sake a more robust, but risky, contagion inducing 
interaction between individuals.  An affirmative biopolitics, and a community 
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substantiated through the gift and not through immunization, requires the risk 
of contamination by coming into genuine and intimate contact with others.62   
 The reality of our situation further accentuates this contagion-centric view 
of community.   Even in the work of Michel Foucault, the dominant view 
envisions bodies as completely discrete and impassable.  However, reality 
continually passes over the threshold of the body through a variety of bio-
techniques, including things such as transplants and vaccinations.  We have 
entered a historical period where bodies are shared and scattered globally, 
shared with other bodies in ubiquitous ways, an entire bioeconomy.63 
 Esposito offers a unique and thrilling interpretation of the biopolitical.  
Presenting not so much the overt affirmative biopolitics of Hardt and Negri, but 
at the same time not seeing the final fulfillment of biopolitics in the 
thanatopolitics endemic of Agamben’s work.  Esposito offers the possibility of an 
affirmative situation within the reality and presence of risk.  Contagion and 
contamination entail a risk between individuals, as the giving over of a gift 
entails real possible loss.  The affirmative possibilities are not inevitable, and as 
such paying attention to the starkness of that risk, something both Agamben and 
Foucault return to time and time again in their work, remains an important 
endeavor in any investigation of the biopolitical.   
 Hardt and Negri, Baudrillard, and Esposito do not exhaust all the 
theoretical work and concepts of biopolitics; however, by examining each some 
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summary of the divergence that biopolitics has undergone in recent years is 
made possible.  Many theorists now use this term in hopes of better 
understanding the contours of a politics that has gone farther and produced 
more institutions than previous formations of governmental power.  I return to 
Foucault and Agamben as a primary and advantageous way of understanding 
the concept, particularly as it relates to terrorism for a few reasons.  Most 
importantly, Agamben and Foucault both attend to the formative and necessary 
elements of religion within their respective definitions and genealogies.  Often, 
biopolitical theory avoids or ignores the religious dimensions of the current 
political age, or misappropriates religion as somehow external to biopolitics.  
This miscalculation can have disastrous effects in how we come to understand 
the problem of terrorism, as I will show later.  In using both Foucault and 
Agamben’s outline of biopolitics I arrive back at the primary distinguishing 
characteristic of this biopolitical age: terrorism presents a unique problem for 
biopolitics precisely because biopolitics addresses terrorism as a problem to be 
overcome through further accentuations of biopower.  A crisis and paradox 
remain: a crisis and paradox that terrorism highlights.   
 Thinkers point out different ways the fundamental political crisis of our 
time shows itself.  Bare life, the thing which politics always separated itself from 
since Aristotle, has been brought into the realm of the political.  But the political 
realm cannot house something so excessively large, so abundantly and infinitely 
impossible to name, symbolize, and control. Terrorism, in targeting life explicitly, 
re-announces the fragility of life and radically undermines the attempts to 
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preserve life in diverse ways.  In response, the biopolitical project attempts to 
hide this fragility and the related failure to account for life.   
 This is the nature of the crisis of the biopolitical, beginning with this 
fundamental crisis of instrumentalizing life, and then further by analyzing social 
practices through this lens. Terrorism mimics and betrays this central crisis of the 
biopolitical. It is possible there is no such thing as terrorism and instead there are 
simply acts of violence, with varying degrees of political or religious rhetoric 
attached to them, that come to be known by biopolitical institutions as “terror.”  
But this field and set of phenomena we call terrorism is only called such in so 
much as it participates in this system of instrumentalization.  Terrorism, as a 
discreet set of activities, partnerships, networks, and violence only exists within 
the realm of global power.  Global power creates terrorism through its 
definitions and brings this meaningless act, according to Baudrillard, into the 
system of symbolic exchanges and therefore gives it meaning.  Kunming attests 
to this.  To name it a terrorist attack gives it a certain value in the system of 
exchanges, a system essentially defined by the biopolitical paradox.   
 If there ever was such a thing as terrorism, 9/11 was quite possibly the 
last act of terror, as it genuinely resisted such symbolic making and stood outside 
this system of hyper-instrumentalization.  But since, as one would expect from a 
system that instrumentalizes and compartmentalizes everything, even life itself, 
terrorism has come to be caught up in the same system of exchanges and used to 
continue this crisis project.   
 The process of constructing terrorism, which mimics and repeats the 
instrumental crisis of biopolitics, comes about as the product of security.   In the 
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coming chapters I will look at three specific forms of explaining terror-as 
excessively violent, as corrupted religion, and as a negative economic force-and 
show how each attempt to protect the crisis of biopolitics ends up only 
reaffirming the ideas presented here.   
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Chapter Two:  Defining Terrorism:  Economics, the Border, and 
Biopolitics 
 
The Definitions of Terrorism 
 
Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics and not a problem for biopolitics.  
Much of the reason for this lies in the ways biopolitical institutions and 
neoliberal governments define and confront terrorism.  Defining terror grounds 
the possibilities of confrontation, while at the same time, the confrontation with 
terror produces definitions.  These concepts interact with each other in 
contemporary political theory and media portrayals of the ongoing war on 
terror.   
 In whatever definition and confrontation with terror, biopolitical regimes 
are hopelessly destined to fail, because terrorism is not a problem which 
biopolitics can solve.  Rather the ways it defines and confronts terror reaffirm the 
processes of biopolitics, namely the management of populations and the 
attending race wars, the reduction of political life to bare life, and the 
exclusion/inclusion mechanisms.  Additionally, because biopolitics relies on 
religious and theological concepts it further exacerbates a deeper religious 
schism in the contemporary world.  
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To show this reaffirmation of biopolitics through confrontation and definitions of 
terror I focus on three of these definitional/confrontational forms.  First, 
contemporary discourse often describes terrorism as a problem of economic 
destabilization.  Terrorism takes away from an otherwise smooth global market 
where everyone would eventually prosper, or conversely, if economic prosperity 
was attained in certain areas of the globe terrorism would subsequently vanish.  
Second, the definitions offered claim terrorism is excessively violent.  The 
definition and confrontation here focuses on the ways in which terrorism 
produces terror because of just how violent it is, especially when compared to 
state forms of violence.  Finally, contemporary discourse articulates terrorism as 
religious fervor gone awry.   
 While these definitions and confrontational frameworks do not exhaust all 
possibilities, they do provide a helpful way of organizing and codifying the 
variety of definitions available for terrorism.  Definitions are difficult as they 
serve as representations for a wide variety of potential actions, motivations, and 
justifications within the mind of the terrorist.  But by examining definitions 
employed one can see the repetition of these three general themes.   
 For example, the 1994 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 
defines terrorism in the following way:  
 
  1.    The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their 
unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, 
as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, 
including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and 
peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States; 
  
 2.    Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave 
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violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may 
pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly 
relations among States, hinder international cooperation and aim at the 
destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic 
bases of society; 
  
3.    Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror 
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.1 
 
Part one emphasizes the way terrorism destabilizes otherwise friendly actions in 
an efficient economy.  Part three emphasizes violent capabilities connected to a 
broad series of motivations for that violence, with religion included both 
implicitly and explicitly.   
 A similar definition from the Arab Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism focuses on the way terror spreads a unique agenda as:  
any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs 
for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, 
causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing 
their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the 
environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy 
or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource.2  
 
This definition more directly focuses on harm to natural resources, showing the 
connection of excessive violence to the economic negativity of terror.   
 The European Union offers a definition of terrorism both as an abstract act 
and intention.  Terrorism is  
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seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government 
or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any 
act, or seriously destablising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organization.3   
 
It then continues with a list of specifically restricted behaviors that may constitute 
terrorism: 
Attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; attacks upon the 
physical integrity of a person; kidnapping or hostage taking; causing 
extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport 
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed 
platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private 
property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; 
seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 
manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, 
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as 
research into, and development of,  biological and chemical weapons; 
release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the 
effect of which is to endanger human life; interfering with or disrupting 
the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the 
effect of which is to endanger human life; threatening to commit any of 
the acts listed.4 
 
Again, this definition focuses on violence and the threat of resources.   
Finally, the United States government often relies on legal definitions of 
terrorism, primarily used by governmental institutions such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations: 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines "international terrorism" and "domestic terrorism" for 
purposes of Chapter 113B of the Code, entitled "Terrorism”: 
"International terrorism" means activities with the following three 
characteristics: 
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§ Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal 
or state law; 
§ Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
§ Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or 
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum. 
 
"Domestic terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics: 
 
§ Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; 
§ Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination. or kidnapping; and 
§ Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b defines the term "federal crime of terrorism" as an offense 
that: 
 
§ Is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; 
and 
§ Is a violation of one of several listed statutes, including § 930(c) 
(relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack on a federal 
facility with a dangerous weapon); and § 1114 (relating to killing or 
attempted killing of officers and employees of the U.S.).5 
 
 Largely speaking, these definitions show the political ways of 
understanding terror in terms of similar characteristics: a focus on violence that 
has some excessive element and some threat to an otherwise efficient economic 
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force.  Outside the realm of governmental agencies and offices, in the world of 
critical theorists, political philosophers, and religious scholars, other definitions 
exist but, again, they share in the above-mentioned common traits of economic 
negativity, excessive violence, and religious fervency. For example, James and 
Brenda Lutz offer the following definition:  
Terrorism involves political objectives and goals.  It relies on violence or 
the threat of violence.  It is designed to generate fear in a target audience 
that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence.  The violence 
involves an organization and not isolated individuals.  Terrorism involves 
a non-state actor or actors as the perpetrator of the violence, the victims, or 
both.  Finally, terrorism is violence that is designed to create power in 
situation in which power has previously been lacking (i.e. the violence 
attempts to enhance the power base of the organization undertaking the 
action.6   
 
They go on to emphasize the overt political aims of terrorism as the essential 
characteristic of terrorism vis-à-vis other forms of violence.  While political in its 
foundation, Lutz and Lutz offer different formations terrorism can take:  
communal terrorism, ideological terrorism, pragmatic/instrumental terrorism.7 
A project that combined 73 definitions of terrorism covered in 55 different 
articles offered the following definition of terrorism: “Terrorism is a politically 
motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the 
pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”8 Uniquely, these authors used 
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publicity within their definition, but publicity and notoriety would be outside 
the bounds of normal economic functions.   
To this point, most of the definitions have emphasized the negative 
economic force of terrorism or the overt, unique, and excessive violence and 
tended to minimize or ignore the religious element.  However, there are many 
definitions of terror that explicitly focus on the religious dimensions.   
The work of Mark Juergensemeyer and Reza Aslan both subsume the 
economic and violent elements under the umbrella of a certain type of religious 
fervency.  Juergensmeyer’s well-known book Terror in the Mind of God and many 
of his articles express the idea that terrorist acts are motivated primarily, if not 
entirely, through the religious framework of “Cosmic War.”9  This concept of 
cosmic war not only gives it a distinctly religious shade, it does so by overtly 
contrasting itself with those more political definitions.  As Juergensmeyer writes 
in one article: 
In the contemporary political climate, therefore, religious activists have 
provided a solution to the perceived insufficiencies of Western-style 
secular politics.  As secular ties have begun to unravel in the post-Soviet 
and postcolonial era, local leaders have searched for new anchors to 
ground their social identities and political loyalties.  What is ideologically 
significant about these religious movements is their creativity.  Although 
many of them have reached back in history for ancient images and 
concepts that will give them credibility, theirs are not simply efforts to 
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resuscitate old ideas from the past.  They offer contemporary ideologies 
that meet present-day social and political needs.10 
 
For cosmic warriors, religion offers a corrupted alternative to other political 
institutions.  Cosmic war theory outlines this perversion of religion in a few 
ways.   First, cosmic war arises out of a sense of urgency and the need for 
immediate action in the world.11  The adherents of selective religious visions of 
the world see our time in history as radically at risk.  Second, the idea of victory 
in a cosmic war lies in a world exterior to this one.12  Within this worldview, 
material reality provides a disadvantageous lack of military or economic power 
to the religious adherent.  Western liberal democracy, and its attending 
globalized economy, spread so rapidly and is such an overwhelming force that 
as a result religious conceptions of the world envision a metaphysical stage for 
the struggle.  Juergensmeyer calls this process “Satanization.” Enemies are seen 
to be potentially anywhere and everywhere.13  In a traditional form of war, 
enemies are known and objectively recognizable, but in a cosmic war, it may be 
harder to locate the enemy because Satan can take many diverse forms.  Further, 
opposing the process of “Satanization” justifies actions of the religious terrorist 
through participation with a deity.14  The deity confirms and sanctions the 
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terrorist’s activities because they are directed at a metaphysical enemy; the 
religious terrorist participates alongside the divine, while the enemy participates 
with Satan.   
 The result of defining the enemy as participating in the actions of Satan 
allows the cosmic warrior to partition the world into binary categories of good 
and evil.15  This partitioning prohibits any middle ground between the two 
extremes and consequently justifies violence against anyone, even children.16  The 
ability to distinguish combatant from civilian erodes as a consequence of the 
cosmic warrior’s logic; a logic that categorizes everyone into warring camps 
regardless of the individual’s will or desire.   
 The starkness of this binary division makes any peaceful negotiation 
impossible.17 In the mind of the cosmic warrior any enemy, as a participant on the 
side of Satan, lies and cannot be trusted to adhere to the outline of a peaceful 
settlement.  Also, compromising in a cosmic war could put the warrior outside 
the graces of the divine figure, and therefore subject to metaphysical 
punishment.   
 Finally, this binary division between those on the side of the divine and 
those on the side of Satan gives meaning to suffering.18  The root cause of any 
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suffering experienced by the cosmic warrior lies in the actions of the enemy.  
Suffering and the enemy eternally coexist as partners and as pollutants in the 
divinely intended order of the world, resulting in a situation whereby ending the 
enemy provides the only means of ending suffering.   
 Such religiously grounded definitions allow alternative strategies for 
confronting terrorism.  As Reza Aslan writes, 
It is within such 'identity vacuums' that Global Jihadism thrives.  For kids 
like Hasib Hussain, whose religious and cultural affinities have been cast 
by their societies as other, Jihadism is more than an alternative form of 
identity - it is a reactionary identity, a means of social rebellion.  It is an 
identity formed through the deliberate linking of local and global 
grievances - both real and perceived - to create a single, shared narrative 
of suffering and injustice.  And only by severing that link, and disrupting 
the narrative, can Global Jihadism be defeated.19 
 
Increasingly, theorists and policy advisors within areas that traditionally 
reproduce political definitions of terror are taking heed of such religious 
definitions.  One example, an article by Heather S. Gregg a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, argues that changing the way western democracies think 
about terrorists with respect to religion and cosmic warfare, will allow for new 
strategic options in dealing with terrorism.  As she suggests: 
Broadly, U.S. policy should aim to depolarize the Manichean thinking of 
these cosmic warriors and not play into it.  Specifically, the U.S. 
government should stray away from making this a war of values, which 
mirrors the rhetoric of Al Qaeda's ideology and feeds the logic that both 
sides are locked in a zero sum battle of right versus wrong, where the 
other side want to take away the other's way of life.  Describing the 
GWOT as a battle where the terrorists 'want to take away our freedom' 
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and other values, places the conflict in the spiritual realm, making it ripe 
for cosmic war.20 
 
Beyond the examples and definitions given, there are those who think 
outside of both the political and religious frameworks as they define terrorism, 
offering a more critical approach.  These theorists borrow from a wide variety of 
academic disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, economics, religious 
studies, philosophy, and political theory to articulate new and different ways of 
understanding this phenomenon.  Two examples expanding the field of terror 
studies are Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism by Jason Franks and the article “The 
Case for a Critical Terrorism Studies” by Richard Jackson, Jereon Gunning, and 
Marie Breen Smyth.   
 Jason Franks expands and provides for a more sophisticated reading of 
terrorism than what he calls “orthodox terror studies:”21 
The study of terrorism has not progressed beyond the realist positivist 
state-centric approach because it is a discourse created and employed with 
the express purpose of providing the state with an understanding of 
terrorism that is based upon a relative legitimacy.  This allows the state to 
deal with terrorism without engaging in a roots debate, as it perceives 
terrorism as a threat to its security.  It can therefore employ whatever 
means it chooses against whomever it wishes.22 
 
By focusing on the covert power structures that influence the ways official 
governmental agencies come to recognize terror, Franks attempts to uncover 
entrenched political patterns.  He still defines terrorism as lethal, political 
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violence but expands the motivations for this violence beyond simple definitions 
provided in more traditional forms of terrorist studies.  Traditionally defined, 
terrorism undermines a state-centric model of governance, but by moving away 
from state-centric approaches and seeing terrorism within a framework of 
conflict, he shows the way terrorists may have legitimate political claims that the 
state ignores.  He then provides four different perspectives for holistically 
investigating terrorism: the state, the non-state actor, the systemic issues, and the 
individual.   
 At the level of the state, Franks shows the way official governmental 
programs, policies, and agencies exacerbate and motivate terrorism through its 
responses to terror.23  The non-state actor potentially has legitimate grievances 
regarding valid socio-economic needs and because of this disenfranchisement 
they may strive for legitimacy through violence.  This requires the state to 
recognize the role of non-state actors in global politics.24  Systemic issues may also 
contribute to the motivations of the terrorist, in that cultural or historical 
narratives could escalate violence when conflicts arise.  Franks argues that 
ignoring the historical and cultural background of the non-state actors could 
result in missing important elements within the reasoning behind committing 
acts of violence.  Such background influences can arise in the form of ideology or 
religious conviction.  Finally, the use of violence can be the consequence of 
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extremely private concerns of a lone individual.25  He offers these different 
perspectives in hope of providing new solutions to the problems terrorism 
presents, arguing,  
The aim of this study is to relocate terrorism out of this relative moral 
quagmire of 'subjective' politics and into the realm of conflict where it can 
be seen simply as an act of violence within a wider context.  This will 
allow the understanding of terrorism to develop alongside changes in 
contemporary conflict and will provide it with access to a roots debate 
and the whole spectrum of multi-dimensional techniques available for 
conflict resolution.26  
 
 Critical Terrorism Studies brings together an eclectic interdisciplinary group 
of theorists to describe the limitations of current research on terrorism, and in 
response, provide a different approach to the problem.  From this initial project 
sprang a journal series, Critical Studies in Terrorism, that serves as the primary 
medium for unique critical perspectives on the issue.   
 Both the initial project and the resulting journal share the same 
fundamental idea regarding much of the work within the field of terror studies. 
Describing the contemporary situation, the editors write:  
More recently, it has been possible to detect a growing sense of unease 
from many different quarters with both the state of much current 
terrorism studies research output and the practical outworking of Western 
counterterrorism policies - which are often rooted in, or at least 
legitimised with reference to, the orthodox terrorism studies 
literature...Similarly, the mixed achievements of the global war on terror, 
together with its morally disturbing and counter-productive aspects such 
as foreign invasion, the Guantanamo Bay internment camp, extraordinary 
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rendition, the use of torture, and erosion of civil liberties, has engendered 
a growing sense of political disquiet dismay.27   
 
Like Franks, the assertions here expand the scope and reach of research into 
terrorism, taking more seriously systemic issues of globalization, identity, and 
socio-economic factors.   
 In general, the critical approach to terrorism resists orthodox approaches 
to understanding terrorism and seek out new possibilities of engagement 
through critical theory.  Not all the theorists within this approach agree, as some 
tension comes about over the term “critical.”28  Even so, the general goal of 
finding solutions to the problem remain, even if the debate shifts to focus on 
uprooting tacit assumptions that the field relies upon. 
 Regardless of the type of definition offered, whether from a policy and 
agency perspective, a religious perspective, or a critical perspective; all agree on 
some essential difference between western liberal forms of violence and acts of 
terrorism.  While critical terrorism studies attempt to unpack the forms of state 
violence that may exacerbate or motivate terrorists, it still maintains a 
fundamental division by insisting that terrorism is a problem with possible 
solutions.   
 My approach seeks to define terrorism not as a distinct and dichotomous 
form of violence separate from western liberal forms violence; due to the fact 
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that, within the biopolitical epoch, terrorism is not an exterior problem with a 
solution.  Instead, it comes about as the secretions and manifestation of a 
fundamental crisis within biopolitics.  This crisis manifests in a few distinct, but 
overlapping, forms of defining terror as offered above:  first, terrorism as a 
negative economic force in an otherwise smooth global ordering of goods and 
services; second, as excessively violent; and finally, as religion gone awry.   
 Initially focusing on the economic issues of terrorism demands some 
reduction in scope.  The global economy is a vast, tangled and complicated 
phenomenon, but much can be detected about the interactions between biopower 
and terror by taking into consideration the role and presence of the border.   
 
The Border 
 
 As a preliminary claim, the narrative around terrorism emphasizes a 
negative economic consequence of terror.  By looking at the complicated 
relationship between the border and economic trade, a counter narrative arises 
that shows the productive elements of terrorism connected to the globalized 
economy.   
This counter narrative begins with the movement of goods and services 
across a globalized landscape and the requirement of borders over which these 
goods and services travel.  At first glance, the border serves as an ideal type of 
heterotopic space described by Michel Foucault, as borders bring into one place 
several unique factors.  The border acts as component of culture making, 
bordering off one cultural milieu from another, and the movement over the 
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border presents a deviation from that cultural norm.  The border provides the 
internal citizen stability and political identification and at the same time, they are 
spaces where individuals in transition exist not as singular political subjects, but 
as a subject between identities.29  Additionally, borders bring together varied 
historical processes into a single recognized formation, and are the spaces where 
cultural ideas evolve.  Wars are waged to fortify or expand borders and function 
in different ways: as porous or rigid depending on the societal shifts over time.  
The border also brings together into a single space things that are generally 
incompatible.30  For example, they bring into contact two very distinct sets of 
codes and laws.  The border not only spatializes the relationships between two 
national territories, it affirms the entire international order.  Finally, the border 
both opens and closes, it can be crossed and it can prohibit movement.31  The 
process, codes, and laws of the border allow and disallow crossing under a 
variety of different conditions and with complex consequences.  As Foucault 
writes, these spaces,  
look like pure and simple openings, but that, generally, conceal curious 
exclusions.  Everybody can enter into those heterotopian emplacements, 
but in fact it is only an illusion: one believes to have entered and, by the 
very fact of entering, one is excluded.32 
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As we can see from Foucault’s conception of hetertopias as applied to the 
border, these spaces define much of our political lives, while remaining 
hopelessly fragile and impotent as the points of transgression.  Economies 
demand porous borders, while at the same time demanding rigidity as 
protection from potentially negative elements.  The challenge for state 
institutions is the management of such a paradoxical condition.  In response to 
this challenge, some states have opted for more stringent regulation and the 
production of visible signs of those regulations through the spectacle of the wall.  
Wendy Brown speaks of this proliferation of wall building, highlighting three 
central paradoxes made evident in the flurry of fence building:   
First, even as those across a wide political spectrum – neoliberals, 
cosmopolitans, humanitarians, and left activists – fantasize a world 
without borders (whether consequent to global entrepreneurship, global 
markets, global citizenship, or global governance), nation-states, rich and 
poor, exhibit a passion for wall building.  Second, within the ostensibly 
triumphant universal political form, democracy (heralded by European 
post-Marxists, Islamic secularists, or American neoconservatives, even if 
each inflects democracy differently), we confront not only barricades, but 
passageways through them segregating high-end business traffic, 
ordinary travelers, and aspiring entrants deemed suspect by virtue of 
origin or appearance.  Third, in a time featuring capacities for destruction 
historically unparalleled in their combined potency, miniaturization, and 
mobility, from bodies wired for explosion to nearly invisible biochemical 
toxins, these deadly but incorporeal powers are perversely answered by 
the stark physicalism of walls.  So, three paradoxes: one featuring 
simultaneous opening and blocking, one featuring universalization 
combined with exclusion and stratification, and one featuring net worked 
and virtual power met by physical barriers.33  
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Internal and External Boundaries 
 
One can easily reduce the paradox down to a question of simply identifying 
friends from enemies, repurposing Carl Schmitt’s primary definition of the 
political.34  But the relationships are more complicated, as Aihwa Ong shows 
through adopting Agamben’s notions of biopolitics.  She argues that borders are 
simultaneously permissive and regulative, and individuals are subject to a 
multiplicity of borders and spaces of exclusion within the bordered nation-state.  
Tensions at the border between opposing states, also exist inside the border, 
making the friend/enemy distinction more complicated.   
 Classic models of political sovereignty focus on exterior and interior 
relationships demarcated by national boundaries.  Contemporary biopolitical 
forms of governance additionally demarcate the interior of the nation with 
different levels and modes of sovereign activity for different populations within 
the territory.  If a certain segment of the population generates economic growth, 
less restrictions and disciplinary powers are placed on those populations, 
particularly when it comes to passing over the border.35  On the other hand, 
should a population antagonize or detract from perceived economic growth, 
disciplinary power increases, especially as it comes to passing over the border 
unhindered.  The interior national territory does not possess a homogenous form 
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of sovereignty, and instead has different types of sovereign action upon different 
populations, creating a patchwork of different governmental policies within the 
same national boundary.36 
 This patchwork results in complications with international arrangements 
regarding borders.  While Agamben tends to focus on negative exceptions to the 
law, those figures excluded from the legal order, Ong reverses this proposition, 
focusing on positive exclusionary practices.   National boundaries, sovereign 
independence, and trade restrictions may be suspended for the sake of economic 
growth and development.37  As a result, individuals supersede normal functions 
of the law at the border, and can move freely through international zones 
provided they offer some special economic advantage.  Regular legal 
maintenance and penalties at the border still apply to those who offer little or no 
economic advantage.   
 Ong and Brown both demonstrate the ways in which internal and external 
boundaries contribute to smooth flowing economies.  Etienne Balibar, on the 
other hand, argues that in addition to the economic factors involved, borders 
produce identities.  By producing stable identities within a border, it reduces 
potential complexities between various groups.38  This allows increased 
management by the state over a homogenous grouping of citizen-subjects, and 
accurately measures the populations within that border.  Borders allow for an 
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epistemological goal of recording each individual citizen-subject, organizing the 
territory and maintaining a stable but porous border.  Within Bablibar’s 
articulation, borders do more than offer a point of crossing but help construct a 
larger international collection of sovereignties that manage and continually 
produce the border.  Further, such borders do not mean the same thing for 
everyone: for certain populations the border may represent an exotic vacation 
while for others the border produces anxiety and fear of potential legal 
retribution.   
 
Biometrics: The Movement of Bodies 
 
Advancements in the field of biometrics, which transform the body into a 
series of biological data points, also contribute to the inclusion and exclusion 
practices at the border.   However, biopolitics and the taking up of life as an issue 
connected to the border does not only exist in the Agambenian form of inclusion 
and exclusion, but also in the actual organization and maintenance of 
biologically lived bodies. Btihaj Ajana offers a three-part definition of biometrics 
that references some key features of biopower.  First, biometrics literally measure 
bare life.  It is a technology that takes up biological information like fingerprints, 
facial patterns, and vocalizations to identify and verify a person’s identity.39  
While these tools utilized in identity and verification are relatively new, the 
general approach by governments of measuring and cataloging the body has a 
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long history, bringing old concerns into contemporary capabilities.  Perhaps the 
most primordial of these techniques was anthropometry, a written description of 
the physical characteristics that could assist in the securing the identity of a 
suspect.  These later developed into the more common “mugshot,” which state 
agencies employ still today.  From this initial activity other technologies arose, 
such as fingerprinting.  Biometrics in contemporary society are not something 
new, but are a modern variant of long sought after processes of fixing, 
measuring, and establishing identity.   
While the technologies today greatly increase biometric capabilities, many 
older technologies are still very much a part the contemporary situation.  
Fingerprints are still readily used by governmental agencies in attempts to 
diminish and stop crime, including terrorism.  For example, the most common 
identifying element for a terror attack is the fingerprint left on bomb making 
materials.  The current database used by the FBI contains 110 million individual 
print records, while the Department for Homeland Security possesses 156 million 
records.40  These numbers may appear rather large, but are relatively small when 
compared to the ongoing biometric Aadhaar project in India, with a goal of 
enrolling 1.2 billion participants, or the entire population of India.41 
Charlotte Epstein offers a similar description of biometrics as that of 
Ajana, but with some additions to issues of risk.  She writes: 
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(Biometrics) identify a person:  these constitute sets of measurements 
derived from the print or photo of distinctive body parts (face, finger, the 
hand, the iris) or a behavioural trait (voice, signature or even keystroke) 
that constitute markers of individuality.  Access is granted to that person 
once she has been correctly identified (‘authenticated’, in the engineering 
lingo).  They are risk-based surveillance systems, where the risk-to-be-
managed is the penetration into the secure space by an unauthorized or 
undesirable body.42   
 
While such systems claim to eliminate or diminish personal human error 
from the process of recognition, they do have some limitations.  Currently, there 
is not a complete catalog available that would be able to establish the identity of 
all individuals, as they can only test particulars against a database of identities 
already collected.  Many fall outside of available databases and therefore have no 
way of verifying identity. This serves as the endpoint for database structuring 
goals, the goal being the creation of a database reducing unknowns and errors 
down to zero by collecting, measuring, and cataloging every member of the 
global population.43  
Epstein offers other insights into the way biometrics and biopolitics 
interact.  For one, biometrics provides a measuring technique based on the living 
body.  It simultaneously provides information on the larger population, subject 
to management, through the processes of individualizing technology (looking at 
the single lived body).  In addition, travelers who wish to pass over borders must 
submit to the scrutiny of biometrics.  This results in reducing the traveler to a 
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mere body, purely biological and subject to measurement and analysis to 
determine the riskiness of that individual. The transition between spaces of 
travel necessitate the reduction of the traveler to bare life.   
Biometric endeavors do not only restrict, control, and securitize borders, 
they can also be used for other goals.  For example, some research indicates the 
possibility of utilizing biometrics to eliminate fraudulent behavior in financial 
transactions.  Additionally, biometric identification could allow individuals 
proof of identity allowing access to governmental institutions, benefits, or to 
eliminate voter fraud.  These could open new avenues for the inclusion of 
otherwise excluded populations.  For example: 
A number of reports on financial inclusion of the poor have been 
produced in tandem with the establishment of the UID44 system, mapping 
their income, economic patterns and access to credit.  The main focus of 
these documents has been to ensure a rapid inclusion of the poor into the 
formal banking and insurance system.  The biopolitical imperative to 
govern life is thus further rearranged in the logics of the assemblage.  
Here, biopolitical management of the population is combined with the 
various globalizing forms of self-entrepreneurship fostered by the ‘global 
form’ of neoliberalism.  The mechanisms and characteristics of biopolitical 
‘security’ thereby turn into a concern for the entirety of a population and 
the optimization of its productive potential.45 
 
Whether one considers the inclusive elements of biometrics highlighted above, or 
the exclusive practices of restricting the movement of certain bodies across 
borders, the decisions made remain obscured by a wall of technological 
anonymity.  No single individual makes the decisions over whether a person 
should be denied entry at a border, instead the decisions are made by invisible 
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algorithms detached from single figures.  Considering this reality in relation to 
ongoing immigration programs highlights some interesting characteristics of 
modern politics.  No single person can ever take the responsibility for either 
deportations or amnesty.  A series of internal mechanisms, biometric 
checkpoints, and abstract policies regarding populations funnel and direct real 
human beings through a series of governmental institutions and programs.  The 
promises of political progress toward increased amnesty, or initiatives toward 
more rigid practices of deportation always remain separate from individual 
actors.  In a strange paradoxical way, the technologies involved in biometrically 
hyper-individualizing humans simultaneously allow a complete non-
individualization when it comes to such decisions.   
 
The Risk of Borders 
 
 Even amidst such a paradox, the reality of biometrics, a uniquely 
biopolitical practice at the border, only happens because of increased anxieties 
from the internal state about the potential arrival of certain bodies.  Bodies 
present risks to the biopolitical state as a contaminant.  Benjamin Muller refers to 
this contamination risk in the following way:  
The biometric risk state speaks to altered imaginations and relations 
between liberty and security, and how these play out in/at various sites, 
such as increasingly prevalent ‘virtual borders’, is of central interest.  Like 
the changing dispositif of security asserted earlier, the biometric state 
involves an odd mixture of the geopolitical and the biopolitical, as well as 
increasing reliance on the mechanisms and technologies of risk.  In this 
case, such technologies of risk are applied directly to the reference object 
of species life itself.  In other words, it is particular forms of life that read 
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as risky, or bodies that are not readable represent vulnerability to the 
biometric state and its obsession with digital life.46 
 
The border then serves as a filter to eliminate the risk of certain bodies, while 
freely allowing other bodies to enter.  As a result, a spectrum arises measuring 
each body that approaches the border in terms of the risk they present.  This 
spectrum interacts with Foucault’s concept of racial wars in remarkable ways, as 
biometrics moves beyond the individual body to identify entire risky 
populations.  For example, the Global Public Health Network monitors a variety 
of data spanning all sorts of media sources across the globe for indications of 
biological breakouts.  These biological breakouts produce new populations that 
increase in position on the risk spectrum.  The breaking down of individual 
bodies to the molecular level undergirds the racial wars fought in protection of 
the species.  As Bruce Braun states: 
While it may be true that in industrialized liberal democracies this model 
of the ‘somatic’ self holds sway, there is another dimension to the 
molecularization of life that has received far less attention.  This has to do 
with the conceptualization of the body in forms of its displacements within 
wider molecular fields.  That is, at the same time that molecular biology 
and genetics have given us a body known at the molecular scale, and thus 
made the physical mechanisms of ‘life’ available to political and economic 
calculation in new ways, they have also, in conjunction with the science of 
immunology and virology, given us another way to conceive of our 
biological existence, no longer in terms of a self-contained body whose 
genetic inheritance is to be managed and improved, but in terms of a body 
embedded in a chaotic and unpredictable molecular world, a body 
understood in terms of a general economy of exchange and circulation, 
haunted by the specter of newly emerging or still unspecifiable risks.47 
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Those bodies with increased risk open the possibility of expungement or 
elimination within the protected population.  Too close of contact with certain 
animals, eating certain foods, or partaking in certain practices all warrant a 
heightened possibility of exposure to unwanted biological agents and may 
increase the risk to life.  Biological decisions must be made for the security of life 
and these decisions occur at both the molecular level and at the level of 
populations.   
 This breaking down of the body into constituent parts at the molecular 
level attempts to predict, manage, and address a risk that has not yet arrived.  
Following Deleuze48, Braun envisions this risk as virtual, yet to occur but still 
foundational to the conditions of the present. The conditions of the present 
produce virtual threats that must be reduced, managed, and, if possible, 
eliminated for the sake of securing life.  The threats, at least within the view of 
biosecurity, arrive in strict relation with those new technologies that allowed for 
the molecularization of the body in the first place.  Just as the border and the 
movement of goods and services demand a paradoxical increase of both 
openness and rigidity, so also the body demands both the freedom to move 
while simultaneously reducing risk.     
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Digitized Borders 
 
To this point, the border has only been described in terms of actual spaces, 
but to realize the true complexity of the border, and from this the global 
economy, requires thinking beyond space.  Gilles Deleuze, in his formal writings 
on the “control society,” offers such an understanding of borders.  Within a 
control society,  
the key thing is no longer a signature or number but a code: codes are 
passwords, whereas disciplinary societies are ruled (when it comes to 
integration or resistance) by precepts. The digital language of control is 
made up codes indicating whether access to some information should be 
allowed or denied.49  
 
This creates a situation where a border is not merely a heterotopic-spatial 
product where goods, services, and people cross but, in addition to the spatial, 
the border can also be non-spatial and virtual.  In new globalized economies, the 
border as both a spatial and virtual reality often replicates and reproduces the 
challenges faced by more traditional sovereign and spatial forms of the border.  
For example, people still demand a free-flowing and deregulated virtual space 
while simultaneously demanding security over the privacy of their personal 
information, financial records, and internet use.  The new forms of virtual 
borders transition from the strict movement of people and goods, to the passage 
of data, but the same demand of porousness and rigidity remain.   
The non state-centric models of the internet generate massive obstacles for 
regulatory policies over these virtual borders.  The internet does not belong to 
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any nation or group, and the borders between virtual users lack the clear 
definitions often associated with traditional spatial borders.50  These difficulties in 
policing virtual borders have consequences not just for governmental agencies, 
but also for the private sector.  Users of the popular online streaming service 
Netflix recently discovered that if one used software they could mask their 
geographic location and effectively tell Netflix servers they reside in parts of the 
world where they do not.  This results in accessing programs that may not be 
available in one geographic region, but are in another.51   
The Netflix example demonstrates that often virtual borders and 
geographic borders intermingle in unpredictable ways.  Virtual space, and access 
to information, can depend on our geographic location, while at the same time, 
geographic spacing can be augmented by virtual interaction.   
To this point, focus on the border has demonstrated its importance in the 
movement and exchange of economic positives.  The complexities of the border, 
along the lines of biopolitical inclusion and exclusion practices maintain an 
economic global order, whereby the border, whether virtual or geographic, 
demands a paradoxical porousness and rigidity at the same time.  The 
porousness of the border centers on the economics involved, as the movements 
of goods, services, and even data all make for economic advantage and growth.  
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Risk, on the other hand, demands the borders be rigid and propel threats away 
from the homogenized and managed interior.   
In response to potential threats, the U.S. implemented and developed 
“smart border” technologies:  
The Smart Border plan is premised on bilateral cooperation that enables 
the United States to deploy information technology to practice risk 
management targeting of vehicles, shipments, and travelers, and to push 
the United States’ ‘borders out,’ while at the same time it attempts to 
minimize the impact of border controls on trade and travel.52   
 
Overly simplifying borders as social constructions, while accurate, misses key 
elements.  They are socially constructed, but with very particular needs in mind.  
Borders technologically control and manage the risk to an internal population, 
while simultaneously demanding the free movement of goods, services, and 
data.  They are bound networks and informational passages that layer the world 
through a series of coded entry and exit points, regulating and protecting an 
internal order while participating in a larger external series of international 
arrangements.   
 Terrorism, among other things, threatens the integrity of porous borders.  
As a result, territories regulate negative potentialities at the border, prohibiting 
and controlling movement and thereby producing new forms of movement in 
response.  To bypass the border new creative endeavors are introduced by 
terrorists, resulting in new securitizing measures, and then responses to those 
measures.  Making the border both porous and rigid creates a cycle of responses 
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and counter-responses.  The internal strategies employed to rigidify the borders 
frame terrorism as a thoroughly negative impact to the otherwise free movement 
of goods, services, and data across borders.   
 The 2014 Ebola crisis serves as a fruitful analogy to the problem of 
terrorism and the border.  During the summer of that year the Ebola crisis 
reached its zenith, as at least 65 individuals infected with the disease began 
arriving in the United States and Europe from Western Africa. Attempting to 
contain the problem and curtail public panic, Senator Ted Cruz along with 
others, proposed eliminating all flights into the U.S. from Western Africa.53  Those 
in agreement with this proposal argued that by eliminating movement at the 
border and making it more rigid, the threat would diminish.  In response, the 
Obama administration and others argued that allowing flights to continue would 
make it easier to track and monitor the movement of people believed to be 
infected.  The results of a rigid border would be an increased creativity in the 
ways people would move into the territory undetected, and thereby minimized 
the government’s ability to track, monitor, and confront the disease.   
 This entire episode highlights the economic issues connected to the 
biological reality of the disease.  The often understated but secretly pervasive 
counter-argument to Cruz was the diminished revenues airline industries would 
face in the rigidifying of the border.   
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 Regardless of the political, biological and economic implications of this 
crisis, one central point arose from this ordeal.  The very same channels utilized 
for the movement of goods, services, and data can produce the demise of the 
groups who maintain those channels.  Ebola was not only a medical and 
biological risk, it was an economic risk.   
 
Shared Paths: Terrorism and Economic Movement 
 
 Arguments against the neoliberal order of a globalized economy whereby 
the movements of goods, services, and data freely move over transnational 
borders, often miss the point that those channels by which those things move are 
not solely devoted to the movement of those things.  Many different possible 
items such as biological contaminants, people, currencies, slaves, destructive 
ideologies, and weaponry rely on the same recognized, authorized, and 
monitored networks.  The positive economic elements and negative elements 
travel the same paths simultaneously, sometimes aware and sometimes unaware 
of their co-travelers.   
 This reality goes both ways.  Groups like al Qaeda hypocritically rely on 
the networks they seek to resist:   
This grafting of entirely modern sensibilities and techniques to the most 
radical interpretation of holy war is the hallmark of bin Laden’s network. 
One of his Afghan training camps during the late nineties was named al-
Badr, after a key seventh-century battle fought by the Prophet 
Muhammad, yet al-Qaeda members training there were tutored in the use 
of high-tech explosives such as RDX and C4.  Members of al-Qaeda 
perform bayat, a quasi-medieval oath of allegiance to their emir or leader.  
But while based in Sudan in the early nineties, they also drew monthly 
paychecks and supported themselves with a wide range of legitimate 
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businesses.  When bin Laden declared war on Americans in 1996, he 
described U.S. soldiers stationed in the Middle East as ‘the Crusaders,’ as 
if the crusades of the Middle Ages were still being fought, and signed his 
declaration ‘from the peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan,’ 
a place barely touched by the modern world.  That declaration of war was 
written on an Apple computer and then faxed or e-mailed to supporters in 
Pakistan and Britain, who in turn made it available to Arabic newspapers 
based in London, which subsequently beamed the text via satellite, to 
printing centers all over the Middle East and in New York.  Thus, a 
premodern message was delivered by postmodern means.54 
 
Private corporate interests securitized through neoliberal governments are not 
separate from the things which those security mechanisms hope to eliminate.  In 
fact, they co-participate in the very same networks alongside each other, often 
with incalculable effects.  The cases of both Ebola and al Qaeda demonstrate the 
possibilities of this network sharing along the routes that move goods, services, 
labor, and data.  The demand for porous borders and the free movement of 
goods, services, labor, and data contributes to the in-securitizing effects that in 
turn produce demands for more rigid borders.   
 An entire industry has arisen to meet the paradoxical demands of both 
open and closed borders.  Security consultants, military installations, 
checkpoints, biometric scanners, risk assessment specialists, and even insurance 
actuaries all participate in the process to keep the movements happening while 
still protecting against the potential threats initiated by terror groups.  By 
maintaining and ordering the pathways along which goods, services, labor and 
data, move this security industry makes those pathways even more efficient.  
The increased efficiency of those pathways, like those travelers who would still 
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find entrance into the U.S. should airlines stop arriving from West Africa, find 
new and increasingly efficient ways to produce terror.  Increased technology 
produces increased vulnerability.  It is for this reason that Didier Bigo and others 
lament the security industry as the (in)security industry.55 
 The war on terror then does not produce an economic negative, but in fact 
participates and generates economic activities.  The demands for a porous border 
to move things creates a situation of vulnerability which then demands a 
securitizing response, which makes the networks of movement more efficient, 
which then opens new possibilities for terrorism which then creates new 
securitizing demands.  They work together, terror and security, supporting and 
justifying each other in a myriad of unpredictable and economically fruitful 
ways.   
 There are those who see this interaction between the war on terror and the 
globalized economic order and provide some nuanced ways of understanding 
the codependency between the two.  First, some see the war on terror as a way of 
expanding neoliberal economic activities into geographic regions where the 
power structures in place prohibit or hinder economic expansion.  Gordon Lafer 
examines this dynamic, arguing: 
I believe that, in its broadest logic, the war [on terror] must be understood 
as a means of advancing the neoliberal agenda of global economic 
transformation.  Both abroad and at home, the pattern of administrative 
behavior reflects an ambitious and aggressive drive to restructure the 
economy in line with neoliberal dictates.56   
																																																						
55 See Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, eds., Terror, Insecurity and Liberty:  
Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes After 9/11 (New York:  Routlede, 2008).   
 
56 Gordon Lafer, “Neoliberalism by Other Means: The ‘War on Terror’ at Home 
and Abroad” in New Political Science 26:3, (2006), 324. 
	 94 
 
By using the invasion of Iraq as an example, Lafer continues,  
The choice of Iraq as the target of invasion and occupation was no doubt 
driven both by Iraq’s vast oil reserves and its potential to substitute for 
Saudi Arabia as the market maker in the global oil exchange.  Apart from 
the Saudis, Iraq is the only country whose reserves are large enough that it 
could regulate world prices by choosing to expand or contract production 
at strategic points in the price cycle.  This strategic value of Iraqi oil – 
above and beyond its straight economic value – explains why, within one 
month of capturing Baghdad, US overseers raised the prospect of pulling 
Iraq out of the OPEC consortium.  Control of Iraqi oil offers the potential 
to exercise critical leverage over the economies of the Middle East, Russia, 
China and other oil-dependent nations.57 
 
For Lafer, the war on terror offers an economic opportunity for the dominate 
powers in the world, at the expense of the Iraqi population.  Military 
interventions arrange global markets in beneficial ways for certain countries, 
while destabilizing others.  The war on terror does not challenge global economic 
stability but instead further entrenches forms of economic control for certain 
actors while exploiting others.  Lafer concludes by describing the war on terror 
as “neoliberalism by other means:  what could not be achieved by trade or treaty 
will be imposed by military force.”58 
 Others see the war on terror as a co-participating force in the larger global 
economic trends.  Christopher Hughes points to the ways in which globalization, 
of the economic variety, contributes to and creates situations for the spread of 
terrorism.  He defines globalization through three functions, first as 
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liberalization, then convergence, and finally as deterritorialization.59  
Liberalization lowers the borders through deepening cooperation around mutual 
interests between independent nation-states.  Convergence is the process of 
political, social, and economic activities that take on broader global dimensions 
beyond limited expressions of cultures.  While the process of convergence 
intends to go beyond cultural domination, in reality it often just expresses 
dominant Westernized or Americanized interests.  Finally, deterritorialization 
changes and transforms social space, bringing people together regardless of 
physical location and bypassing the rigidity of borders.  By examining 
globalization through this process Hughes articulates a contemporary world 
unbounded by the organization of nations.  While at one time nation-states 
played an integral role in organizing markets, corporate interests, and territorial 
integrity, they no longer do.  Additionally, security evolves to meet the new 
demands of a deterritorialized world no longer attached to a single nation, it now 
protects international networks, often having to protect the nation-state from 
globalization.   
 The shifting organization of the world results in new political identities 
that challenge the nation-state often through direct confrontation and violence.  
As Hughes writes: 
[G]lobalisation has manifestly also facilitated the actual terrorist activities 
of al-Qaeda.  Globalisation, again in conjunction with the effects of 
decolonisation and bipolorisation, has eroded the sovereignty of states, 
and it is in the areas where the sovereign control of states is weakest – 
most notably Afghanistan and Somalia – where terrorist networks have 
accumulated.  For such states are where the remit of the central 
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government often fails to run and where groups can practise illicit 
activities relatively free from interference….Globalisation as economic 
liberalisation and the transcendence of sovereign control over social 
interaction, spurred on by improvements in transportation and 
information technology, has enabled trans-national crime and terrorist 
organisations to mimic the behaviour of transnational corporations 
(TNC’s) and to move with greater ease across deregulated economic and 
territorial spaces.60   
 
Ulrich Beck, on the other hand, conceives of terror as an antithesis to the 
globalized economic order, contrasting the liberal process with that of terror.  Yet 
terrorism, even for Beck, is not a pure economic negativity.  Instead, it mimics 
those neoliberal and globalized processes, but in a deformed and perverse form.  
As he describes it: 
With the horror images of New York, terror groups have with one blow 
established themselves as new global actors in competition with states, 
economies and civil societies.  The terror networks have become ‘NGO’s 
of violence’.  They act like nongovernmental organizations: deterritorial 
and decentralized; thus, on the one hand, local, on the other, 
transnational.  While, for example, Greenpeace has the lead in respect to 
the environmental crisis and Amnesty International in respect to the 
human rights crisis when contrasted with states, the terrorist NGO’s 
repeal the monopoly on violence previously enjoyed by states.  However, 
this means, first, that this kind of transnational terrorism is not limited to 
Islamic terrorism, but can associate itself with any possible aim, ideology 
or fundamentalism; and, second, that one must differentiate between the 
terror of national liberation movements, which are territorially and 
nationally bound, and the new, transnational terrorist networks, which 
are deterritorial – that is, beyond borders – and which as a result of their 
actions depreciate with a single blow the national grammar of military 
and war.61 
 
Some themes appear similar between Hughes and Beck: for the former terrorism 
arises because of globalized economic systems, where for the later terrorism 
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undermines the globalized economic order but in a reciprocal mimicry of that 
order.   
 Even more controversially, others imagine the neoliberal economic order 
as a form of competing terrorism without the label.  Vandana Shiva, a proponent 
of such a radical view, expresses it this way:  
Terrorism will not be stopped by militarized minds that create insecurity 
and fear.  The ‘war against terrorism’ will create a vicious cycle of 
violence:  It will not create peace and security.  Terrorism can only be 
stopped by cultures of peace, democracy, and people’s security.  It is 
wrong to define the conflict as a war between ‘civilization and barbarism’: 
It is a war between two forms of terrorism that are mirror images.  Both 
sides can only conceive of monocultures that must erase diversity, the 
very precondition for peace.  They share the dominant culture of violence.  
Both sides are clones of each other and their victims are innocent people 
everywhere.62  
 
Shiva, unlike the others previously mentioned, sees no distinguishing and 
essential separation between global economic forces and the forces of terrorism.  
The only difference between al Qaeda and a Monsanto are the motivations.  The 
neoliberal order, with the power of state militaries, follow the same patterns of 
violence and a desire to universalize their vision of the world that many terror 
groups employ.  Elsewhere Shiva writes about the way neoliberal forms of 
power rooted in biopolitics grow into bioeconomies, where the market itself 
seeks to shape and control life.  The economy no longer looks only at renewable 
resources like oil, but now seeks to control, augment, and privatize the very 
processes of life.  Using the example of intellectual rights over seeds by 
companies like Monsanto, Shiva highlights the disparities between the 
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developed and developing worlds through these novel and destructive 
bioeconomies.63 
 Describing terror as a negative force on the economy ignores the realities 
and nuances between the way terror and neoliberal forms of globalization 
operate.  Terrorism does not produce a negative economic impact, and as a 
result, even as much as biopolitical governments may render terrorism as a 
phenomenon to overcome, those governments rely on terror as a participant and 
motivation for economic activities.  Terrorism results in economic growth and 
development, through the matrix of securitizing activities.  Security, and the 
process of securitization that rely on the biopolitical notions of inclusion and 
exclusion at the border, and the management of populations, end up implicated 
in the very thing it hopes to protect against.  Biopolitics then cannot solve 
terrorism as it participates, economically, in the activities of terror.
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Chapter Three:  Violence, Religion, and Terror 
 
Definitions from the previous chapter provided three ways of 
understanding how contemporary neoliberal state actors, a variety of theorists, 
and organizations frame definitions of terrorism. In addition, I showed the way 
biopolitics inhabits and informs the first of these definitions: terrorism negatively 
impacts economic productivity.  By looking closely at the border and its role in 
security, terrorism, and trade, one sees the paradoxical biopolitical demands of 
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, along with population management.  In 
addition to this framing of terror two others came from examining the 
definitions: first, that terrorism is excessively violent, and second that perverse 
religious passion motivates terror.   
Most imagine terror involving bombs, gunfire, and attacks on innocent 
civilians.  Equating terror with violence does not provoke much disagreement, 
but the nature and scope of violence can be a bit more complicated.  In a video 
released August of 2014 entitled, “A Message to America,” images interspersed 
and spliced together depict a story of violence perpetrated by, and against, the 
Islamic State.  The video culminates in the beheading of James Foley by a man 
who came to be known throughout popular culture and the media as “Jihadi 
John.”  In response to the video, then president Barrack Obama said the 
following:  
	 100 
The terrorist group known as ISIL must be degraded and ultimately 
destroyed…In the most horrific crimes imaginable, innocent human 
beings have been beheaded, with videos of the atrocity distributed to 
shock the conscience of the world.  No God condones this terror.   No 
grievance justifies these actions.  There can be no reasoning – no 
negotiation – with this brand of evil.  The only language understood by 
killers like this is the language of force.  So the United States of American 
will work with a broad coalition to dismantle this network of death.1 
 
David Cameron, also responding to the video stated: 
We’ve all been shocked and sickened by the barbaric murder of American 
journalist James Foley and by the voice of what increasingly seems to have 
been a British terrorist recorded on that video.  It was clear evidence – not 
that any more was needed – that this is not some foreign conflict 
thousands of miles from us that we can hope to ignore.2 
 
In a Washington Post article in 2014, Terrence McCoy explains the success of the 
Islamic State through the spectacle of violence they employ.  He writes,  
[T]he acts of terror have been wildly successful. From beheadings to 
summary executions to amputations to crucifixions, the terrorist group 
has become the most feared organization in the Middle East. That fear, 
evidenced in fleeing Iraqi soldiers and 500,000 Mosul residents, has 
played a vital role in the group’s march toward Baghdad. In many cases, 
police and soldiers literally ran, shedding their uniforms as they went, 
abandoning large caches of weapons.3   
 
These responses share in their insistence of excessive and brutal violence 
as a primary reason for the deployment of counterterrorism measures.  Barbarity 
and viciousness of the violence used by these groups prompts a response and 
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elicits fear.  While the beheading of journalists undoubtedly demands a response, 
what is not clear is what makes the violence especially undue.  Under what 
metric can we measure violence and categorize it as either reasonable or not?  
What essential quality allows for the determination of one thing as more or less 
violent than another?   
 Terrorism certainly involves violence.  To be terrifying requires violence, 
as it needs to remind the victim of their fragility and vulnerability.   All humans 
instinctively react in extreme ways to images of burning, mutilation, beheadings, 
dismemberments, and other such acts.   However, defining terrorism entirely in 
conjunction with violence raises serious questions about proportionate and 
disproportionate responses.  The actual statistical risk to the average citizen 
shows that the attention given to terrorism as a potentiality might be exaggerated 
in relation to the actuality of attacks.  A report prepared for the State Department 
of the U.S. found that during 2014 there were 13,463 unique global terrorist 
attacks, with a total fatality of 32,727.  However, of those 32,727 fatalities, 19% 
(6,200) were the preparators of the attack.4  During the same year, the Center for 
Disease Control shows the number of suicides in the United States alone at more 
than 39,000 and homicides at 17,000.5  Only 36 of the fatalities of terrorism 
occurred within the United States.  The amount of attention given to terrorism, 
both socially and politically, outweighs the raw number of victims, especially in 
comparison to other violent activities.   
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 In contrast, Simone Molin Friis identifies the special nature of terroristic 
violence not in the numbers but in the visual spectacle.    The sheer visibility of 
the Islamic State in media and social media contributes to the sense of excessive 
violence.  This video, clearly displaying the beheading of a single human, 
produced much higher visibility than other forms of violence that groups like IS 
regularly utilize as part of their approach, even including other beheadings.  Friis 
writes of the James Foley video,  
ISIS’s beheading videos are said to show that ISIS is unique in its brutality 
and beyond anything we have ever seen.  Yet this interpretation—
unfortunately—seems to have less to do with the actual frequency of this 
form of violence and more with the way in which beheadings—and the 
violence in Syria more generally—have tended to disappear from view, or 
never appear at all, in the West.  The exceptionality of ISIS is thus partly 
established through a process in which ISIS’s beheadings are made 
exceedingly visible across media platforms, whereas other similarly 
gruesome acts of violence, including beheadings carried out by other 
warring factions, are reduced to more marginal visual sites.6 
 
It does not appear that the visibility of death makes the videos special, so much 
as the means of achieving the death.  The video impacts the viewer not merely as 
a depiction of the loss of life, but as a depiction of a particularly brutal act, and 
the horrific nature of the act popularizes and makes visible the video.  If the 
violence were not striking in some way, the video would certainly be less 
pervasive.  Talal Asad observes something similar regarding suicide bombing:  
Western reports of Tamil suicide bombers in Sri Lanka and even of the 
many suicide bombers in occupied Iraq attacking fellow Iraqis do not 
display the same horror—or evoke it in a Western audience.  All of this 
																																								 																				
6 Simone Molin Friis, “’Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading Videos 
and the Visibility of the Violence in the War against ISIS,” International Affair:  
91: 4(2015):  725-746.   
 
	 103 
may be true, but still doesn’t tell us why horror is expressed, when it is 
genuinely expressed, and what it consists in.7   
 
Asad then later describes horror as the consequence of violence that threatens 
something more than the individual, such as a way of life, a community, or a 
population.8  If horror comes about because of a threat to the way of life of some 
people, then what specific “way of life” is threatened?   
 Blaming media saturation and a demand for elicit content on television 
only provides for part of the explanation.  The choices in content work both 
ways: the consumer demands images of certain types of violence for reasons 
beyond simply the media feeding them those images. The representations of 
violence shown, in either reporting or entertainment, speak to the general 
cultural attitudes of acceptable and unacceptable forms of violence.  The way of 
life Asad refers to defines, cultivates, and demands certain parameters on 
violence either as acceptable to that way of life, or not.   
 Victims play an important part in this defining of the way of life, 
particularly the methods for making decisions between victims and non-victims.  
Using certain groups, such as a police force or military, allows for demarcating 
lines within the social order between combatants and non-combatants.  Shannon 
French argues that the excessiveness of violence, beyond what a way of life 
would consider appropriate, results from targeting specifically noncombatant 
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victims.9  Of course, that way of life provides the lines between appropriate and 
inappropriate targets, that others may or may not agree with.   
Others argue terrorism does not require violence to be horrifying, as it 
need only have, “the ultimate end of getting the subject to act in the particular 
way the agent wants him to act.”10  Responses to fear make terrorism excessively 
violent, not the actual victim or method of violence.  In this case the victim plays 
an important role, but only in so much as terrorism can target their potential 
choices and behavior.  Terrorism exists in the consequence of augmenting 
decisions victims make about things like where to go for entertainment, about 
which politicians to vote for, and about sentiments regarding foreign policy. 
 
The Strategy of Violence: 
 
 Part of the problem with terroristic violence is the lack of justification.  
Responses by victims often involve some plea for rationality for the atrocity, 
indicating that the lack of strategic goals somehow makes the violence 
particularly troubling.  A Washington Post article from 2014 describes the general 
conditions of the Islamic State:  
Death was everywhere in the sacked city of Mosul, a strategically vital oil 
hub and Iraq’s largest northern city.  One reporter said an Iraqi woman in 
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Mosul claimed to have seen a ‘row of decapitated soldiers and policemen’ 
on the street.  Other reports spoke of ‘mass beheadings,’ though the 
Washington Post was not able to confirm the tales. 
 
 It later continues,  
The stories, the videos, the acts of unfathomable brutality have become a 
defining aspect of ISIS, which controls a nation-size tract of land and has 
now pushed Iraq to the precipice of dissolution. Its adherents kill with 
such abandon that even the leader of al-Qaeda has disavowed them. 
‘Clearly, [leader Ayman] al-Zawahiri believes that ISIS is a liability to the 
al-Qaeda brand,’ Aaron Zelin, who analyzes jihadist movements for the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told The Washington Post’s Liz 
Sly earlier this year.11   
 
Part of the profundity of violence relies on the senselessness of its use.  Strategic 
violence directed at some very specific goal in a direct confrontational struggle 
makes sense and can be justified, for example, conflict for the sake of a politically 
magnanimous end transforms suffering into a tragic necessity.  However, the 
violence utilized by the Islamic State appears to lack such clearly defined goals 
and merely revels in violence for the sake of violence.   
 Some argue that excessive violence is the strategy.  Hassan Hassan, an 
analyst at the Delma Institute and expert on the Islamic State argues that the 
group regularly seeks out repulsive forms of violence for a variety of strategic 
reasons.   Fatwas issued on the public immolation of the Jordanian pilot Muadh 
al-Kasasbeh justify the extreme violence as a potential deterrent to other enemies.  
He explains,  
the Jordanian’s capture provided a huge opportunity for it to humiliate 
the international coalition and send a strong message to Muslim countries 
participating in it. ISIS recognised that the act would alienate some 
Muslims, but believes it will deter many more. What ISIS gains from 
violence, it calculates, trumps any losses in popularity. This strategy was 
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similar to the one followed by the group’s founding father, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, himself a Jordanian, when he set the precedent of filming the 
slaughtering of an American captive, Nick Berg, in 2004. The killing, 
which the CIA said was carried out by al-Zarqawi, won him the nickname 
“the Sheikh of the Slaughterers” by fellow jihadists.12 
  
However, viewing violence as the strategy might ignore some of the other 
internal justifications for that violence by prioritizing the external response 
(deterrent).  Chetan Bhatt from the London School of Economics emphasizes the 
theological motivations for acts of violence, aside from purely political forms.  
He contrasts an instrumental view, which attempts to rationalize the violence 
within political and ideological intentions, against an internal theological view.13  
 Attempts to give meaning to violence, particularly political, may say more 
about those defining the violence than those perpetrating acts of ferocity.  
Focusing on the instrumental function of violence highlights some of the hyper-
instrumentalization endemic to the biopolitical state.  Considerable advancement 
in capabilities for violence by biopolitical states, produce new uncontained 
possibilities for those technologies of violence to be used against those states.  
The increased production and use of drones, for example, has created a situation 
where those same technologies are regularly employed by a variety of groups.  
The more knowledge gained on how to destroy bodies the more awareness of 
human biological fragility.14  Tensions then increase over the conceptions of 
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violence, and the appropriateness of violence, by and with governments 
purportedly concerned with the flourishing of life.   However, violence exists at 
the heart of these biopolitical states.   
 The neoliberal order, which promotes biopolitical measures to diminish 
violence through political means, requires a foundational act of violence at the 
heart of the political order itself.   States maintain a threat of violence against 
those who would oppose this new code and order.  Resistance may arise against 
the legal order in time, both collective and individual, but the law must remain 
intact for the maintenance of that founded political order.  Threats against that 
foundational violence require permanent possibilities of retribution, while states 
must simultaneously confront and negotiate with a variety of new conditions in 
the overall legal landscape.    New demands of justice require that the law 
constantly consider these new conditions and find any new modes of organizing 
and promoting legal order.  Justice sits outside the law, as the law never quite 
reaches the fullness of the possibilities of justice, as some new condition may 
always come about that upends the previous idea of justice.15 
 Like justice, violence comes from outside the law, first as the foundation 
of that legal order, and then as the demands for progress.  Violence visits and 
haunts the legal order, serving as a tool to remedy parts of the law that demand 
remedy, without nullifying the entire process.  But the threat to nullify and then 
enact a completely new legal order through violence remains a continual 
possibility.  Additionally, some forms of violence can also exist in a purely 
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narcissistic form, outside the search for justice or a new political order, and 
instead as a means toward self-gratification.  For example, a murder committed 
in an act of selfish revenge, or the violent robbery of some institution for financial 
gain.   
 Regardless of the violence for the sake of justice, or violence for merely 
narcissistic gain, the law eventually takes up and uses that violence, folding it 
into its institutions in response and maintenance of the social order.  Violence has 
political usefulness: like the economically positive responses to terrorism, 
violence can serve productive aims within the biopolitical state.  At the very 
foundation of social contract theory Hobbes insists on the productive aspects of 
violence to, “conform the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid 
against their enemies abroad.”16  The militia under the control of the sovereign 
functions as the most important institute of social order, further indicating the 
essential quality of sovereignty is the monopoly on violence.17  Rousseau similarly 
envisions violence as a productive potential recourse for those who would 
otherwise ignore the order of the law.  Though unlike Hobbes, Rousseau does 
not centralize violence under one authority, but disperses it across the entire 
body population calling all to arms should need arise.18  Even Thomas Paine in 
his suspicion of governance admits that violence may be used to remedy 
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individuals lacking moral virtue and to prevent a threat by those individuals to 
the order of the law.19 
 The founding of the order of the law on violence and the subsequent 
maintenance of that law through the continued threat of violence does not 
monolithically dictate appropriate and inappropriate uses of violence.  For 
example, appropriate violence looks radically different through the 
anthropologies of Locke and Hobbes.   In Hobbes’ account, humans in a 
“natural” state were constantly at war with each other and, as a result, 
perpetually fragile and at risk.  The sovereign, with the exclusive rights to enact 
violence, does so to ward off any uprising of the state of nature and all the 
violence that comes with it.  Locke, on the other hand, imagines a blissful state of 
nature where humans existed in perpetual natural freedom.  The violence of the 
state only serves to protect the good of that freedom from those who would seek 
to harm it.  After the foundational threat, the order that comes forth retroactively 
makes sense of the state of nature, giving meaning to it, and the violence that 
ruptured it and substantiated the new legal order.  The law and the peace it 
brings makes sense out of the violence of its own inception, articulating its own 
meaning of violence and justifying that foundational violence through an 
instrumental explanation for violence both primordial and continual.   
 This process of violence and its own justification is remarkably analogous 
to the theological concept of the miracle.  By erupting through a decision by the 
sovereign God, countering the establishment of natural law, the miracle appears 
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like an exterior violent act.  But external eruption alone does not make it a 
miracle; in addition, the miracle must provide some larger lesson regarding the 
metaphysical world.   It must make meaning of the power over death and 
sickness, the fragility of the human condition, or the unconditional love of God.   
Failure to provide some lesson or instill some idea of power results in it not 
being a miracle, but merely a disturbance.  The law with its demands and 
prohibitions must also provide some explanatory and justifying power for its 
role in the life of the citizen.  If it fails to produce meaning out of its 
establishment and break with a previous order, it fails to be the law.   
 Violence and the establishment of the law can only make sense in the 
biopolitical epoch as a measure for sustaining life.  Violence can only be used for 
the protection of life, otherwise it is meaningless and falls outside, as something 
unacceptable in its lack of instrumental value.  Only within this framework of 
demanding profound instrumental violence for the protection of life can wars 
against objects (drugs, poverty, terrorism) have meaning.   
 Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics and not for biopolitics, because 
terrorism uses the foundational model of violence central to the biopolitical state, 
but in the most perverse way.  It terrifies the biopolitical state through 
enactments of violence in non-instrumental forms.  Any strategies that do exist 
within terrorism are not grounded in seeking out a new code of law, and 
therefore cannot be recognized as appropriate violence.  No meaning can be 
made of the violence by the biopolitical state because it uses the very 
foundational act of the peaceful state in a reciprocal form, resisting all attempts 
then to define terroristic violence with any instrumental value.  But by doing this 
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terrorism exposes something in biopolitics.  By denying terrorism meaning 
within an instrumental system it also admits its own violent foundation even as 
it insists on the preservation of life.  Terrorism exposes the fundamental lie of 
biopolitics, that it cannot fulfill its intended goal as it relies on the disrupted core 
of death and violence as its center.   
 
Religious Fervor: 
 
Finally, some of the attempts to outline terror rely on explanations 
focusing on extreme and passionate religious conviction gone awry.   The 
biopolitical state allows for religious devotion, but only within certain 
parameters that terror fundamentally and irrevocably falls outside of.  This view 
relies on a firm distinction between not only a religious and secular divide, but 
within the religious, proper and improper forms of devotion.    
The distinction between the religious and secular are difficult to maintain 
particularly when considered in conjunction with the ongoing war on terror.  
Bruce Lincoln demonstrates this in his side by side readings of Osama bin Laden 
and George Bush’s responses to 9/11.  Both responses rely on a set of theological 
claims, and justify violence through religious idea of friends and enemies.  For 
both a divide between political adversaries relies on a divide between the 
metaphysical categories of good and evil, providing a transcendentally 
established, but imminently fixed, line between victims and perpetrators.20 This 
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flavor of binary religious language finds its way into a variety of discussion on 
terrorism beyond Bush and bin Laden alone, particularly when terrorism often 
blatantly attaches itself to religious symbols.    While not overt, this binary 
thinking itself undergirds Samuel Huntington’s idea of our new age marked by 
the clash of civilizations.  Politics and ideology are slowly eroding, replaced 
instead by civilizational divides.  Religious ideas take up residence deep within 
the histories of these civilizations.21 
Since the time that Huntington wrote this in the 1990’s the general climate 
today envisions more deeply a version of radical Islam in opposition to global 
civilization.  My point is not so much to argue in support or against Huntington’s 
clash of civilization theory, instead I contend that modern forms of secular 
neoliberalism rely on a theological paradigm, and this paradigm appears 
particularly vulnerable to terrorism.   
While secular systems may rely on religious ideas, it is equally the case 
that religious thinking often relies on images of political power and violence.  In 
an article for Christianity Today, author Timothy George shows how Augustine’s 
response to the attack on Rome by Alaric and his followers resonates with 
contemporary terrorism, going so far as to compare Alaric with Osama bin 
Laden.22  George warns against the equation of any political state with the 
sovereign Kingdom of God, as each complement each other but are not the same.  
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Immanent political institutions have a finite amount of authority established by 
the infinite authority of God.  George also offers some distinctions between 
Christian and Islamic theology on the issue, even if the proposed focus of the 
article is terrorism at large, and not rooted to any specific religious organization.  
God provides a sense of ultimate security which terrorism attempts to undo, but 
cannot, because true security lies in an infinite and not finite source.   The 
attempt to render the world infinitely open to security, the explicit goal of the 
biopolitical takes shape within early Christian theological demands on political 
meaning.   
This theological impetus drives a wedge in the world between light and 
dark.  Julie Ioffe, in Foreign Policy, argues that this “Manichean” wedge motivates 
and produces religious terrorism in a variety of groups.23  If the world becomes 
subject to such divisions, violence appears an inevitable outcome of protecting 
the light from the intrusion of the dark.   
Ioffe draws focus upon an important element within the work of religious 
violence.  Violence may relate to religion different ways.  First, violence can be 
rooted in an overt religious narrative.  Religious teachings important to a group 
may focus upon the violent images within the larger mythological system, and as 
a result call for specific violent actions in response to these teachings.  
Alternatively, a person may merely belong to a religious organization and 
commit acts of violence completely detached from the teachings of that group.  
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In either case, violence does serve a function in the larger mythological systems 
of religion.   
Both Rene Girard and Walter Burkert provide examples of a larger body 
of theory that seeks to explain the apparent pervasiveness of violence in religious 
narratives and mythology.  Both focus upon the ways in which sacrifice appears 
in religious thought.  For Burkert sacrifice resonates with deep primordial drives 
to connect life and death.24  Affirmations of life appear out of the violent sacrifice, 
particularly as what was sacrificed nourishes and continues life.25  By looking at 
things like the practices of communion and Greek ideas of sacrifice, Burkert 
shows the ways death sustains and supports life.  Killing for the sake of sacrifice 
symbolically frames the biologically pragmatic act of killing.  The killing of small 
animals as a way of warding off evil spirits mimics the biological act of offering a 
predator an alternative meal through another, smaller animal.  The practice of 
sacrifice involves,  
active killing.  The victim-to-be saves himself by becoming a killer in turn.  
In a way, this doubles the protection to be achieved, both assuaging and 
threatening the putative aggressor, in a practice that is most strongly felt 
to be efficacious.26   
 
Taking power over the natural world through the enactment of death informs the 
logic of the supernatural world, still demanding death to preserve life: 
																																								 																				
24 Walter Burkert "Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual." Greek, Roman and 
Byzantine Studies 7, no. 2 (1966): 121. 
 
25 Walter Burkert. Homo Necans : The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual 
and Myth. Berkeley (California:  University of California Press, 1983), 342.   
 
26 Walter Burkert, Creation of the Sacred:  Tracks of Biology in Early Religions 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 54.   
 
	 115 
In the situation of the herd vis-à-vis the carnivore – the zebras attacked by 
lions – when one individual is killed, the others feel safe for a time.  The 
instinctive program seems to command: take another one, not me.  This 
ancient program is still at work in humans, still fleeing from devouring 
dangers and still making sacrifices to assuage and triumph over anxiety.  
In this perspective sacrifice is a construct of sense that has proved almost 
universally effective throughout the history of civilization.27 
 
Rene Girard offers a similar concept of religious violence through his 
often cited “scapegoat theory.”  Scapegoating relies on a mimetic anthropology 
that Girard outlines in Violence and the Sacred, stating that violence only occurs in 
response to the presence of a rival.  Contrary to initial analysis, the rival does not 
compete for a single object which then must be decided through violent 
confrontation.  Instead, the rival desires an object and through that desire 
establishes that object as valuable.  As Girard describes it:  
The rival desires the same object as the subject, and to assert the primacy 
of the rival can lead to only one conclusion. Rivalry does not arise because 
of the fortuitous convergence of two desires on a single object; rather, the 
subject desires the object because the rival desires it. In desiring an object 
the rival alerts the subject to the desirability of the object. The rival, then, 
serves as a model for the subject, not only in regard to such secondary 
matters as style and opinions but also, and more essentially, in regard to 
desires.28   
 
Desiring any object and competition for an object all rely on a mimetic 
relationship between humans, where we repeat the actions, motivations, and 
passions of others.   
Only by understanding the mimetic anthropology can one understand the 
functional elements of his scapegoat theory.  The relationship of rivalry produces 
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an ambiguous self-identity as both the same as the rival, and fundamentally 
different from the rival.  Desiring what the rival desires makes the two alike.  
However, they both want the object and the finite nature of the object makes 
them different.  Elsewhere, Girard connects the issue of ambiguous self-identity 
with the large scale social persecution of certain groups.  At both the individual 
and the social levels the inability to control the different conflicts that arise over 
the object demands a set of solutions.  Introducing the sacred figure into the 
sacrificial act offers a solution:   
Sacrifice plays a very real role in these societies, and the problem of 
substitution concerns the entire community. The victim is not a substitute 
for some particularly endangered individual, nor is it offered up to some 
individual of particularly bloodthirsty temperament. Rather, it is a 
substitute for all the members of the community, offered up by the 
members themselves. The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community 
from its own violence; it prompts the entire community to choose victims 
outside itself. The elements of dissension scattered throughout the 
community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and 
eliminated, at least temporarily, by its sacrifice.29   
 
 Burkert shares with Girard some elements of the scapegoat theory, as it 
functions in much the same way as his idea of offering up a part of something to 
protect the larger whole.  But for Girard the scapegoat establishes the identity of 
the victim as unclean or guilty justifying the violence visited upon them.  Burkert 
points out the way in which that victim may be “despised and worshipped at the 
same time.”30  In this moment of ambivalence it may happen that memory and 
memorial come to be an element of the violence in that “gratefully we honor 
their memory, and make sure to remain attached to the tales recalling those 
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thrilling events.  Ritual language prevails in this context:  there are victims, there 
is sacrifice.”31 
 For both, violence serves an instrumental function within the scope of the 
religious system and larger mythological structures.   Burkert insists that 
violence carries forward, very literally, the continuation of life; while for Girard, 
violence sustains the peacefulness and functionality of the social order.   Legal 
structures, as has been shown, provide justification for violence.  In addition, 
within the religious order violence has a similar functional role.  While Burkert 
and Girard share their views of violence possessing instrumental value, they are 
both helpful in articulating the ways religious violence interfaces with 
biopolitics.  Violence serves a purpose of continuing life in each, and violence 
utilized by terrorists calls into question this continuation of life.  Terror brings 
death back inside a system that expunged it through the instrumentalization of 
religious violence.  Biopolitics, unlike terror, always seeks to hide violence under 
the cover of efficacy.  
 
Biopolitics, Violence and Religion 
 
Whether politically or religiously justified, biopolitical states demand 
functional and instrumental violence.  Terrorism, on the other hand, contradicts 
that instrumental demand and instead makes a spectacle out of violence.  Death 
was at one time a spectacle, but that has since changed as death is increasingly 
private and hidden away by a political system that insists on the preservation of 
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life.  Justifiable violence becomes synonymous with sterility, efficiency, and 
silence; rarely drawing attention to itself.  Reversing this, terrorism makes death 
startlingly visible. As Achille Mbembe describes,  
In a context in which decapitation is viewed as less demeaning than 
hanging, innovations in the technologies of murder aim not only at 
‘civilizing’ the way of killing.  They also aim at disposing of larger number 
of victims in a relatively short span of time.  At the same time, a new 
cultural sensibility emerges in which killing the enemy of the state is an 
extension of play.  More intimate, lurid, and leisurely forms of cruelty 
appear.32   
 
 Biopolitics entails a certain justification for violence and a certain style of 
violence.  Paul Virilio details the forms of violence in the contemporary state.  
Battlefields no longer rely on local experiences and interpretations of the 
strategies for combat as increasing uses of technology and digital representation 
of an ongoing war provide more accurate readings of the success or failure of 
strategies.  In this reality images are more important than lived realities.33  Due to 
the ubiquitous presence of digitizing technologies, cameras, and media 
interpretations of images, representations of violence are easily reproduced.  
Because of this ease of reproduction, local knowledges, objects, and experiences 
are rapidly vanishing, replaced by non-unique reproduced digital images.   
 The process of disintegrating local realities and experiences not only 
occurs in wars and battles, but these images and the loss of locality takes place on 
a global scale.  For Virilio, globalization reduces and erases the local for the sake 
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of a globalized image and scaled pervasive gaze.34  Transitioning into a fully 
globalized reality forces the individual to witness reality through a mediation of 
images and digitized reality that overtake local realities.  Considering life caught 
in the circulation of images helps in understanding the role of terroristic violence.  
Some images, as Virilio points out, generate and produce fear in the viewer.35  In a 
world saturated by images to make something noteworthy it must produce a 
spectacle of novelty, otherwise it would be lost in the sea of circulated images.  
Violence must stand out in some way for it to produce the intended fear: 
The apparatus that manufactured this phantom of threat is a complex 
network of institutional authority with each node looking to expand or 
consolidate its power.  Each piece in the network does not necessarily 
need be in collusion with any other piece.  Each needs only to see 
possibility, and act accordingly, knowing that fear is one the most 
exchangeable and profitable signs in political economy. (Even the slowest 
of bureaucracies act quickly in its presence).  Since all parties involved 
have a stake in taking their fantasy for reality and turning the most 
improbable into the most probable, the manufacturing process is nearly 
frictionless, and the rewards are tremendous.36 
 
Fear coupled with the instability of globalization justifies retributive violence by 
the state for the protection of the species.  However, beyond this justification 
through fear and protection, biopolitical violence affirms life of one sort, even as 
it deals death.  If the biopolitical state can successfully reproduce fear, or meet 
terror with the terror of “shock and awe campaigns,” then it may deter future 
violence and end a war before it even begins.  At the same time, state violence 
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demands secrecy and efficiency, never reveling in the spectacle of gore but 
instead in the cold calculations of wars fought through drones and computer 
simulations.  Terroristic violence exposes the struggle and competition over the 
power of the image, and in doing so biopolitical states betray their own internal 
logic regarding violence.  
 To justify violence, it must be useful; if it fails to affirm life and protect the 
species, then violence appears as unjustifiable.  Terrorism disrupts by using 
violence completely lacking in usefulness.  This lack of usefulness makes the 
spectacle of violence special and unique relative to biopolitical violence.  It is not 
more violent in the raw numbers of those killed or injured, but it stands out 
against forms of violence that emphasize cold calculations and war from a 
distance.  Terrorism, quite unlike biopolitical violence, embodies a lack of 
efficiency, and because of this inefficiency appears as a spectacle.  The Islamic 
State’s use of beheading, for example, is not an efficient way of enacting death on 
an enemy.  It requires time, energy, and exertion that a drone or bomb does not, 
and limits the numbers of casualties to the number of people one can behead.  
The process is slow, tedious, and brutal.  Certainly, a drone strike would produce 
more victims, but it lacks the visceral reality and intimacy with the body.  
Swords exude overt inefficiency in the modern world, and they bring into stark 
focus the fragility and permeability of the body.  Terroristic violence uselessly 
engages in inefficient forms of violence, and this useless inefficiency makes it 
terrifying.   
 Terrorists know they cannot hope to defeat the overwhelming might of 
states, and as a result they seek violence of a different sort.  By increasing the 
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symbolic aspects of violence terrorists increase the repetition of the images of 
violence, and produce more fear in response to the horrific and pervasive image.  
Kiarina Kordela demonstrates effectively the way suicide bombings engage in 
this struggle over the image with the biopolitical state.  For her suicide bombings 
become “part and parcel of biopower.”37  
  She first articulates terrorism as rooted in the production of horror, but 
horror for Kordela is a non-discursive, or pre-discursive, reaction to some event, 
falling outside the sphere of human activities fixed in the production of 
discourse.  She relies on classic definitions of the human as uniquely discursive 
and rational, and horror produces something outside the boundaries of rational 
engagement.  Language cannot adequately encapsulate the raw and bare reality 
of sheer terror, and can only be met with a scream.  Horror, to be truly horrific, 
must exclude thought.38   
 Kordela cites the work of Jacqueline Rose, who argues suicide bombings 
are troubling precisely because they cannot be understood in rational political 
and social terms.  While such tactics kill far fewer people than other forms of 
violence, they do produce remarkable intimacy between the perpetrator and the 
victim, thereby producing more terror.  By dying and suffering alongside the 
victims, and without gaining any political, financial, or social reward, the suicide 
bomber brings into a tight unity the victims to him or herself.  The fearful 
response to such attacks  
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stems partly from the unbearable intimacy shared in their final moments 
by the suicide bomber and her or his victims. Suicide bombing is an act of 
passionate identification – you take the enemy with you in a deadly 
embrace.39   
 
Horror lacks any formal linguistic or discursive arrangement, and therefore 
cannot be adequately expressed in political terminology.  The conditions by 
which someone recognizes something as horrific may have discursive and 
political origins, but the response remains beyond language.   
 Kordela accentuates the inexplicability of horror and the prohibition 
against offering explanations in Rose’s theories on suicide bombings.  Terrorism 
produces something that fundamentally cannot be explained, and the political 
elites in the west, try as they may, cannot theorize away the truth of raw terror 
and horror as a response to the attacks.  Making an act of violence subject to 
explanation, usefulness, instrumentality and thereby justification demarcates a 
line between a life worthy of protection and a life which is unworthy, or in 
Foucault’s biopolitical terminology, a divide of biological racism.  Kordela writes 
of this division:  
The incitement to horror is a discursive mechanism that aims at the 
construction of a racial divide between humans and non- or subhumans 
around the criterion of the presence or absence of, precisely, horror.  And the 
‘monstrous’ designates that which (perhaps an admixture of childhood, 
madness, and sanctity?) must be met with horror.40 
 
 The contours of racism for Foucault ultimately provide the criteria for 
justification of violence.  If the political system which focuses upon the protection 
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and sustaining of life needs violence to sustain that life, then violence may be 
enacted.  The victims of that protective biopolitical violence must be separate 
from that life that violence seeks to protect.41  This form of biological racism 
changes over time, from the Nazi program to the Cold War, but it remains, for 
Foucault, detached from ethnic forms of racism.  It exceeds the petty racial 
divisions between ethnicities, and instead makes a deeper racial divide at the 
center of the species.  The reality of who falls on which side of that divide 
depends on unpredictable historical movements, transitions, and ruptures.     
 Kordela offers a new articulation of this dividing line between the human 
and subhuman, a line not drawn on ideological grounds, but a “division that 
falls between what can be at all discursively apprehended, and what cannot (or 
must not) and is instead supposed to elicit a purely affective reaction: horror.”42 
The monstrous image of the terrorist fulfills a need embedded in the biopolitical 
system.  This system needs horror because it gives meaning to the construction of 
the racial line between the human and subhuman.  Terrorism performs a 
necessary biopolitical function in its providing something beyond language and 
political rationality that supports the very dividing line at the center of worthy 
and unworthy life.   
Turning to psychoanalysis and the concepts of repression and foreclosure, 
Kordela shows why biopolitics cannot discursively apprehend the violence of 
terrorism.  Repression and foreclosure function similarly to signification, as 
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repression occurs because of some signifier and returns as a coded signifier the 
analyst and individual must de-code to understand the source of the repression.  
Foreclosure, on the other hand, does not return as signification but as an act 
against life, acting as a defense mechanism so that the original repressed 
signification cannot be decoded.43  In a similar way, biopolitics does not wish to 
uncover and decode the original signification of foundational violence of the law.  
Terrorism functions in the exact same form: 
I see the key to answering this question in the fact that, once we view 
suicide bombing as part and parcel of biopower, we cannot overlook a 
striking paradox at its core: the fact that it strives for a better life through 
an act that disregards not only the life of the victim but also that of the 
perpetrator – in short, all life.  In suicide bombing the biopolitical goal of 
improving life passes through a moment at which life is treated as 
superfluous.  Suicide bombing is the point at which it is revealed that the 
universal principle of biopolitics (life as object and objective) may also be 
based on its own exception (the superfluity of life).  At first sight, one 
might actually be tempted to ascribe a kind of ‘natural’ affinity between 
suicide bombing and the ‘monstrous’ precisely because, however 
biopolitical its goal may be its means treat life as superfluous.44   
 
Kordela takes her analysis one step further, connecting suicide bombing to 
the larger activities and logic of biopower.  By looking carefully at the internal 
justifications for violence by terrorist groups, she points out that many do not 
commit such atrocities out of strict religious piety.  Religion only factors in as a 
response to more pervasive problems with the conditions of life experienced by 
the terrorist.  Terrorists justify their use of violence by envisioning death as a 
better option than the continuation of life here and now, under these political, 
																																								 																				
43 Ibid., 201.   
 
44 Ibid., 202.   
 
	 125 
social, and economic conditions.  She connects the motivations of suicide 
bombing with biopolitics, writing,  
It follows that, by aiming at better conditions of life, the strategy of suicide 
bombing is itself biopolitical.  The fact that life, and a better life, is the 
primary objective is a biopolitical principle that today transcends not only the 
distinction between Islam and the West but also the distinction between religion 
and secularity, and it is shared globally.  The so-called monstrosity of suicide 
bombing is not an exception to, but part and parcel of biopower.45   
 
This claim may reach a bit too far, as many suicide bombers and terrorists 
likely engage in violence for reasons other than the unbearable qualities of life, 
but her ideas remain instrumental in showing the way terroristic violence serves 
a thoroughly biopolitical end, bringing back into focus the central claim that 
biopolitics cannot solve the problem of terrorism.  However, her argument 
remains convincing and relevant without the claim to a universal pursuit of a 
better life in some metaphysical transcendental world beyond death.  I find that 
the complete lack of any goal, even one beyond this world, provides more horror 
in the act.  By providing some meaning for the motivations of terror, Kordela 
seems to work against her insistence on the non-discursive realities of horror.  
The real problem for horror and terrorism lies in the complete inefficient and 
meaninglessness of it.  The moment meaning enters, even in the form of 
desperation in the face of this life, some element of horror is lost.  Terrorism can 
only be horrific when it profoundly lacks meaning, lacks explanation, and lacks 
articulation.   
Terrorism reveals, in its enactment of meaningless and inefficient violence, 
the paradox at the center of biopolitics.  The racial division creates the political 
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criteria and justification for that which becomes the exception in Agamben’s 
work.  Not as mere idea or philosophical component of politics, but as actual real 
bodies who violence can visit with racial justification.  Racism defines certain 
bodies as exceptional and subject to violence for protective reasons.  Even the 
death of innocent civilians can be justified if the racial component maintains a 
line of distinction to all members of a given population.  This line must continue 
forth, as it does not merely justify violence, but supports the entire biopolitical 
program.  The primary and primordial act of the exception, between the friend 
and the enemy, the foundational violence that establishes the law, and terrorism 
all connect through their mutual pre-discursive, pre-juridical, pre-political 
moment.  The core of biopolitics (all politics) rests on a moment of exception, of a 
division between the natural and the civil, of bare life and political life.  But this 
exception, and the violence of its inception at its inception, remains pre-
discursive.  It can only be given political and discursive meaning after its 
establishment and in retrospect.  In this way, it shares a strong relationship and 
correlation with the natural affective element that Kordela relies upon.  Violence 
under the sovereign, and later the biopolitical racial exception, can always be 
justified but only by ultimate recourse to a pre-discursive and pre-political 
foundational violence.   
Terrorism brings to the surface affective pre-discursive and pre-political 
violence.  It reminds the biopolitical order, with its meticulous safety plans, 
emergency broadcasts, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, etc. that all 
justifications for violence and protection of life remain thoroughly dependent 
upon a pre-political violence that insists on the superfluity of life.   
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Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics in that, like Kordela insists, it is part 
and parcel of biopolitics.  It relates in a fundamental way to biopolitical violence, 
not in its seeking a “better life” even through the eradication of life, but that it 
uses violence without meaning.  Symbolic forms of violence like beheading and 
suicide bombing utilize the most inefficient means of enacting violence from the 
perspective of contemporary military engagement.   If it utilized the modern 
forms of warfare for some presupposed political purpose it would, by its very 
nature, cease to be terrorism.  It would be violence certainly, but a violence 
which could be accounted for.  Instead, terrorism is a violence that can never be 
accounted for and is in a perpetual state of competition with the biopolitical 
state, each falling short of really capturing terrorism.  Terrorism is terrifying, it is 
a certain type of violence, because it is a violence which biopolitics cannot, and 
does not want to, give an account.  It does not want to account for it because at 
the very core of its own exceptional justification it cannot account for its own 
enactment violence in the exact same way.  
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Chapter Four:  Conclusion:  Terrorism as Heresy 
 
Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics and not for biopolitics.  The inability 
by biopolitical regimes to disavow the religious center contributes to the basic 
ineffectualness of the larger biopolitical neoliberal project in dealing with 
terrorism.  I have previously shown the ways that biopolitics uses religious 
features in its own constructions of power, dominance, and political institutions.  
However, in doing so it disavows those religious inclinations in favor of a 
broader secularized focus upon life.  As a result, the power of sovereignty does 
not lie in the ordainment of individual leadership by a divine being. Political 
figures derive their legitimacy from consent, as opposed to divine decree. 
Instead, the focus and object of biopolitics is the secularized condition of life, 
abstracted from religious and metaphysical explanation.  In this abstracted life, 
biopolitics covers over its internal religious mechanisms, hiding them from view.   
 Terrorism brings back into focus otherwise hidden and concealed features 
of biopolitics.  First, it makes obvious the economic progress that happens as a 
response to terrorism.   Neoliberal states wage wars against terror, yet rely on 
terror as a part of the economic progress of globalization.  The massive 
investments into security infrastructure, biometrics, and border protections 
indicate the underlying economic growth made possible by the very thing 
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neoliberal biopolitical states unite resistance against, under the name of a race 
war.  If biopolitics could solve the problem of terrorism in some final way, 
economics would undergo radical shifts in remedying those lost investments into 
processes of securitization.   
 More importantly, biopolitics cannot solve terrorism because terrorism 
betrays the inner metaphysical and religious tendencies endemic to biopolitics.  
First, it makes visible the violence foundations of the state, a state that declares as 
its central motivation, peace.  It reminds the biopolitical regime of its own 
reliance upon violence, and exposes the justifications for violence as grounded in 
efficiency, precision, and instrumentality.  Even more so, terrorism provides a 
robust and amorphous enemy by which the racial war, crucial to the biopolitical 
impetus to protect the species is required.  Without terrorism, the edifice of the 
biopolitical demand to wage species protective war would crumble, leaving 
nothing but the raw exposed center foundational violence, rooted in the logic of 
sacrifice.   
 Defining, investigating, and critically analyzing terrorism within the 
larger context of biopolitics demands attention to the religious elements of the 
ongoing struggle and clash of universalisms.  As I argued in the last chapter, 
religion and violence overlap in their mutual demands of instrumentality, 
something terrorism flagrantly violates.  However, this violation of the 
instrumental demand of biopolitics does not leave terroristic motivations 
completely devoid of religious material.  Internally, terrorist organizations may 
use religious ideas to justify, motivate, or demand violence.  Looking at two 
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movements, the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement demonstrates 
this reality.   
 Graeme Wood, in his lengthy article for The Atlantic, outlines a convincing 
argument that the actions of the Islamic State cannot be understood detached 
from their radical Islamic interpretation.  Many within terrorist studies disregard 
the genuine theological underpinnings of the actions by the Islamic State, often 
accusing them of being an artificial or perverted religious form.  Wood, on the 
other hand, insists on a deep and nuanced theological engagement, even if that 
engagement produces horrific consequences.  The failure to appreciate and 
isolate the theological impetus embedded in the Islamic State comes from two 
tendencies in the West.  First, the West often imagines “Jihad” as a monolithic 
endeavor, applying the same logic that al Qaeda employs to this new group that 
moves beyond those messages and ideas.1  Additionally, the West overlooks the 
striking medieval religious nature of the Islamic State.   
 One of the primary distinguishing characteristics missed by the west’s 
description of the IS is the failure to appreciate the centrality of the Caliphate.  By 
relying on the motivations of al Qaeda in their focus upon the distant enemy, 
Western descriptions of the IS fail to seriously consider their goal of establishing 
an internal, functioning, and robust Islamic kingdom.  This Caliphate has two 
elements.  First, it is undoubtedly a political exercise in its forming laws, 
regulations, prohibitions, and basic organizational institutions.  Second, it is 
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religious in nature in the demands of worship and spiritual accountability of its 
actual and potential citizenry.   
 Wood provides three primary points of religious and spiritual 
accountability rooted in the establishment of the Caliphate.  First, the kingdom 
demands devotion from would-be citizens.  One must be a Muslim as an initial 
requirement to participate in this new kingdom.  As a result, the U.S., along with 
other Western countries, do not present the greatest threat to the purity of the 
kingdom.  Rather, al Baghdadi and other members of the Caliphate consider 
Muslims who fail to fully adhere to the harsh theological requirements of the 
Islamic State the greatest enemy. Leadership engages in the regular 
admonishment of certain Muslims and Islamic sects, declaring those outside the 
boundaries of the IS as heretics.  Codes of purity and orthodox belief within the 
Islamic State demand much from adherents, as Wood describes the heightened 
regulatory practices: 
Denying the holiness of the Koran or the prophecies of Muhammad is 
straightforward apostasy.  But Zarqawi and the state he spawned take the 
position that many other acts can remove a Muslim from Islam.  These 
include, in certain cases, selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes 
or shaving one’s beard, voting in an election – even for a Muslim 
candidate – and being lax about calling other people apostates.  Being a 
Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the 
Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the Koran 
is to deny its initial perfection. (The Islamic State claims that common 
Shiite practices, such as worship at the graves of imams and public self-
flagellation, have no basis in the Koran or in the example oft he Prophet.)  
That means roughly 200 million Shia are marked for death.  So too are the 
heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law 
above Sharia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God.2 
 
																																								 																				
2 Ibid., 9.   
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Second, the rigid theological demands of leadership over the Caliphate appear 
impossibly stringent, yet al Bagdhadi still claims legitimate leadership over this 
kingdom.  His role as leader does not derive from charisma or political power 
alone, but a robust theological claim predicated on precise understanding of 
Sunni law.  These requirements are that the leader must be an adult male seen by 
the community as a moral guide, having integrity, and possessing religious 
authority.  The kingdom must possess some territory to establish its rule, and the 
ruler must be from the genealogical line of the Prophet Muhammad.  Third, the 
Islamic State presents a profoundly complicated and idiosyncratic apocalyptic 
vision, in which they play a primary role.  In Woods words: 
The Islamic State differs from nearly every other current jihadist 
movement in believing that it is written into God’s script as a central 
character.  It is in this casting that the Islamic State is most boldly 
distinctive from its predecessors, and clearest in the religious nature of its 
mission.3   
 
Demands of devotion and adherence by the Islamic State differ from other 
terrorist and Islamist political organizations in their expressed lack of attention to 
bringing about yet another political situation, instead they focus on the bringing 
about of the actual end of the world.  It is this apocalyptic narrative that makes IS 
so different from other jihadist organizations.   
 This apocalyptic and earth shattering goal, while certainly dramatic, 
provides helpful insights into the activities and strategies of the IS.  Discerning 
apocalyptic tendencies in the organization produces tangible strategies for 
Western states in the ongoing struggle against the Islamic State’s hold on the 
region.  Fighting this organization demands a different set of tactics than those 
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previously used with other terrorist groups, even groups that share some 
theological notions.  As Wood explains: 
Al-Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going 
underground.  The Islamic State cannot.  If it loses its grip on its territory 
in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate.  Caliphates cannot exist as 
underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: 
take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are 
no longer binding.  Former pledges could of course continue to attack the 
West and behead their enemies, as freelancers.  But the propaganda value 
of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty 
to jihad.4   
 
 Like the Islamic State, many recognize the Christian Identity movement 
less for the theological nuances and more for their overt acts of violence.  The 
bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal building, the terrifying routine of mail 
bombs by Ted Kaczysnki, the shooting in 1998 at the Nation’s capital, the beating 
of a gay Wyoming college student, and the dragging and subsequent death of a 
black man in Texas provide only a handful of examples of infamous acts of 
violence perpetrated in the name of Christian Identity.  However, while the 
actions have relative notoriety in the larger culture and media, the theological 
and religious claims that make the movement unique are often ignored.  Yet, 
these acts of violence cannot be detached from the deeper theological ideas that 
motivate them.  
 This movement began in the 1940’s with theological ideas that distinguish 
it from other forms of Christianity and Christian extremism.  First, it supports 
and justifies much of its violence through an ongoing race war between white 
males and the rest of humanity.  It establishes this idea of white superiority 
through a peculiar interpretation of Hebrew scriptures, arguing that the lost 
																																								 																				
4 Ibid.  
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tribes of Israel are in fact British, and that white English people are the true heirs 
of God’s kingdom.5  Internal doctrinal statements attest to the importance and 
centrality of their self-perceived racial superiority evidenced through theological 
materials: 
We believe the White, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and kindred people to be 
God’s true, literal Children of Israel. Only this race fulfills every detail of 
Biblical Prophecy and World History concerning Israel and continues in 
these latter days to be heirs and possessors of the Covenants, Prophecies, 
Promises and Blessings of YHVH God made to Israel. This chosen 
seedline making up the “Christian Nations” (Gen. 35:11; Isa. 62:2; Acts 
11:26) of the earth stands far superior to all other peoples in their call as 
God’s servant race (Isa. 41:8, 44:21; Luke 1:54).6  
 
For the Christian Identity movement, multiple creation myths explain this vital 
racial differentiation.  Humanity was not started as a single human, instead they 
utilize different accounts for the diversity of races in the world today.  For 
example, they argue that blacks are not the children of Adam, but were created 
as a lesser race before the creation of Adam, and do not share in the image of 
God.  Additionally, Jews are not part of the lineage of God’s created order but 
the hybrid offspring of Eve and Satan, often depicting Cain as the descendent of 
the devil, and the Jewish people as his lineage.7  Hybridity of races, from their 
perspective, causes contamination, infections, viruses, and health calamities.8 
																																								 																				
5 For a larger explanation of the hermeneutical approach see Danny W Davis, The 
Phinehas Priesthood: Violent Vanguard of the Christian Identity Movement, ABC-
CLIO, 2010.   
 
6 “Kingdom Identity Ministries Doctrinal Statement of Beliefs,” 1999 
 
7  J. R. White “The road to Armageddon: Religion and Domestic Terrorism,” 
Quarterly Journal of Ideology, vol. 13, 1: 11-21. 
 
8 Stephanie Shanks-Meille, and Betty Dobratz “Sick Feminists or Helpless 
Victims: Images of women in Ku Klux Klan and American Nazi party literature,” 
Humanity and Society, vol. 15, 1 (1991): 72-93. 
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 This basic distinguishing factor between races supports the larger 
narrative of an ongoing struggle between the forces of true white patriots and a 
federal government corrupted by Jewish influences and conspiratorial power.  
The Turner Diaries, a fictional account written in 1978 by Andrew MacDonald (a 
pseudonym of William Pierce) details the struggles between a small band of 
vigilante Christian warriors against the Goliath of the American Federal 
government.  After the passing of the Cohen Act, which outlawed the ownership 
of guns and other weapons, this small group revolted against the government, 
often resorting to the use of homemade bombs at the sites of Federal government 
buildings.  While a fictional story, the book serves as a kind of manifesto for 
many within the movement who perpetrate violence, often eerily like acts 
depicted in the novel.   
 In general, the Christian Identity movement harbors severe suspicions of 
the government and retaliates against perceived conspiratorial plots that 
undermine white power.  In their own words:  
With the growth of mass democracy (the abolition of poll taxes and other 
qualifications for voters, the enfranchisement of women and of non-
whites), the rise in the influence of the mass media on public opinion, and 
the insinuation of the Jews into a position of control over the media, the 
U.S. Government was gradually transformed into the malignant monster 
it is today: the single most dangerous and destructive enemy our race has 
ever known.9 
 
Ongoing struggles against a corrupt and conspiratorial government justify the 
use of violence, particularly against federal buildings and abortion clinics.  These 
violent activities are part of a larger narrative that envisions a coming 
																																								 																				
 
9 “National Alliance Goal Statement,” 1996.   
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apocalyptic battle between the forces of white males and the lesser races, that 
will culminate in the overthrow of all secular governments and the establishment 
of a global Aryan Christian theocracy.10 
 Both the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement share in a few 
key features.  First, they share in the apocalyptic insistence of bringing the 
regular and mundane world to a cataclysmic end. Second, they both distrust the 
powers at work in the world today.  Third, they justify violence through the 
corrupted political power in the world today.  They share a general distrust of 
globalization and the economic elites who benefit from rapid economic 
expansion.  Finally, and most notably, they share in a unique combination of 
theology and politics.  Both movements insist religious law inherently contains 
more authority than secular laws.  Each movement demands an apocalyptic 
overthrow of the secular state and the establishment of a theocracy, and attaining 
such goals stresses the use of violence.   
 Rendering the struggle between a religiously apocalyptic mythology and 
a rational secular legal order relies on an internal idea of the secular state as 
devoid of such spiritual, metaphysical, and theological tendencies.  However, I 
have previously shown that biopolitics relies on theological and religious ideas at 
its very foundation (sovereignty and the Shepherd model of power), and as such 
this struggle between the two cannot be imagined as a struggle between 
theological fervency and apocalyptic visions against a cold, life-centered, 
detached rationality.   Both are theologically invested in some universalized 
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vision of the world, though terrorism’s vision imagines a lack of production and 
progress, and a fiery end to the normal functional processes of the law.    
The biopolitical order does possess a series of theological claims, as 
paradoxical as that may appear.  Simon Critchley aptly describes contemporary 
political ideas of biopolitical theological sovereignty,  
here we approach the paradox of sovereignty: it is only through the 
strangeness of the foreigner that the laws are seen to have authority and to 
be binding on an autochthonous people.  On the one hand, the law is and 
has to be the free expression of the general will, the perfect interiority of a 
people to itself, but on the other hand, there has to be a lawgiver, someone 
who stands outside society by virtue of which the law has authority 
beyond the self-authorizing acts of the general will.  The only legitimate 
law is one that we give ourselves, yet the law has to be given to us.11   
 
Neoliberal biopolitics demands an imminent law, established without reference 
to a divine authority, completely imminent.  At the same time, it requires 
something that transcends the legal order, ensuring the law remains intact and 
enforceable.  Legal prescriptions only have authority in so far as one can witness 
its enforceability.  As pointed out earlier in the reading of Agamben, the 
sovereign figure that ensures the enforceability of the law stands both inside and 
outside.  Sovereignty simultaneously enforces the law and yet stands outside of 
it through the availability to suspending the law.  It has in it a theological 
conception, a divine sovereign figure that stands above and transcends the 
imminent law while maintaining the claim that the law only comes about from 
the collective agreement and manifestation of a symbolic contract between 
rational individuals.   
																																								 																				
11 Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology, (New 
York: Verso, 2012), 62.   
 138 
 The paradox that Critchley observes is analogous to Walter Benjamin’s 
“Mythic Violence.”  For Benjamin there are two distinct modes of violence within 
this title of mythic violence.  First, it announces the arrival and foundation of the 
legal order itself, or the state.  An example of this arrival of a new order might be 
the French Revolution, a violent affair certainly, but one with the expressed idea 
of establishing some new politically normative condition.  Additionally, mythic 
violence preserves the legal order.  Modern politics for Benjamin, is a  
dialectical rising and falling in the lawmaking and law-preserving 
formation of violence.  The law governing their oscillation rests on the 
circumstances that all law-preserving violence, in its duration, indirectly 
weakens the lawmaking violence it represents, by suppressing hostile 
counterviolence.12   
 
However, divine violence disrupts and opposes this mythic violence from an 
exterior position.  It competes with and undermines the regulatory power of 
mythic violence, in a way not unlike terrorism.   
 I brought up similar ideas in a previous chapter, but here I want to 
combine these ideas with the concept of heresy as a means of explaining and 
analyzing terrorism.  A clash of competing orthodoxies exists between the 
biopolitical state, and the Islamic State or Christian Identity.  By explaining the 
theological foundations of both examples of terroristic violence one can uncover 
the orthodoxy that founds both groups.  There is a kind of mythic violence 
employed by terrorist organizations that founds their movements and regulates 
their activities, ideas, and theological concepts.  Both the Islamic State and the 
Christian Identity movement have a regulatory concept of orthodoxy at work in 
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their activities, institutions, and messages.  Orthodoxy unifies disparate 
members.  David Christie-Murray’s work on Christian heresy opens with this 
point of unity, as he argues the Roman empire adopted the Christian faith out of 
a political desire for unity.13  Heresy, etymologically related to the Greek word for 
choice, indicates an intentional movement away from this unity, and a challenge 
to the regulatory power of orthodoxy.  Similarly, the sovereign regulates and 
maintains a legal order which can be upended by the presence of terror, so the 
unity or orthodoxy finds itself questioned by heretical choices of intentional 
resistance.   
 In the groundbreaking word Border Lines, Daniel Boyarin proactively 
describes the rise of heresiology as the impetus and machine by which 
Christianity and Judaism came to define themselves as overtly distinct and 
different religious systems during the second century.  In this mutual declaration 
of heretical ideas of the other, they end up co-constituting each other through 
self-reflexive antagonistic definitions.  Through heresiology or “the science of 
heresies,”14 Christianity and Judaism establish and maintain an internally 
coherent identity predicated on definitions substantiated over and against the 
perceived internal theological failures of the other.  As a result, the very notion of 
heresy constitutes the church, “Christianity, it would seem, or rather, the Church, 
needed ‘Judaism’ to be a religious other, and some maintained and reified this 
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term as the name of a religion.”15  Declaring the other as heretical serves the 
power of differentiation to be productive rather than merely repressive.  In a 
similar form, biopolitics needs the religious other of terrorist organizations to 
substantiate and define itself.   
 Continual problematic assertions of political and religious ideas by certain 
groups are not met with repression; those groups provide an internal stabilized 
identity for biopolitical neoliberal regimes to define themselves against, as 
intrinsically different from. In the declaration of something terroristic, a 
constructive self-identity, unbound to the claims of apocalyptic terrorism, arises.  
The naming of something as terrorism consequently declares an internal theo-
political orthodoxy.   
 
Biopolitical Orthodoxy: 
 
Schmitt famously states that all secular concepts in politics are based on 
theological concepts, and in this claim the workings of internal orthodoxy 
already appear.  While the contemporary world of biopolitics imagines itself 
detached from universal and transcendental concepts so common in theological 
claims, neoliberal forms of governance unwittingly rely on those very theological 
ideas, namely the transcendental idea of the sovereign and the shepherding 
model of leadership.  The question then is how this process happens whereby 
theological concepts are expressed in secular political discourse.   
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 One version of this hidden theological material emphasizes the 
secularization process where language describes and articulates politics through 
secular categories, while the ideas themselves have religious content.  In 
conjunction with this, Schmitt argues that liberalism, at its core, negates, rather 
than produces, politics.  The primary political idea for Schmitt is the friend and 
enemy divide, yet liberalism negates this distinction in a few ways.  Most 
noticeably, it imagines a universal humanity extracted from political divisions 
and subdivisions.  Universal humanity undermines the possibility of an enemy 
by which political formations become available.  However, liberalism ultimately 
fails at this ideological goal.  Expanding the friend, and diminishing the enemy, 
through the universalization of humanity may, on the surface, appear to support 
peace, but the peace sought by this liberal agenda ends up producing more 
violence, suffering, and warfare.  Rather than a distinct, direct, and objective 
enemy that the political establishes itself over against, everyone becomes a 
potential enemy.  When these potential enemies do actualize, the liberal state 
attempts peaceful engagement in hopes of managing and solving the conflict.  
For example, economic sanctions are a central tool in the arsenal of modern 
neoliberal conflict.  While having the appearance of a peaceful deterrent, they are 
in fact designed to have direct material consequences on the livelihoods of 
citizens.  The threat of actual starvation and death are not logically detached 
from the power and force of economic sanctions.  Schmitt concludes his book The 
Concept of the Political with a prophetic warning:   
For the application of such means, a new and essentially pacifist 
vocabulary has been created.  War is condemned but executions, 
sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, 
international police, and measure to assure peace remain.  The adversary 
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is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby 
designated to be an outlaw of humanity.  A war waged to protect or 
expand economic power must, with the aid of propaganda, turn into a 
crusade and into the law war of humanity.  This is implicit in the polarity 
of ethics and economics, a polarity astonishingly systematic and 
consistent.  But this allegedly nonpolitical and apparently even 
antipolitical system serves existing or newly emerging friend-and-enemy 
groupings and cannot escape the logic of the political. 16 
 
The first co-constitutive orthodoxic claim by the biopolitical state 
envisions a universal human species, allowing for the racial war developed in a 
previous chapter, but it can also only be claimed over and against a system that 
names and identifies objective enemies.  The orthodox claim of biopolitics denies 
all presence of an objective enemy, instead only declaring war against abstract 
ideas such as the war on drugs, the war on communism, and finally in its most 
recent iteration, the war on terror.  Neoliberal biopolitical states do not fight wars 
against other objective states and peoples, but instead against ephemeral ideas 
detached from populations.   
Heresy, then, appears in the formation and naming of an objective enemy.  
For both the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement a real, tangible, 
objective enemy exists: Muslims who do not follow al Badghdadi’s narrow 
prescriptive interpretations of the law, and anyone not white, respectively.  The 
identity of the enemy matters little for the orthodox position of the biopolitical 
state, it could be any group; instead, the naming of a particular, objective enemy 
makes the essential heretical claim.   
Previously I have argued that whether from the perspective of the 
economic factor, the excessive violence, or the religious fervency, terrorism fails 
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to meet the biopolitical demand of instrumentalization.  It resists, and 
simultaneously exposes by its very absence of meaning, the failure of its 
instrumentality.  Upending the orthodoxy of usefulness demanded by the 
biopolitical state, terrorism presses a heretical position.  Emphatically 
condemning terrorism as an economic negative betrays an internal messianic 
orthodoxy of biopolitics.  As one author describes,  
This contemporary clash of titans is the most recent remake of a very old, 
fundamentally religious scheme.  Judaism and Christianity have, from their 
very inception, entertained the hope that this world could be uprooted 
and regenerated through and through by God’s Messiah, by a message of 
liberation; and after Hegel’s strained efforts to transform Christianity into 
a secular philosophy of the World Spirit, Marxism offered the secularized 
version of messianism and claimed that single-minded social struggle, 
propelled at all times by a ‘chosen class,’ would eventually make manifest 
the ‘other world’ in the form of classless, scarcity-less society.17 
 
The economic markets of global trade, whether from a neo-Marxist perspective 
or a classical economic perspective share in the inherent messianic potentials of 
secularized political ideas.  By engaging in acts completely devoid of messianic 
hopefulness and optimism, and instead apocalyptic ends, terrorism commits the 
heresy of uselessness.  Demands for instrumental value only respond to acts with 
no instrumental value.  In a larger discussion of Islamic heresy, the author John 
Henderson observes that many Muslim scholars are only polemical in their 
writings when some heresy comes about that demands response.18 Orthodox 
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ideas of Allah or the nature of the Prophet only enter into the discussion as a 
response to some heretical counterpoint.  Similarly, the naturalness of the 
messianic and optimistic instrumental insistence by biopolitical states does not 
require description and elucidation until something contrary and devoid of such 
usefulness arises.   
 New political formations can arise, even movements that respond to or are 
critical of biopolitical formations.  Religiously speaking, we may refer to these 
new communities as schisms, rather than heresy.  Within the larger field of 
heresiology the distinction between schism and heresy appears, as authors like 
Tertullian and Cyprian employ both, though the distinctions may be difficult to 
parse.19  However, while new radical political and religious groups can form 
under the political dominance of biopolitics, they must share the internal 
orthodoxic idea of instrumental value.  Without some optimistic and rational 
goal of making the world better, rather than hurling the world into apocalyptic 
chaos, they will be dealt with by the state differently from terrorist organizations.  
Even in utilizing violence, the discourse and descriptions of those violent acts 
will lack the important political descriptor of terrorism.   
 Finally, heresy produces disharmony, and disharmony threatens the basic 
and fundamental demand of an easily managed population.  Describing the 
conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Paris during the 16th century, Dalia 
Leonardo, describes disunity in strikingly biopolitical language.  She states: 
The League’s concern for the health of the religious and social body, and 
its adherence to an organic notion of society remained a mainstay of 
Catholic rhetoric through the Wars of Religion.  Since Catholics’ view of 
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community revolved around the metaphor of the body and the interaction 
of its various members, the advantages of participating in the Catholic 
liturgy provided numerous individual and communal benefits.  However, 
by denouncing and mocking the fundamentals of Catholic orthodoxy, 
especially Christ’s real presence and the sacrifice of the Mass, Calvinists 
had severed all ties to the Catholic community and were no longer 
members of the body of Christ.  It was only natural that conviction in a 
corporeal metaphor would lead Catholics to view Huguenots as a disease 
corrupting religious and social bonds.  To borrow a concept from an 
anthropologist, Mary Douglas, League rhetoric depicted the differences 
between Catholics and Huguenots as a contrast between ‘holiness and 
abomination,’ order and chaos, good and evil.20 
 
On the one hand, heresy frightens the orthodox with its apparent and overt 
disunity.  Through distancing by explicit choice from the larger orthodox body, 
the heretic risks polluting and contaminating that body and throwing all into a 
perilous situation.  Terrorist groups in their heterodoxic naming of specific and 
objective enemies, and the uselessness of their violence, risk contaminating the 
biopolitical project in substantial and frightening ways.  The war on behalf of the 
species always takes the protection of the species from some contaminant as its 
motivation and justification for violence.  The heretical element of terrorism 
contrasts with the pure, internal, easily managed orthodox population.  On the 
other hand, internal orthodoxic opinion fears for the heretic’s life, and potentially 
afterlife.21  Dismissing the orthodoxic opinion threatens the community certainly, 
but it equally exposes the heretic to divine judgement.  Liberal care for the 
terrorist, and their economic conditions often revolve around this idea of 
heretical redemption.  Solving for terrorism through increased economic viability 
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and even more globalization often use the logic of decreasing terrorism, while 
not taking seriously the internal religious and theological claims of terrorist 
organizations completely separate from an economic context.   
 Finally, the most obvious form of heresy in terrorism is the use of death.  
Biopolitics at its core, maintains a central orthodox concern over life, and its 
flourishing.  Terrorism centers on the concept of death.  It is not uncommon to 
hear the refrain attributed to Osama bin Laden and other terrorists, “We love 
death as you love life.”  Olivier Roy adds,  
Now, the terrorist’s death is no longer just a possibility or an unfortunate 
consequence of his actions; it is a central part of his plan. The same 
fascination with death is found among the jihadis who join Islamic State. 
Suicide attacks are perceived as the ultimate goal of their engagement.22   
 
At the center of terrorist violence resides the specter of death, the most anathema 
of concepts for the orthodoxy of biopolitics.  Neoliberal biopolitical states go to 
great lengths to protect life, and demand the sacredness of life, while terrorist 
organizations flaunt and center death as a direct oppositional theo-political 
claim.  Without death, terroristic violence would not level such a heretical claim 
over and against the biopolitical unity of an orthodoxy that insists on protecting 
life at all costs.   
Showing the ways in which the biopolitical state constructs an orthodoxy 
in response to, and alongside, the heretical ideas of terrorism might provide an 
interesting intellectual exercise, but it does not yet provide distinct advantages 
over and against other ways of articulating terror.  Arguing that terrorism might 
be better understood through the lens of heresy requires some description of the 
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distinct advantages offered by this approach.  This lens appreciates the ways in 
which the contemporary divide in the ongoing race war espoused by Foucault 
rely on deeply embedded heretical logic.   
First, articulating terrorism as a type of heresy uncovers the ways in 
which terroristic groups respond to globalization.  More specifically, many 
terrorist organizations attempt to return to a pristine and imagined past prior to 
the ills and consequence of globalization.  Taking as an example the heresy of 
Pelagius, one encounters an argument for the sake of the pristine human.  He 
adheres to an absence in the inherent sin nature, instead conceiving of sin 
through habitual action, and from this habitual activity one comes under the 
judgement of their sins.  While condemned at the Council of Carthage in 318, 
other forms of this heresy continued after his death.  At its core, Pelagius 
envisions an ideal human apart and detached from sin. He tries to remedy the 
more pessimistic view held by Augustine, whereby the human regardless of 
action is always tainted by the reality of sin.  Making this analogy certainly does 
not advocate that terrorist organizations are good and without incredibly moral 
flaws, but it does make the point that many terrorist organizations imagine a 
world prior to the pollution and disenfranchisement of globalization.  Like 
Pelagius, they imagine a condition prior to the entrance of some faulty idea, in 
this case globalization and economic disenfranchisement.   
Heresy rarely springs up on its own accord, but often responds to some 
fault established by the predominant dogma at the time.  Pelagius responds to 
the pessimistic insistence on the corruption of humanity, challenging the 
commonly held idea of an ontologically sinful human.  He hopes for a return to a 
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situation of truth, covered over by a mistake in the orthodoxy of the moment.  In 
a similar way, terrorism often foments at the opportunity of returning the world 
to some idealistic pre-globalization. Of course, the imagined world prior to 
globalization might not look the way the terrorist imagines, but that response to 
the faults of globalization should remain an important part of any investigation 
into terrorism.  Likewise, a hope of an imagined pre-global age does not insist on 
some romanticized and heroic excuse of the violence they employ.  On the 
contrary, condemning the violence can only really happen when actual 
descriptions of motivations for that violence are provided.  Further, it shows the 
ultimate failure of the terrorist organizations, as I have shown the ways terrorist 
groups rely on globalization and hypocritically chastise the very things that 
make them successful (social media, technology, global trade, etc.).   
Second, terrorism as a heresy does not stray far from Carl Schmitt’s 
original political project, and it is surprising that this concept has not already 
been developed further by Schmitt himself or contemporary political theological 
interpreters of Schmitt.  If all secular political concepts are rooted in theological 
concepts, as Schmitt insists, then it appears odd that Schmitt never substantiates 
his fundamental claim of the friend-enemy divide upon some theological claim. 
Heresy exists in the most primordial theological moment, providing an 
intelligible divide between metaphysical goodness and evil, prior to political 
divisions.  Heresy provides the option of rendering someone outside the grace of 
the divine figure, with full support of that divine figure.   
The social and political divides utilized for the sake of a race war rely on 
the very early manifestations of a divide between correct and incorrect 
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metaphysical articulations.  Heresy may even exist at the inception of language, 
as the moment one can name a thing in representational form, the ability for 
error and misnaming occurs.  Making an incorrect cognitive choice about the 
nature of reality, in its most fundamental form, provides for deep material by 
which humans can make distinctions between various groups.  The failure by a 
group or individual to articulate appropriate truth about the nature of reality 
provides justification for a variety of social divisions.  The friend/enemy divide, 
at the heart of politics, relies on a heretical distinction.  Terrorism, as the newest 
manifestation of this divide, necessarily reestablishes the primal heretical 
distinction at the root of human epistemological work.   
Finally, framing terror as heresy focuses on the ways in which groups like 
the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement view the world in some 
way that has been lost to the globalized biopolitical order.  Terrorists, while their 
actions and violence betray a substantial lack of meaning, do have some vision of 
the world the biopolitical neoliberal order has lost.  Again, this does not 
romantically excuse the violence such groups employ, but even the most 
repugnant actors in the world can still provide some insight into how people 
view reality.  
In the case of contemporary terror, a truth emerges over the precarity and 
vulnerability of life, and the ultimate failure of a system that purports to protect 
that life in some definitive sense.  Biopolitical states eradicate life in a myriad of 
ways, regularly resorting to violence, and often ignoring the suffering of its own 
citizens, in systemic ways.  The pollution of the earth, the pillaging of the 
environment, the proliferation of weapons capable of destroying the world, the 
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bio-piracy of crops, the commodification of bodies for sexual ends, and the 
unhealthy fascination with guns are all endemic of a culture that hates life.  Yet, 
the entire political matrix sets as its goal the maintenance and protection of life.  
Something appears afoul with these expressions of political goals and the 
actualized social and cultural undertakings.  The fundamental disharmony of the 
neoliberal order, the simultaneous celebration and disavowal of violence, all 
come into focus when one takes the ongoing heretical actions of terrorists 
seriously.   
Viewing terrorism through the lens of heresy says much about the actions, 
motivations, and factors involved in terrorist endeavors.  But it equally says 
something about those citizens and participants in the neoliberal order.  It 
exposes those things hidden by the insistence upon life, and the ruptures of the 
social and cultural dynamics that work against this agenda.  Terrorism brings 
back into focus the very fragility of life, and the impossibility of its protection.  
Foucault speaks of the ways in which death vanishes from the vision of 
the citizens of a biopolitical order.  Hiding death in private ceremonies, or 
transforming it into something artificial in video games and entertainment, 
renders death invisible in the social order.  Mortuaries provide a cover for dead 
bodies, pushed out and expunged from regular social spaces.  Ceremonies that 
pay respect to the dead exist only the privacy of the internal family structure, 
and even those memorials are undergoing changes, shifting from the exposure of 
death to celebrations of life.   
Yet, death remains part of the human experience.  The attempts to render 
it invisible fail, because we share this ultimate and final fate with the animals.  
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We are going to die.  Terrorism, at its most heretical, reminds of us of this reality, 
even as biopolitical projects aim to hide and obscure it.   
Terrorism cannot be solved by biopolitics, as it cannot even be adequately 
explained.  It remains fundamentally detached from a system that takes life as its 
ultimate object, and the instrumentality as its primary function.  Terrorism is the 
pre-political meaninglessness made manifest in the center of politics.  Like the 
inexplicability and meaninglessness of death, a problem that cannot be solved by 
politics of any sort, terrorism is the heretical reminder of this decisive and 
ultimate reality of the human.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Terrorism defines current politics.  Many political institutions, 
mechanisms, definitions, and policies potentially relate back to the problems of 
terrorism. It could even be said that terrorism serves a necessary functional role 
in the construction of modern neoliberal political activities.   
 To fully understand and appreciate this necessary functional role 
terrorism must be understood in accordance with the goals and prohibitions 
embedded in contemporary political motivations.  Like any formation of politics, 
the biopolitical state arises with goals and ideas that energize its activities and 
institutions.  Namely, life has taken up a residence at the center of this political 
moment.  On the one hand, from Foucault’s perspective, this focus upon life 
justifies violence for the sake of a body population, which it organizes and seeks 
to assist in flourishing.  For Agamben, life highlights the primordial distinctions 
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and thresholds contemporary politics brings back to the surface in new and 
unforeseen ways.  For both theorists, and many others who follow their lines of 
thought, life has been made political.   
 This making life political does not occur spontaneously but relies on a 
long and varied historical development, that easily could have been otherwise.  
For both, religion acts as a force within this historical development.23  Foucault 
uses at length the Shepherd model to characterize and describe the ongoing 
developments and shifts in power, while Agamben relies on Schmitt’s ideas of 
sovereignty rooted in the exceptionality of the miracle.   
 By highlighting this shared religious and theological material, I have 
attempted to remedy something that appears in the ongoing literature devoted to 
these two thinkers.  Emphasizing this shared theoretical material does not equate 
the theories of the two and make them synonymous.  It does, however, work 
against the tendencies in scholarship that overly focus upon their differences.  
Their differences are important, and they are many; but the overlap between the 
two should not be forgotten or minimalized.  This predominantly appears in the 
																																								 																				
23 I use religion and theology interchangeably as both Foucault and Agamben 
signal a reliance upon western Christianized concepts to define what they mean 
by religion.  Further, thinkers within political theology, as a specialized field of 
political philosophy and theology, often use these terms without a fleshed-out 
distinction.  Obviously, theology takes on forms dependent upon the religious 
histories and dogmas it speaks to.  There are general ideas of divinity, separate 
from particular religious histories or mythologies, that political theology often 
utilizes.  For example, the role of the miracle in Schmitt’s political theology could 
certainly find historical realization in Christianity, but likewise it would be 
similar in Judaism and Islam.  To use them interchangeably here does not ignore 
the particulars established by certain faith traditions, and the nuances that would 
result in theology; however, in this case the nuances are less important than the 
generalized concepts that come to articulate the specific theoretical ideas of 
political theology.    
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literature specific to Foucault and the diminishing of the religious ideas so 
important and central to his work.   
 Further, I wanted to highlight the religious dimensions of each to show 
the ways in which the institutionalization of biopolitics in neoliberalism 
disavows the very religious ideas upon which it was constructed.  Modern 
biopolitics insists on an irreligious and secularized form of politics, while 
simultaneously relying on religious ideas to support that political structure.  It 
disavows its own genesis, and this general disavowal of the religious nature 
plays an important role in the importance and centralization of terrorism.  For 
example, the ways terrorism comes to be understood as a problem relies on the 
religious fervency anathema to contemporary politics.  Since terrorism often 
relies on religious mythologies, ideas, and symbols it presents something 
uniquely unlike biopolitics, at least from the perspective of biopolitical states.  
This distance and difference biopolitics continually insists upon between its use 
of violence and the terrorist’s, relies on this distance between the secularized 
state and the overtly apocalyptically religious ideas of terrorists.  Terrorism looks 
and feels unique because biopolitically infused forms of neoliberalism disavow 
their own religious mythologies, ideas, and symbols.   
 The ways neoliberalism centralizes terrorism reaffirms the disavowal 
process.  The emphasis on terrorism as an economic negativity disavows the 
ways the economy, and the variety of securitization projects, rely on the presence 
of terrorism.  If terrorism were to vanish today, the economic consequences 
would be enormous.  Yet this ongoing war on terror provides a narrative that 
insists on terrorism as a destabilizing factor for the global economy.   
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 The biopolitical insistence and focus upon the flourishing of life disavows 
violence as a tool of an archaic past.  Its use of violence takes on ethical and 
political justification through the protection of that life it defines as worthy.   
Make no mistake, violence has not been wholly disavowed, but instead requires 
certain definitional elements rooted in the primordial distinctions of the state.  
Violence emanates through the biopolitical state, but it must serve some 
instrumental purpose of protecting that secularized and abstracted form of life.  
Defining terrorism as excessively violent requires some foundational idea of 
violence to define itself over and against other forms of violence.  In this case, 
terrorism appears to the biopolitical state as excessively violent precisely because 
the violence it employs lacks efficiency and instrumental effectiveness.   
 The religious fervency of terrorists roots the process of disavowal that 
shows up in the other ways biopolitics centralizes terrorism.  To be clear, this is 
not a defense of terrorism in any way, likewise it is not a defense of the 
biopolitical state.  I aim to only point out the ways that biopolitics has come to 
define terrorism as something fundamentally in opposition to the forms and 
modes of biopolitical neoliberalism.  Imagining terrorism within the larger 
framework of heresy remedies this series of disavowals in four ways.   
 First, it brings to the fore the forgotten religious shadings of biopolitics 
and contemporary politics.  Political theology in general has gone about this task, 
and I merely offer up another way of envisioning the theological elements of 
secularized politics.  Heresy serves a non-exhaustive definitional role that 
highlights the ongoing religious elements of the ongoing war on terror from both 
the side of neoliberalism and the side of the terrorist.  If one were to 
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comparatively analyze the discourse that western nations produce they would 
witness this reality.24  By framing the entire struggle in the language of heresy the 
religious dimensions are not forgotten and covered over by the appearance of 
naturalized secularization.   
 Second, heresy demonstrates the ways in which each side of the war on 
terror end up co-constituting and forming the other.  Like struggles over 
orthodoxy and heresy in the past, this struggle recurrently defines each side 
unlike the other.  For this co-constitutive element to work each side requires the 
other side.  Terrorism requires a neoliberal and globalized system to attack while 
that neoliberal and globalized system require some enemy to define itself 
against.  This need of defining oneself against a perceived enemy might not be 
exclusive to heresy alone, but heresy highlights the ways in which orthodoxy for 
each relies on the perceived shortcomings of the other.  Each does not merely 
have an enemy that they disagree with over a territory or some limited resource, 
but the differentiation takes on a more pervasive ideological element.  By 
examining terrorism through this lens of heresy, the struggle and war transform 
from one of imminent resource struggles, to a transcendent ideal form of the 
world.   
 Third, it highlights an internally established orthodoxy of biopolitics.  
Predictably, this orthodoxy centers on life and instrumentalization.  Of course, 
those orthodoxic elements show up in the ways it defines terrorism: as a threat to 
life, as a threat to the economic utility of the current system.  Heresy allows focus 
																																								 																				
24 See Bruce Lincoln, “The Rhetoric of Bush and Bin Laden,” in Holy Terrors: 
Thinking About Religion after 9/11, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2002.   
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upon the ways in which biopolitics generates and manifests its own sincerely 
established correct ideas about politics and society, and the resulting coercive 
encouragement of the population to uniformity around this orthodoxy.    
 Fourth, heresy allows for novelty.  This might appear as an abstract and 
undetermined benefit of the proposal, but novelty on its own can be generative.  
The entire structure of studying terrorism has come to a standstill, even while 
terrorism expands beyond the established academic and political categories.  The 
transition to eco-terrorism, bioterrorism, cyberterrorism, and narcoterrorism all 
produce new and unforeseen consequences for which traditional terrorism 
studies cannot adequately account.  Novelty in the study of terrorism can 
produce new theoretical tools for understanding these different and divergent 
activities that lack some of the hallmark elements of more traditional state 
sponsored, religious, and political terrorism.   
 Likewise, heresy, while novel, can only do so much.  It retains only a 
limited scope within the larger field of terrorism studies.  Future work needs to 
be done, namely in the ways in which terrorism will augment and shift in the 
future.  New apocalyptic images, detached from religious mythologies are on the 
rise, and attending terroristic endeavors, uses of violence, and destabilizations 
will occur.  Heresy, as a concept may be advantageous in this changing political, 
religious, and social landscape.    
 More importantly, terrorism and neoliberalism are not the only forces 
involved in these ongoing changes.  Just as Christianity and Judaism were not 
the only religions in the world during the 2nd century, a time where they were 
both hurling claims of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, terrorism and neoliberalism 
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are not the only options available for contemporary political movements.  New 
forms of rebellion and political change are certainly possible.  However, if 
neoliberal states produce the working definitions of the global political order and 
these definitions disavow their center, working to hide the very impetus of their 
actions, then genuine new articulations of political possibilities will always be 
caught in resisting something not sufficiently understood.  The point of this 
dissertation was not to understand terrorism more effectively, and thereby 
combat it with more precision.  The real goal is to understand biopolitics and 
neoliberalism more fully to produce new forms of political possibilities.   
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